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The evaluation of creative ideas is a special case of judgment and decision making. It is difficult 
to objectively evaluate creative products because most people possess an internalised model of 
creativity which is usually neither verbalised nor explicitly defined. Also, one of the main 
assessment dimensions of creativity, originality varies as a function of the evaluator’s previous 
experience. For these reasons, previous research has provided practical rather than theoretical 
grounds for studying the evaluation process. The present thesis examines the conceptual basis 
on which people evaluate creative ideas. The aim is to identify factors and conditions which 
enhance the detection of creative ideas.  
A novel paradigm was created to test how creativity-related features influence the assessment 
of creativity. In six experiments, experts’ and non-experts’ judgment was examined regarding 
urban design. Two experiments established the expert ratings of the stimuli. Further two 
experiments explored the extent to which non-experts relied on four features (originality, utility, 
scalability, and riskiness) for judging the creativity of novel project ideas while the level of 
motivation was controlled. Overall, the findings show that non-experts’ creativity judgment 
relied on all four characteristic features. Their ratings of the features predicted a substantial part 
of the variance in the creativity ratings. In another experiment, the effect of providing explicit 
task-related information was tested. Such information did not make a solid difference in the 
creativity ratings. A final experiment assessed the differences between making relative and 
absolute judgments about creativity. There was a large overlap between the selection of best 
and worst ideas regardless of which way the judgment was made. 
In conclusion, non-experts were found to possess a robust internal model of creativity and not 
to make random choices. Experts and non-experts were found to judge creativity vastly 
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A REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES REGARDING THE EVALUATION 
OF CREATIVE IDEAS 
 
1.1 Preface 
One of the leading creativity scholars, Mihály Csíkszentmihályi notes with a bit of 
frustration that "psychologists tend to see creativity exclusively as a mental process" (1999, p. 
313). He does not think that this approach would do justice if one set out to solve the big 
questions (such as what is creativity and where does it come from?). To justify his statement, 
he explains one of the biggest Aha! moments of his decade-long career. It was a pivotal point 
for him, when, after years of ineffectual attempts of understanding creativity as process situated 
within the mind, he finally realised that researchers need to look beyond the level of the 
individual to understand how creativity happens and zoom out to see the bigger picture. That is 
how he was inspired to come up with a systems approach for the study of creativity 
(Csíkszentmihályi, 1988, 2014), which highlights the need to analyse the interaction between 
the creator and the audience of the creative work and also takes the many social factors which 
determine how creative endeavours turn out in real life into account.  
While the dynamic, intersubjective nature of creativity should not be neglected, the 
position this project takes is that both high- and low-level approaches should be used to answer 
the big questions stated at the start. Keeping the discourse on a high, systematic level provides 
us only with an approximate understanding about the exact processes, therefore, in the present 
project, intrapersonal aspects of the creative process are investigated to gain a more fine-grained 
picture about how evaluations are made. The present thesis is focused on exploring factors 
which influence how judges of creativity react, and the experiments were aimed to find 
manipulations which could help to make more rigorous and consistent judgments of creativity. 
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As it turns out from this short prologue already, conceptualising creativity is key to 
understanding its underlying components. This chapter gives an overview of the theoretical 
approaches to the study of creativity, whereas the second chapter reviews the wide range of 
assessment methods regarding the evaluation of creative products. Below, the major research 
trends in creativity research are summarised, then the essential definitions from judgment 
research are clarified. The chapter also outlines how these two fields can be combined and what 
kind of framework is necessary to build their union. 
In the next section, I am introducing the field by presenting the most relevant theories 
associated with the thesis research. An account of the creativity research trends is provided by 
summarising the cognitive, economic, and problem solving & expertise-based types of theories 
about creativity. 
1.2 An Account of Creativity Research Trends 
There are many theories available on creativity, however, the ones which provide 
overarching explanations about what creativity is are difficult to test empirically (e.g., personal 
and societal level of creativity, Csíkszentmihályi, 1998; Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009; Simonton, 
2013; or domain-specificity, Baer, 2015; Plucker & Beghetto, 2004) and those which are 
suitable for experimental investigations are addressing the sub-questions, not the big questions 
of creativity. A few examples of the big questions are the following (based on Mayer, 1999): 
what is creativity (how should we define it)? Is creativity a personal or a social phenomenon? 
Is creativity common or rare? Is creativity domain-general or domain-specific? Is creativity 
quantitative or qualitative? These questions are all addressed by the research community but 
due to a lack of integration of theories, there is very little consensus regarding the answers. The 
“let a hundred flowers bloom” approach provides scholars with a wide array of theoretical 
models and pragmatic techniques for investigations, however, due to the mixed methods, the 
comparability of the empirical studies remains low and even if great meta-analyses are 
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produced, their impact on the selection of research methods is limited (cf. the guidelines 
provided by Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Long, 2014).  
As Kozbelt and colleagues (2010, p. 21) put it: 
"The variation is compounded by the fact that creativity involved a multitude of 
definitions, conceptualizations, domains, disciplines that bear on its study, 
empirical methods, and levels of analysis, as well as research orientations that are 
both basic and applied - and applied in varied contexts." 
 
This quote was the conclusion of an extensive sorting job, in which the numerous 
available theories were grouped into ten categories: developmental, psychometric, economic, 
stage and componential process, cognitive, problem solving and expertise-based, problem 
finding, evolutionary, typological and systems theories of creativity. While Chapter 2 appraises 
the psychometric approach to creativity, here I discuss the basics of the other three related 
categories. Namely, the cognitive, the economic, and the problem solving & expertise-based 
theories of creativity.  
1.2.1 Cognitive Theories of Creativity. Cognitive theories of creativity address the big 
question of whether creative cognition is an extraordinary functioning of the human mind or 
creative products are results of a business-as-usual functioning. The consensus in psychology 
is that creative responses result from the same cognitive structures as non-creative responses, 
i.e., creativity does not require largely distinct processes as non-creative thinking does (e.g., 
Perkins, 1981). The central difference between the creative and non-creative functioning is not 
that creative people do have certain structures which non-creative people do not; it is rather that 
creative people use their mind to ignore some commonly used knowledge base while they 
access some not typically used knowledge base (Ward, 1994). The cognitive processes used for 
creativity, such as metaphorical thinking, the use of analogies, imagery, conceptual 
combination, or conceptual expansion, can be used in non-creative endeavours too (Ward, 
1994; Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999). This theory is called the ‘creative cognition approach’ 
(Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995), and changed the way how scholars 
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thought about creativity in ‘90s. Since the approach is chiefly concerned with how problem 
solvers generate ideas and then explore the implications of these responses, and since these two 
processes are intertwined, Finke and colleagues (1992) came up with the geneplore model of 
creativity (generate + explore). 
Regarding the underlying cognitive mechanisms of creativity, the same big question can 
be raised: are these mechanisms of normal or extraordinary kind? If we think of the mind as a 
computer, the principle of parsimony dictates that creative products are the results of the same 
hardware and code language as non-creative products. What might be different is the script 
which gets executed and the programming of these scripts, which is the creative effort of the 
person. As the cognitive background of this, two antithetical types of thinking, convergent and 
divergent thinking (Guilford, 1956, 1967) are speculated to underlie the creative problem-
solving process. It has been proposed that problem solvers use convergent thinking for selecting 
a single (best) solution in response to a well-defined problem by applying standard procedures 
to existing knowledge. By contrast, divergent thinking can be utilized in more ambiguous 
situations, where a range of alternative solutions are possible, therefore responses may vary 
individually (Cropley, 2006). The popularity of the concept of divergent thinking has meant 
that for some it has been translated into a measurement tool of creativity itself (Zeng, Proctor, 
& Salvendy, 2011; Kaufman and Baer, 2012); though this approach has been severely criticized 
(e.g., Dietrich, 2007; Piffer, 2012). Among others, Cropley (2006) reset the balance by noting 
that both convergent and divergent thinking are necessary for producing creative ideas and that 
it is not contingent on divergent thinking alone. 
Divergent thinking, along with high ideational fluency, is often equated with creative 
cognition (Policastro & Gardner, 1999), and all humans are capable of these, even if to a varying 
degree. The model of generative cognitive style (Policastro & Gardner, 1999) includes three 
components, about which the same can be said. For creativity to happen, imagination, a sense 
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of domain relevance, and intrapersonal intelligence are required. In the words of the authors (p. 
217), "imagination leads to originality, sense of domain relevance leads to high quality, and 
intrapersonal intelligence checks illusory and/or emotional inferences in the process of 
constructing a novel but appropriate representation". 
Although these properties, such as intelligence, are rather dispositional than situational, 
creativity trainings can also rely on explicit strategies which advocate creative thinking. Such 
guidelines are usually related to metacognition and include tactics such as ‘what if the opposite 
would happen what you expect’, ‘identify and question your assumptions’, ‘turn the problem 
upside down’, ‘shift your attention to something else and incubate on the problem’ (Kozbelt, 
Beghetto, & Runco, 2010). Metacognition is an introspective process in which the individual 
can reflect on and control his or her cognitive performance. There are two main components: 
the knowledge about cognition and the regulation of cognition. The regulation strategies 
involve voluntary cognitive shifting or changing the zoom at which the problem is considered. 
Employing effortful planning and control of thinking and memory processes can be used to 
boost the generation of creative responses. E.g., divergent thinking is influenced by 
metacognitive strategies since a strenuous search is conducted to find original responses, where 
the strategy is to ignore all the trivial answers. Thinking about thinking fosters self-reflection 
and the conceptualization of abstract terms. This technique is often utilized for creating mind 
maps. 
1.2.2 Economic Theories of Creativity. There are several principles of economics, 
which can be adapted to creativity research. The advantage of using economics for 
psychological research is that clear-cut hypotheses can be tested (Kozbelt, Beghetto, & Runco, 
2010). Here, I will shortly discuss predictions based on investment strategies. One example of 
explaining creativity-related phenomena with economical concepts concerns experts and posits 
that the reason why experts are less susceptible to shifting to disruptive methods is that doing 
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so would increase their costs and would grant a smaller return of their previous investment (cost 
of education, working hours associated put towards the reigning paradigm) at the same time 
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Another example of the economic view of creativity is that 
incentives associated with certain behaviours reinforce them, while costs associated with other 
behaviours reduces the chance of exhibiting them. If standing out from a group comes with the 
cost of becoming labelled or stigmatised, benefit of showcasing an original response will be 
outweighed by the potential cost if the size of the group will be large in contrast to a scenario 
in which the size of the group is small. Amabile’s (1996) alternative explanation of this 
phenomenon is that by a highly original idea, uncertainty grows too and there can be reasonable 
doubts whether the idea will be feasible and implementable eventually. In fact, standing by to 
originality comes with a potential of risk (Rubenson & Runco, 1995). 
A final example of adapting concepts from economy to creativity research is provided 
by Sternberg & Lubart (1992, 1995). They introduced the investment theory of creativity, 
according to which creative individuals are trying to buy low and sell high on ideas, and use 
intellectual processes, knowledge, intellectual styles, personality, motivation, and 
environmental context to do so. Similarly to investment making, the resources of a creative 
person are scarce and must be allocated wisely. Discernment abilities are crucial for picking the 
best ideas to pursue (Silvia, 2008), and thereby making the investment with the highest potential 
return.  
1.2.3. Problem-Solving and Expertise-based Theories of Creativity. Both for the 
present conceptualisation and operalisation of creativity, it is useful to build on the problem-
solving literature, as it can be interpreted as a wider framework for creativity which involves 
the solving process of both ill-defined and well-defined problems. Both by creativity and 
problem-solving, information is coordinated toward reaching a specific goal (Wiggins and 
Bhattacharya, 2014).  Concepts from Newell & Simon (1972), such as the stages of the 
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problem-solving process (initial state, operations state, goal state), or problem representation, 
problem space, operator, as well as solving strategies, can be applied towards tackling the big 
questions regarding creativity (e.g., Langley, 1987). The use of these terms enables a precise 
discussion of how creativity-related phenomena, such as an insight is triggered in the mind 
(e.g., Ohlsson, 1992). Creative solutions are provoked by ill-defined problems (e.g., Pétervári, 
Osman, & Bhattacharya, 2016), and creativity is often assessed by providing participants with 
difficult problems (more details about this will be provided in Chapter 2), for the solution of 
which strategy use and the level of expertise can be important. 
Expertise is defined as a collection of experiences acquired during a longer time span, 
during which the person engages in deliberate practice in their chosen domain. There is even a 
ten-year rule of thumb in the literature as it has been shown that a decade is the minimum time 
investment with which a person can become a domain-specific expert (Bloom, 1985; Chase & 
Simon, 1973; Ericsson, 1999; Ericson, Roring, Nandagopal, 2007; Hayes, 1989; Kozbelt, 2005; 
Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1962; Simonton, 1991, 1997). More details about why the knowledge 
of a domain is crucial for creativity will be provided in Chapter 2 and 3. Here, I focus on the 
role of expertise in idea evaluation as these aspects are the most relevant for the purposes of the 
thesis.  
Expertise was articulated as a requirement for successful evaluation of creativity by 
many scholars (Cropley & Kaufman, 2013; Kaufman & Baer, 2012; Kaufman, Baer, Cropley, 
Reiter-Palmon, & Sinnett, 2013). However, empirical studies do not reveal which part of 
expertise makes experts’ judgment more accurate than of lay people’s. In creativity studies, the 
case is usually that experts and non-experts need to evaluate creative products, which can be 
anything from mousetrap designs to poems (e.g., Kaufman & Baer, 2012; Kaufman, Baer, 
Cropley, Reiter-Palmon, & Sinnett, 2013) and the difference in their evaluations is deduced to 
be the result of the difference in expertise. Novices are found to rate in accordance with the 
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experts for products they are familiar with/frequent user of, e.g. mobile phone holders by Haller 
and colleagues (2011), and mildly or not at all in accordance with experts in case of products 
which are complex (Galati, 2015) and come from a highly structured, codified domain 
(Kaufman et al., 2013; Simonton, 2009).  
When we look for differences between experts and non-experts in the literature, we find 
that expertise is more than a large amount of information collected from a specific domain: in 
the present research, novices educated about what constitutes a creative product could not 
substitute experts (e.g., Storme, Myszkowski, Çelik, & Lubart, 2014). Experts are theorised to 
outperform lay judges of creativity because their accumulated experiences grant them multiple 
benefits (e.g., Bonnardel, & Marmèche, 2004; Turnbull, Littlejohn, & Allan, 2010). They can 
operate with more information at the same time as their chunking span of domain-relevant 
information is higher than non-experts’ and can also remember these chunks more accurately 
than non-experts do; experts also possess a more detailed mental model about creativity and 
therefore can construct a more accurate problem representation than what lay people are capable 
of (Ericson & Charness, 1994). Additionally, experts approach a problem differently from naïve 
people when it comes to the evaluation of creative ideas. They use different problem-
decomposing strategies (Ho, 2001) and can detect more information sources than novices 
(Björklund, 2013). They also have alternative internalized standards of what is creative 
(Kaufman, Baer, Cole, & Sexton, 2008), including a fine-grained consideration of more 
sophisticated criteria compared to judges with no expertise (Kaufman et al., 2013). Finally, they 
can adapt to both the availability and the lack of decision criteria (Bettman & Sujan, 1987), and 
their internalized standards make them weigh relevant criteria differently than novices do 
(Silvia, 2013). 
From the summary of the essential research trends for conducting this research, we 
learned that creative responses are the results of the same cognitive structures and mechanisms 
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as non-creative responses (e.g., convergent and divergent thinking). Due to the tendency of 
trying to keep the costs low and the benefits high, creative people must allocate their resources 
wisely; also, the judges of creative products must focus on the projects bringing the highest 
return on the resources invested into them. Another takeaway from previous research is that the 
problem-solving literature can be applied well to discuss creativity as a process. Finally, 
expertise was articulated as a requirement for successful evaluation of creativity, however, it is 
unclear what aspect of expertise is enabling professionals to make better evaluations than naïve 
observers. Is it only their knowledge of the domain or are there conditions under which lay 
people could perform just as well as they do? We will look for further information to answer 
this question. 
As for the next step, a more nuanced explanation will be given about what constitutes 
creativity and what does not. The next section outlines the various definitions of creativity and 
what the conceptualisation of creativity could be based on them. 
1.3 Definition(s) of Creativity 
To achieve a scientific measurement of creativity, working with precisely defined terms 
is key. One of the biggest problems with the science of creativity is that it has been problematic 
to outline a clear definition of creativity for a long time. Fortunately, this problem seems to get 
resolved recently, the research community is getting settled on the few, consensually accepted 
definitions. For the purposes of this thesis, the standard definition of creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 
2012) was interpreted for evaluation purposes: a product is creative if it is judged to be highly 
original and useful/effective by observers. These two criteria were complemented with two 
additional ones, low risk and high scalability, which were appropriate for the task domain but 
had a much smaller weight toward overall creativity. 
Historically, there are many different definitions of creativity, but this chapter will only 
give a short overview of the definitions. Two kinds of definitions can be differentiated: one of 
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them provides a short, dense definition and focuses solely on the crucial criteria for creativity, 
while the other kind of definitions are attempting to give a full account of creativity and include 
its socially determined nature by describing the contextual factors too. 
Regarding the first kind, Runco & Jaeger's definition (2012, p. 92) is the one accepted 
as "the standard definition of creativity": “Creativity requires both originality and 
effectiveness”. This definition is comprised of two components, similarly of Bruner's 
intertwined definition regarding creativity as an "effective surprise" (1962, p. 18). However, 
other componential definitions of creativity are built up from three different components: the 
additional one is linked to the interaction with the observer of the product, i.e., it is highlighted 
that the product should trigger a surprise or should be non-obvious (Simonton, 2016). Examples 
of the three-component definitions are Simonton's (2012), who posits that a creative product is 
new, useful, and nonobvious; Kaufman & Sternberg's (2010) who argue that a creative product 
is novel, good, and relevant; or Boden's (2004) who describes a creative product as novel, 
valuable, and surprising. 
The more detailed definitions of creativity describe the context in which creativity is 
embedded as well as the relations between the contextual factors. For instance, Plucker et al. 
(2004) define creativity as “the interaction among aptitude, process, and environment by which 
an individual or group produces a perceptible product that is both novel and useful as defined 
within a social context” (p. 90). Amabile's (1982, p. 1001) seminal definition goes around the 
criteria and describes the process in which creativity is recognised: "A product or response is 
creative to the extent that appropriate observers independently agree it is creative. Appropriate 
observers are those familiar with the domain in which the product was created or the response 
articulated. Thus, creativity can be regarded as the quality of products or responses judged to 
be creative by appropriate observers, and it can also be regarded as the process by which 
something so judged is produced". Later (1996, p. 35), she provided a slightly different 
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definition: “A product or response will be judged as creative to the extent that (a) it is both a 
novel and appropriate, useful, correct or valuable response to the task at hand, and (b) the task 
is heuristic, rather than algorithmic. By definition, algorithmic tasks have a clearly identified 
goal, but heuristic tasks might or might not have a clearly identified goal; the important 
distinction is that, for heuristic tasks, the path to the solution is not completely straightforward.” 
On a similar account, Csíkszentmihályi's (1996, p. 28) definition of creativity also details the 
system in which creativity unfolds rather than the properties which a creative product must 
possess: "Creativity is any act, idea or product that changes an existing domain or that 
transforms an existing domain into a new one" and it cannot happen "without the explicit or 
implicit consent of a field responsible for it". 
To sum up, a maximally creative product is as high on originality, utility, and surprise 
as possible and the creator is producing the work in a cultural and social system which 
influences the outcome. We must also note that creative products are created on a large 
spectrum, which results from the many possible combinations of the constituting dimensions 
and the lack of cut-off criterion. What is more, the process of creation is dynamic and a product 
which might not look creative at the first glance can end up as an outstanding product through 
the multiple iterations characteristic of many creative activities (e.g., writing poems, lyrics, 
painting pictures, etc.) 
To address which categories exist between fully creative and not creative at all, and to 
cover the entire spectrum of creative products, Simonton (2016) has developed a 
comprehensive framework of creative outcomes, supported by his three-component 
conceptualisation of creativity (Table 1). His mathematical formula is built up using three 
different components. The first one is initial probability. Unoriginal ideas seem highly probable 
at the beginning, while original ideas seem highly improbable initially. The second one is final 
utility which denotes the effectiveness or appropriateness of the creative product. The third one 
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is called prior knowledge and regards the creator’s awareness of the utility of the product. The 
higher this value is, the stronger the “hunch” or the feeling of knowing is about what the 
outcome will be. Conversely, a low level of prior knowledge means a low level of anticipation 
and can be conceptualised as surprise. 
Table 1   
Creative and non-creative outcomes according to the three-criterion definition. 
Initial probability Final utility Prior knowledge Outcome 
1 1 1 Routine, 
reproductive, or 
habitual ideas or 
responses 
0 1 0 Creative ideas or 
responses (c -> 1) 
1 1 0 Fortuitous response 
bias (e.g., “lucky 
guesses”) 
0 0 1 Rational suppression 
(e.g., extinguished 
responses) 




0 1 1 Irrational 
suppression 
1 0 1 Irrational 
perseveration 
0 0 0 Blissful ignorance 
Note. This framework is based on the following equation: c = (1 - p) * u * (1 - v), where p is 
the initial probability, u is the final utility, and v is the prior knowledge of that utility. This table 
was adapted from “Defining Creativity: Don’t We Also Need to Define What is Not Creative?” 
by D. K. Simonton, 2016, The Journal of Creative Behavior, n/a–n/a. Copyright 2016 by the 
Creative Education Foundation. 
 
In this framework, the three-criterion multiplicative definition of personal creativity is 
outlined as a mathematical formula: c = (1 - p) * u * (1 - v), where c is creativity, p is the initial 
probability, u is the final utility, and v is the prior knowledge of that utility (p. 11). By 
articulating the necessary and sufficient conditions of creativity, he resolves the earlier dilemma 
of whether a product with no originality or no utility could be deemed as creative (Diedrich, 
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Benedek, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2015; Weisberg, 2015). His resolution of the issue is that if either 
originality or utility drops to zero, then the product or response cannot be called creative.  
What we can see from the diversity of creativity definitions is that although people have 
an internalised model of creativity, this is usually not verbalised and therefore lacks an explicit 
definition. Even for professionals, it took many years to present an all-inclusive 
conceptualisation of creativity and there was a lengthy debate about the boundary conditions, 
since it is not clear where creativity ends, and non-creativity begins. In the present thesis, the 
focus was not on finding the boundaries of creativity but on identifying features associated with 
it. The main assumption underlying our creativity definition was that observer's perception of 
creativity is linked to their perception of the product's originality, utility/effectiveness, 
riskiness, and scalability. However, the latter two factors were complimentary and were 
assumed to carry less weight toward forming creativity judgments than the first two factors. 
After specifying the definition of creativity, let us discuss an overarching framework for 
the psychological research on creativity. This theoretical framework is called the 4 Ps of 
Creativity (Rhodes, 1961; Runco, 2004), and is comprised of a systematic categorisation of the 
aspects of creativity. The 4 Ps stand for process, product, person, and place, which was 
subsequently expanded to the 6 Ps of Creativity (Simonton, 1990; Runco, 2003), by adding 
persuasion and potential to the mix. The thesis research is focused on the creative process and 
its outcome, the creative product. Therefore, these two categories will be detailed below. 
 
1.4 Process and Product Theories of Creativity 
Two of the Ps, process and the product theories will be summarised below as these are 
the subject of investigation in the present thesis.  
1.4.1 Process theories. There are various ways of conceptualising the creative process, 
but most theorists assert that the creative process consists of several consecutive stages (e.g., 
blind variation and selective retention model, Campbell, 1960; associative hierarchy theory, 
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Mednick, 1962; three-process theory of creativity, Davidson and Sternberg, 1986; geneplore 
model, Finke et al., 1992). The number of stages differs by theory, and this is largely dependent 
on the ways in which theorists describe the critical components of the stages (e.g., preparation, 
incubation, illumination, and verification by Wallas, 1926; whereas problem formulation, 
preparation, idea generation, idea evaluation, and idea selection by Amabile, 1983). However, 
regardless of these variations, researchers agree on two main essential operations of the creative 
problem-solving process: (1) the generation of ideas and (2) the evaluation and selection of (an) 
appropriate outcome(s) (e.g., Finke et al., 1992; Lubart, 2001; Reiter-Palmon and Illies, 2004). 
Given that these two stages are common to all theories of creativity, and are relatively 
uncontroversial, it is for these reasons that most empirical studies focus on these two stages as 
central to the creative problem-solving process.  
However, it is worth noting that there are far more empirical investigations conducted 
on creative idea generation than on idea evaluation (Amabile and Müller, 2008; Rietzschel, 
Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2010; Silvia, 2008). Separating the two phases is necessary to disentangle 
the distinct cognitive processes applied in them, however, both idea generation and evaluation 
are critical for shaping the creative product of the creative process, and the two stages are tightly 
linked (neither makes sense without the other). Further, we must note that the creative process 
is a dynamic one which can involve several iterations of generation and evaluation of ideas that 
a problem solver goes through before reaching an end state (Lonergan, Scott, & Mumford, 
2004; Kozbelt and Durmysheva, 2007). 
1.4.2 Product theories. Shifting now to the product theories of creativity, one of the 
widely accepted frameworks is the so-called propulsion model of creativity; this theory 
identifies eight types of creative products as propulsions in a conceptual space (Sternberg, 
Kaufman, & Pretz, 2002). The least significant creative contributions can be labelled as (1) 
replications or (2) redefinitions of established products. They are necessary starting points but 
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do not move the field forward. On the other hand, products which serve as (3) forward 
incrementation and (4) advance forward incrementation can move the field forward in the 
direction which it is already going towards. What is more, with (5) redirection, (6) 
reconstruction/redirection and (7) re-initiation, it is possible to start moving the field to a new 
direction, to return from a new direction to an earlier one, or to shift to a new starting point and 
initiate movement from there, respectively. Finally, (8) synthesis is about combining and 
merging the essence of different paradigms into a new one. Using this theory, the contribution 
of each creative product can be accounted for. Focusing on creative products yields the 
strongest evidence-based approach on this field. Next, I will continue listing the merits of using 
a product-based approach for creativity research. Subsequently, the disadvantages will be 
discussed too. 
On the plus side, creative products can be quantified and are tangible, even if the 
processes leading to such outcomes are yet ineffable. The biographical and historiometric 
approaches to creativity (i.e., studying the chronicle of human lives to see how significant 
creators produced their work) can make a good use of archival data and make it possible to 
reconstruct how geniuses’ career and personality evolved during their lifetime (e.g., Simonton, 
1998; Kozbelt, 2007). Importantly, the topic of this thesis is evaluation and how different 
groups of people make judgments about creativity, and dividing creators from their products 
provides a clean state for assessment. This approach was chosen because outside the lab, 
creative products are often competing for funds and recognition independently from their 
creators. Since the products are the means by which creativity receives recognition, we focus 
our attention on understanding by which mechanisms a product can achieve that. One caveat 
for researchers here is that products are not of interest by themselves, it is their interaction with 
the audience by which they are found to be creative (Csíkszentmihályi, 1996, 1999). Thus, 
when studying the products, it is really that the judges who evaluate the products must be drawn 
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under scrutiny. It is arguable whether the accuracy of creativity judgments can be interpreted 
(e.g., Silvia, 2008), thus, usually the agreement in raters is assessed (Chapter 3 discusses this 
issue in more detail). Taking the products as the central aspect of creativity lends itself as a 
good angle for the study of evaluation. 
The other side of the coin is that treating products as separate entities from their creators 
is rather problematic when creative idea generation is discussed. In that scenario, the division 
between the person and the product might entail the problem of making reverse inferences (cf. 
Hutzler, 2004; Poldrack, 2006), since the products are used to gain information about their 
creators. Although the assumption is that highly creative products are constructed by highly 
creative people, establishing this link does not yield any predictive power for the quality of the 
next creation of the same person.  
After this short introduction about the field, now we turn to the particular topic of this 
thesis, which is how people evaluate creativity. The next section recaps what evaluation is and 
what cognitive mechanisms are linked to the assessment of ideas. The review of the literature 
will bring us closer to understanding how lay people and experts inform their judgments made 
about creativity. 
 
1.5 Evaluating Creativity 
Evaluation can be defined as the convergent phase after generating ideas (Basadur, 
1995), when implementation, rejection, or revision can take place (Mumford, Lonergan, & 
Scott, 2002). This section provides a summary of the cognitive mechanisms linked to the 
assessment of ideas. Discussing these mechanisms in detail is necessary because despite the 
theories of creativity including the evaluation of ideas as a critical component (Finke, Ward, & 
Smith, 1992; Simonton, 1999; Sternberg, 2006), we know more about the errors in creative 
thought (Mumford, Blair, Dailey, Leritz, & Osburn, 2006) than about the process how these 
judgments are built.  
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Lay people are inexperienced judges of creativity and the goal of the researchers is 
usually to identify manipulations which can make them more similar to experts. First, I discuss 
the spontaneous behaviour of lay people in terms of the criteria they use for evaluation and the 
cognitive biases which might impair their performance. Subsequently, studies trying to bridge 
the gap between experts and non-experts are explored. 
As it is not clear what lay people use as criterion for judging creativity, there are 
multiple studies investigating the effect of external manipulations on the internal criteria. 
Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe (2010) investigated whether providing explicit selection criteria 
can improve selection efficacy (this was also tested empirically in Chapter 6), whether 
participants choose either desirable and feasible or original ideas spontaneously, and whether 
processing the ideas on a deeper level correlates with improved selection performance. No 
evidence was found for a linear relationship between the level of idea processing and selection 
performance. Those who were instructed to select creative ideas rather used originality for the 
basis of their selection, as opposed to those who had to pick the best ideas: then participants 
preferred the ideas they found implementable. Overall, usefulness and the potential impact the 
idea had overrode the need of originality. In a different experiment, prompting participants to 
use a broad problem scope, as opposed to a narrow problem scope, facilitated to generate more 
creative ideas but not to select more creative ones (Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2014). 
Moreover, it was found that people thinking with a more abstract mindset rated ideas as more 
creative than those with a more concrete mindset (Müller, Wakslak, & Krishnan, 2014). 
Inducing promotion focus as opposed to prevention focus during the assessment of creativity 
led participants to more accurately rate the originality of their own responses (Herman & Reiter-
Palmon, 2011). The use of criteria was assessed also by creative products in science tasks 
(Long, 2014). The analysis of qualitative interviews showed that judges used appropriateness, 
novelty, thoughtfulness, interestingness, and cleverness as their assessment criteria. Notably, 
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these were not independent factors and their use varied by task type and by judge groups which 
employed them. 
Finding different results in different tasks served as another evidence for the domain-
specific nature of creativity and motivated researchers to investigate the influence of tasks on 
the judgments made about creativity. Runco, Illies, & Eisenman (2005) showed that realistic 
creativity tasks elicited more appropriate solution ideas than unrealistic ones, whereas 
unrealistic tasks provoked more original and flexible ideas. 
As for the common thinking biases associated with the evaluation of creative ideas, 
lay people were found to be less accurate in evaluating the originality of exceptional as 
compared to less novel ideas. This difference was found to be a function of the complexity of 
the setting at the time of idea development (Licuanan, Dailey, & Mumford, 2007). However, it 
was also shown that actively focusing on originality and the appraisal of interactional processes 
led to reduced errors in undergraduates' evaluations (as compared to the baseline expert 
judgments). Lay judges of creativity also advocated easily understandable, widely usable ideas 
which were in alignment with the the social norms, as opposed to risky, time consuming, and 
original ideas (Blair & Mumford, 2007). It was not only that people performed sub-optimally 
in assessing the ideas themselves but they also underestimated the resources needed for 
implementing the creative ideas presented to them (Dailey & Mumford, 2006). In a 
comprehensive summary (Mumford et al., 2006), multiple possible sources of biases, such as 
pre-existing knowledge, limitations in processing capacity, patterns of information use, and the 
strategies applied in process execution, have been classified as contributors to the evaluation 
process. 
Turning now to the role of expertise in the evaluation of creative ideas, expertise is 
often defined as a domain-specific, specialized knowledge acquired through more thousand 
hours of experience and focused practice (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1978; Ericsson, 
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Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993). It was found that experts’ tacit knowledge affects their pattern 
recognition abilities (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985; Gurteen, 1998; Eraut, 2000; Cianciolo et al., 
2006) and that this knowledge allows them to make rapid decisions, such as to recognize 
creativity when they see it (Amabile, 1982; Baer 1994) (more information above the properties 
of experts can be found above in the Problem-Solving and Expertise-based Theories of 
Creativity section). Although creativity is always evaluated in a specific socio-cultural context 
and may defy empirical objectivity on an individual level (Schaffer, 1994), the added benefit 
of using trained experts for judging creative ideas is that there seems to be a rather substantial 
agreement among them when it comes to evaluating creative products (e.g., Hennessey, 1994; 
Kaufman, Lee, Baer, & Lee, 2007; Kaufman et al., 2008). In the absence of a clear-cut criterion 
for what qualifies as creative and what does not, such a consensus in experts’ opinion may be 
considered as the measurement tool for creativity (the use of expert ratings as substitutes for 
criteria will be discussed in Chapter 3). 
Since acquiring expert evaluators may be very demanding for both researchers and 
companies, a great body of literature is targeting the exact differences between novice and 
expert evaluators, and aims to bridge the gap between them. Currently, there are a variety of 
trainings constructed to enhance judges’ evaluation skills (e.g., Storme et al., 2014). Trainings 
were found as methods which can increase the similarity of lay participants’ judgments with 
expert opinions, however, there are still problems with the inter-rater reliability of lay judges 
and the shift towards expert opinions is not sufficient to actually replace experts by the trained 
lay judges (Bruer, 1993; Kaufman, Gentile, & Baer, 2005; Kaufman et al., 2008; Kaufman, 
Baer, & Cole, 2009; Kaufman, & Baer, 2012; Storme et al., 2014). Despite the trainings, there 




Namely, the standards and criteria by which ideas are judged appear to differ 
significantly between experts and non-experts (Kaufman, Baer, Cole, & Sexton, 2008; 
Kaufman et al., 2013; Silvia, 2013). There is a high degree of internal reliability of expert 
evaluations of creative products (Amabile, 1982; Hennessey & Amabile, 1999; Kaufman, Lee, 
Baer, & Lee, 2007), which does not tend to be the case in non-experts. Experts are equipped to 
handle contexts where strict criteria of assessment of creativity are available, as well as contexts 
when there are no decision criteria (Bettman & Sujan, 1987).  In contrast, non-experts tend to 
have difficulty in developing reliable criteria for assessing creative ideas, which in turn limits 
their ability to identify ideas that experts would evaluate as genuinely creative (Galati, 2015). 
In this section, the behaviour of both lay people and experts were described while 
completing creative evaluation tasks. Since it is difficult to recruit experts for conducting 
academic research, many studies attempted to bridge the gap between expert and non-expert 
evaluations. In multiple studies, the aim was to bring lay participants closer to experts via 
various manipulations (e.g., trainings, information briefs, mindset inductions). Despite finding 
results for an increased alignment between non-experts and experts after applying these 
manipulations, vast qualitative differences remained between the creativity ratings provided by 
expert and non-expert judges. Although prototypical situations could be trained, non-experts 
were not expected to be able to adapt when facing a novel situation, whereas experts were found 
to quickly transfer their knowledge even in stressful situations. While numerous boundary 
conditions have been investigated, it is difficult to organise and compare the findings due to the 
different paradigms and domains involved in the studies. Much information is available, 
however, it is scattered and not integrated into one theoretical framework. The next step is to 





1.6 The Focus of The Thesis 
The key insight drawn from the sections above is that while most research is conducted 
on idea generation (cf., Long, 2014), there are fewer studies focusing on how ideas are 
evaluated (e.g., Basadur, 1995; Silvia, 2008). In particular, little is known about the cognitive 
mechanisms of creative idea assessment, except maybe that lay people are not very good at it 
(Blair & Mumford, 2007; Dailey & Mumford, 2006; Rietzschel et al., 2010). This is the gap the 
present thesis set out to start filling. Now, I shortly outline the rationale behind the thesis 
research. 
Given the modern technological advancements, there is now an almost unlimited supply 
of ideas (Bayus, 2013), curating them became a key role to manage for success (Bakker, 2014). 
Often, companies ask for expert opinion when selecting ideas (e.g., Magnusson, Netz, & 
Wästlund, 2014). Experts of a domain (e.g., digital technology or visual arts) are chosen as 
curators because they are better suited than lay people to recognize the potential of ideas due to 
their experience with predicting the reaction of the market (Basuroy, Chatterjee, & Ravid, 2003) 
and to their potential to influence trends (Reinstein & Snyder, 2005). Therefore, there is 
motivation for researchers to tease apart in which ways expert evaluators deviate from the 
general population. Given the limited understanding of this topic, the present thesis aims to 
examine the basis on which creative ideas are evaluated by people with and without relevant 
expertise. Specifically, three main research questions are investigated in this thesis. First, the 
use of which inner criteria is fed into the judgment made about creativity? Second, what is the 
weighting of the criteria informing the judgment? The experiments were designed to gain data 
about which criterion is more important than the others to confirm or falsify current theoretical 
conceptualisations of creativity. Third, what contextual factors are influencing the evaluation 
of creative ideas? These questions will be outlined in detail in Chapter 4. 
The motivation for this research is the hope that by understanding more about the 
cognitive underpinnings of making judgments about creativity, it will become possible to 
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reduce the amount of guesswork ratings given by non-professional evaluators as well as the 
mythical bubble of "divinity" (Cropley, 2010) surrounding creativity. The wider goal is to start 
an optimisation for creative evaluations in terms of the guidelines and preparation judges are 
receiving. It is in the interest of all of us that the judges of both potentially paradigm-shifting 
products and everyday inventions get to incorporate findings from the cognitive science 
literature. Hopefully, with time, a more data-driven and less incidental approach will become 
the mainstream by awarding grants and prizes. 
Now that the rationale of the present research was sketched out, let us take a look on 
how previous studies addressed the aforementioned issues. In the next section, an organised list 
of earlier studies is provided, in which I discuss both the theoretical conceptualisation of 
creativity for the research purposes and the way in which the concepts were measured. 
 
1.7 Different Approaches for Uniting Creativity and Judgment Research 
The body of literature is limited on the evaluation of creative ideas, however, there are 
a handful of studies investigating how judgments are made about creativity. In this section, I 
discuss the theoretical conceptualisation of empirical studies investigating the evaluation 
process. Most of the available literature applies the short, two-component definitions of 
creativity (examples of this are listed in the Definition(s) of Creativity section), i.e., they use 
novelty, originality, or uniqueness on one side and usefulness, appropriateness, utility, 
relevance, or value on the other side as the criteria of creativity. Since both criteria are required 
for a creative response or product, it is worthwhile to study how these two components are 
weighted relatively to each other and to what degree they are integrated. The previous findings 
can provide valuable insights to what weighting between originality and utility can be expected 
a priori when looking for answers to the second main research question (“What is the weighting 
of the criteria informing the judgment?”). Thus, these are the aspects I analyse while describing 
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the theoretical framework of the available assessment methods. (Further assessment criteria for 
the judgment of creativity will be listed in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.) 
The earliest assessment tool similar to the paradigm used in this thesis is Susan P. 
Besemer's Creative Product Semantic Scale (1998; Besemer & O'Quin, 1986, 1987, 1993; 
Besemer & Treffinger, 1981). The theoretical model behind the scaled is called the Creative 
Product Analysis Matrix. This model can be used for the measurement of domain-general 
creativity by products and consists of three creativity-related criteria: Novelty, Resolution, and 
Elaboration & Synthesis. Novelty includes originality and surprise; Resolution is comprised of 
value, logic, usefulness and understandability. The third dimension is called Elaboration & 
Synthesis and it includes the facets of being organic, elegant, and well crafted. For the 
evaluation, these nine facets are used in form of pairs of adjectives and participants need to rate 
each criterion on Likert scales while being presented with pictures of objects (e.g., chair 
designs). Horn & Salvendy (2009) conducted two studies using similar stimuli to Besemer’s. 
First, lay judges of creativity evaluated chairs and lamps on a web-based platform, then 
individually selected products were judged using paper and pencil in the second study. An 
exploratory factor analysis could explain 72% of the variance and identified three factors related 
to creativity: Affect, Importance, and Novelty. This data-driven conceptualisation aligns well 
with the three componential definitions of creativity. An interesting finding was that Affect was 
an equally good predictor of creativity as Novelty, which draws attention to the role of emotion 
in creativity assessments. 
Another category of consumer products which is frequently used in creativity research 
as the stimuli for evaluation is advertisement. E.g., the Creative Product Semantic Scale was 
used for judging print advertisement campaigns (White, Shen, & Smith, 2002). It was found 
that while experts (advertising professionals) and non-experts (college students and members 
of the general public) agreed on the originality and logicality of the ads, they disagreed on how 
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well crafted and well executed the products were. Since the results were presented on an ordinal 
scale only, no data about the weighting of originality and appropriateness was available. 
Another study (Caroff & Besançon, 2008) fulfilled exactly this gap: the role of 
originality and appropriateness was investigated while making judgments about automobile 
advertisements. In three experimental conditions, participants had to judge the creativity of 
fifteen ads either without any instructions, with using explicit criteria, or with receiving training 
for the task. The findings suggested that originality is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
of creativity. Appropriateness modulated the creativity ratings in interaction with originality 
and originality influenced creativity more when appropriateness was on a low level, while when 
appropriateness was on a moderate or high level, the impact of originality on creativity ratings 
was reduced. Regarding the experimental conditions, when participants had to rate creativity 
without receiving any special instructions, appropriateness was in a linear relationship with 
creativity. However, when they received explicit instructions on how to judge creativity, 
appropriateness did not predict creativity anymore. Finally, when participants received training 
for the task, the highest ratings of creativity were associated with a moderate level of 
appropriateness. 
Another aspect of investigating the evaluation of creativity in advertisements is to look 
at how certain personality characteristics influence the weighting of creativity-related criteria 
(Storme & Lubart, 2012). Here, again the Creative Product Semantic Scale was applied as the 
measurement instrument (20-degrees Likert-scale). The authors found Novelty as the most 
influential predictor of creativity (not Resolution, or Elaboration & Synthesis). The expressed 
and implemented creativity concepts of lay participants (explicit and implicit in the authors’ 
wording) were also studied and the findings showed that Novelty was the most heavily weighted 
dimension in both recalling participants’ creativity definitions and in the experimental task. 
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A different method for evaluating creative responses was applied by Runco & Charles 
(1993), who asked participants to judge ideas by sorting cards containing a set of ideas (each 
card contained 8 responses to a divergent thinking task) to piles of high/low originality, 
appropriateness, and creativity. Originality and appropriateness seemed to work as trade-offs 
to each other: the lowest originality ratings were given to the idea sets with the highest amount 
of appropriate ideas and the lowest appropriateness ratings were given to the sets with the 
highest amount of original ideas. Similarly to the paradigm used in this thesis, both non-expert 
and expert participants had to rate originality and appropriateness and originality as rated by 
the lay participants themselves predicted creativity ratings. Testing the boundary condition of 
reducing originality to zero, creativity ratings decreased when the number of appropriate ideas 
in the set increased. A high level of originality and appropriateness as judged by experts was 
linked to high creativity ratings. 
Another noteworthy paradigm of investigating creativity is instructing participants to 
draw alien creatures and then asking them to write a short description about them (Ward, 1994). 
In a study (Kozbelt & Durmysheva, 2007), lay judges had to evaluate the creativity of these 
products based on their internalised model of creativity; independently, a code system was 
developed to analyse the attributions of the products. Unfortunately, the originality and 
appropriateness of the products were not registered. However, both the drawings and the 
paragraphs were coded according to multiple comprehensive criteria (e.g., creature as a whole, 
features of the creature, creature's emotional expression). Paragraph coding categories were 
found to be the most predictive of creativity. The characteristics of alien creatures which was 
linked to a higher creativity score showed a systematic pattern: greater conceptual combination 
resulted in more creative products. 
After discussing laboratory experiments, let us close with a real-life example of 
conducting research about creativity. Although Frederiksen & Knudsen's (2017) paper is placed 
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in the innovation literature, their methodology investigates the precursors of innovation, 
namely, creativity, thus their paradigm belongs to this section. In a study with a high ecological 
validity, industry and market experts were asked to evaluate some of the 106 student project 
proposals (one of the fifteen experts evaluated all of them). The dimensions for assessment 
were novelty, usefulness, and market potential of the projects and experts used a 0-100% scale 
for rating. Unfortunately, only descriptive statistics and the correlation between the dimension 
are communicated, thus there was no information revealed about the weighting of the 
dimensions. According to their conceptual model, all three dimensions were equally important, 
however, since the stimuli were real business ideas regarding new energy sources and offshore 
wind power, a longitudinal study could follow up which ratings were associated with the best 
outcomes in the implementation phase. 
After flashing out how other scholars have united creativity and judgment making 
research to measure the creativity of products, now I introduce the conceptualisation of 
judgment used in the present research and propose a possible framework taken from judgment 
research for the investigations of this thesis. 
1.8 A Framework from Judgment Research 
Judgment can be defined as the result of forming beliefs about the likelihood of 
uncertain events (Hardman & Macchi, 2003). It can be also defined as a tautology: judgment is 
what judges do (Martin, 2006). In this sense, judgment can be defined as an activity exerted by 
cognitive agents: judging something is soliciting evidence, as well as weighing, interpreting, 
and assessing the evidence to make sense of the world (Martin, 2006). 
In this thesis, judgments stand for estimations of values; they are made regarding the 
degree of creativity found in project proposals. Given the socially determined nature of 
creativity, the Theory of Social Judgment (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Hammond, Rohrbaugh, 
Mumpower, & Adelman, 1977; Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, & Steinmann, 1975) was chosen 
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as the theoretical (and mathematical) framework for conducting the research. The core idea of 
this approach was laid down more than 60 years ago, almost at the same time when the scientific 
study of creativity started, by Egon Brunswik (1952, 1956), a functionalist psychologist 
interested in the adaptiveness of judgment making. In his writings about representative design, 
he portrayed judgment analogously to perception (Goldstein, 2004): humans perceive both 
objects and events by relying on incomplete information and are constructing the full picture 
based on sensory cues. A mathematical model of this notion was later formalised as a prism of 
cues between the actual values and the judgments made about these values. The Lens model is 
simple and elegant, it does not only capture what is happening in a person's head while forming 
a judgment but also includes the environment of the person, the surrounding ecology (see Figure 
1).  
 
Figure 1. Outline of the Lens model. Adapted from “Heuristic and Linear Models of Judgment: 
Matching Rules and Environments” by R. M. Hogarth & N. Karelaia, 2007, Psychological 




The basic logic behind the model is that judgments are formed based on pieces of 
information (called cues), which are probabilistically related to the judgment, and get 
incorporated to varying degrees. The environment involves a criterion value which can be 
interpreted as a 'true score' of the judgment and it can be investigated how much the participant's 
actual response is corresponding to this; the metric is called achievement index and can be 
calculated via a correlation analysis. Brunswik (1952) noted that the cues are always in a 
probabilistic relationship with the criterion, as well as they are associated with various degrees 
of uncertainty with regards to their reliability and validity, thus they cannot be interpreted as 
deterministic factors. In fact, making inferences based on the cues involves two types of noise: 
one of them is associated with perceiving the cues, while the another one with applying the 
information extracted from the cue to the judgment (Kirlik, 2009).  
According to Funder’s (1995, 2001) Realistic Accuracy Model, four steps must be 
completed in sequence in order to reach a realistic judgment. The path to making an accurate 
judgment starts with relevance: the target of judgment must signal relevant information chunks 
to the observer. The second step regards availability as the conveyed information must be made 
available to the observer. The third step is about detection as the available information must be 
detected by the observer. Finally, the fourth step concerns utilisation and posits that the detected 
information must be interpreted and weighted in the correct way to reach an accurate judgment. 
Since the steps are built on each other, any mistake on a lower level will distort the judgment 
and amplify the inaccuracies. This model was described because the Lens model operates on 
the same principles and assesses the accuracy of the judgment. Brunswik’s conceptualisation 
was picked up by Hammond and his colleagues (1977) and they extended the ground principles 
into the mathematical framework of social judgment research. In fact, the issues with the 
possible imperfections also became quantified and termed in the extended Lens model. The 
term cue utilization denotes the assessment of what cues are to which extent governing the 
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participant's judgment process, while cue validity is associated with the process of determining 
how predictable is the criterion using the given set of cues (Stewart, 2001). Part of the elegance 
of the model is that each of its components can be calculated with simple statistical analyses. 
As Stewart put it (2001, p. 35), the contribution of the Lens model is that it became „possible 
to analyze cognitive performance into the part that was due to the environment, the part that 
was due to the judge, and the relation between them".  
The application of this model to creativity research, along with the linear model 
equation, can be found in Chapter 3. In sum, the Theory of Social Judgment lends itself as a 
suitable framework for investigating how people rate creativity. The Lens model offers a simple 
quantitative model for assessing which fallible cues are informing the judgments made about 
creativity. By adapting the model to creativity research, it will become possible to analyse 
whether expert and lay judges of creativity use the same criteria to inform their judgments and 
how both groups are weighting each criterion. 
After outlining the selected framework from judgment research, let me reiterate what is 
the proposed theoretical framework for studying creative evaluation as an applied case of 
judgment making. Creativity is discussed from a cognitive point of view, i.e., in the focus of 
interest are the cognitive mechanisms involved in creative idea evaluation. Creative products 
are defined as both novel and useful, and these two components are interlinked. Further, 
creativity can only be interpreted within a social context; the judgment made about creativity is 
the result of the interaction between the product and its observer, the judge. Regarding the 
judges, there are two distinct groups examined, experts and lay people. This setup serves the 
purpose of investigating the role of expertise in creativity judgments. To date, there are several 
studies comparing experts’ and non-experts’ judgment about creativity, however, these studies 
do not offer a cohesive explanation to the question what experts are doing differently to become 
better judges of creativity than people without relevant expertise. The present research 
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addresses what information sources are used to inform judgments made about creativity 
(criteria) and how they are used (weighting). The next chapter will introduce the conceptual 






A REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES REGARDING THE 
EVALUATION OF CREATIVE IDEAS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Creativity is a multifaceted construct and notoriously difficult to capture by a single 
definition (Runco and Jaeger, 2012). Creativity is conceptualised as a process that is broadly 
similar to problem solving, in which, for both, information is coordinated toward reaching a 
specific goal (Wiggins and Bhattacharya, 2014), and the information is organized in a novel, 
unexpected way. Problems which require creative solutions are ill-defined, primarily because 
there are multiple hypothetical solutions that would satisfy the goals (Reitman, 1965). Because 
there are no objective rules on how to reach a solution to a creative problem, a combinatorial 
explosion of possible choices occurs (Simon, 1989; Simonton, 2010). Therefore, embarking on 
a solution to an ill-defined problem necessitates the problem solver to frame and interpret what 
might be relevant as a possible goal and then to establish a solution that meets that goal (Hayes, 
1989; Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, & Redmond, 1994).  
For a creative problem, an original solution is often unthinkable in advance, thus 
assessing creative solutions (i.e., creative ideas) occurs in the absence of objective 
criterion/criteria against which a creative product can be measured up to. As Amabile (1983, p. 
359) put it, “current definitions of creativity are conceptual rather than operational; their 
conceptualizations have not been translated into actual assessment criteria” yet. Due to this 
‘criterion problem’ (McPherson, 1963, Shapiro, 1970), it is difficult to objectively evaluate the 
extent in which a particular goal is met (Runco and Smith, 1992; Runco and Chand, 1995). One 
of the aims of this thesis is to establish criteria which can predict reliably what people will deem 
as creative. The lack of usable criteria can be detected on higher levels too. Due to the problems 
with measurement, there is only a limited pool of available paradigms about the evaluation of 
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creativity – this chapter gives a summary of the existing paradigms linked to the evaluation of 
creative ideas. In order to develop a new measurement tool, first the previous research is 
presented in an organised form. The paradigms are reviewed from two angles: first, according 
to the type of the paradigm, and second, according to the complexity of the paradigm. From the 
overview of the paradigms, several methodological issues come to light. For the purposes of 
the present thesis, two big issues are introduced, both related to the difficulties with the 
scientific measurement of creativity. After discussing the issues with the subjective and 
domain-specific nature of creativity, we move on to the focal point of establishing a novel 
paradigm: to the selection of creativity-related criteria. An overview of the existing taxonomies 
is provided to inform the reader which criteria have been previously used to measure the sub-
components of creativity. Finally, the reasons for selecting the criteria for the present research 
will be fleshed out, keeping the applied research context in mind. 
 
2.2 Research Approach 
Since Guilford’s famous APA Presidential Address held in 1950, the psychometric 
perspective became the mainstream approach in creativity research, launching the first golden 
age of creativity research (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999). Other scholarly approaches include the 
biographical approach (e.g., Gruber’s and Gedo’s work); the historiometric approach 
hallmarked by Dean Keith Simonton’s work, the biometric approach favoured by Richard 
Haier, and the experimental approach used by Theresa Amabile and many others.  
Here, we discuss the psychometric and the experimental approaches, as these two are 
relevant for the thesis work; but before delving into the topic, perhaps it would be worthwhile 
to spell out what are the exact differences between these two approaches. The psychometric 
and the experimental approach are indeed quite similar, however, they differ in terms of the 
research design employed in them; in psychometric investigations, the research questions are 
scrutinised with correlational and causal-comparative designs, while by experiments, 
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(quasi)experimental designs are used to generate data (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999). Another 
major difference, as identified by the authors, is that while experiments are focusing on the 
cognitive, problem-solving, and product aspects of creativity, psychometric investigations 
focus on the personality and environmental aspects of creativity. The thesis research can be 
sorted into the experimental approach. 
There are four main areas of research in the psychometry of creativity: one might 
investigate the creative processes, the personality and behavioural correlates of creativity, the 
characteristics of creative products, and the attributes of creativity-fostering environments 
(Rhodes, 1961). From these, naturally, the characteristics of the creative products will be 
presented in this chapter.  
There are not too many measurement instruments for creative idea evaluation. Below, I 
summarise the currently available research methods while sorting them according to multiple 
viewpoints. However, please note that the ‘market leader’ paradigm called the Consensual 
Assessment Technique (Amabile, 1982) will be only shortly discussed in this chapter as 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to a thorough analysis of this paradigm. 
 
2.3 Sorting the Paradigms According to Type 
There are many ways to administer the evaluation of creative products. Previously, it 
was noted that common design competition assessment methods vary to the degree in which 
they are formalised - some judges rely on their gut feelings while others use external reference 
points and interpersonal discussion to refine their judgment (Yen & Sun, 2008; Lu & Luh, 
2012). The previously identified types could be categorised according to three axes: (1) whether 
the assessment is structured or not; (2) whether the evaluation is absolute or relative; and (3) 
whether the assessment is provided with or without discussion amongst the judges. This section 
describes each axis in detail. 
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First, an example of a non-structured assessment can be a judgment made using gut 
feelings. (Pétervári, Osman, & Bhattacharya, 2016). Evaluating creativity requires the complex 
assessment of multiple dimensions, however, these dimensions are not articulated often. Also, 
lay people were found to have rather implicit models regarding creativity (Lim & Plucker, 2001; 
Runco & Johnson, 2002). Given that it is difficult to explicitly verbalise the content of the 
models, judges of creativity might have an easier time with rating creativity based on their 
ineffable feelings than with forcing themselves to come up with an explanation to their 
judgment. Another example of a non-structured assessment can be a funding agent who feeds 
back some thoughts on a pitch he watched, highlighting what was his personal impression and 
his non-official advice. This assessment is subjective but also quick and efficient, focusing on 
the essential information in a communicational context.  
In scientific investigations, usually more formalised assessments are used. This is to 
offer a more in-depth coverage, to avoid ignoring any important aspect of the evaluation. 
Structured assessments require more paperwork but result in richer, less biased output data. A 
good example of a highly structured assessment method is the Creative Solution Diagnosis 
Scale (Cropley & Cropley, 2012), which inventories all noteworthy creativity-related criteria.  
Second, creativity can only be assessed compared to a certain set of other products. The 
reason for this is that a requirement of creativity is for the product to be new and novelty 
emerges only in comparison. Thus, this axis differentiates between two reference systems: 
when a creative product is measured up ‘in general’ and when it is compared to other products 
which were designed to fulfil the same goal. In the first case, an absolute judgment is made, 
where the judges utilise their expertise and taste acquired through many years of being 
presented to more or less similar items. This type of judgment is less dependent on the exact 
context, therefore, can be deemed as a “standalone”, reliable rating. However, in real life, 
creative items are usually produced for open tenders where the entries are contrasted with each 
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other to find the winner (e.g., Science magazine’s Dance Your Ph.D. competition, Creative 
Review’s Annual Competition, or the Shorty Awards ‘honouring the best of social media’). 
This other type of judgment is called relative judgment. Here, the question changes from ‘how 
creative is this product?’ to ‘which product is more creative than the others?’. An example 
assessment method of making relative judgments is the frequently used sorting comparison 
method called Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT), which operates by asking several 
experts to rate the items and establishes rankings through quantifying the agreement among the 
raters. This method is often referred as the ‘gold standard’ of creativity evaluation (Carson, 
2006) and is therefore thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3. The differences between making 
absolute versus relative judgments are further demonstrated in Chapter 7 through empirical 
data. 
Third, similarly to the idea generation phase, there are numerous techniques for getting 
to the most creative idea in the evaluation phase too. Findings vary in suggesting whether judges 
are the most equipped to spot great ideas if they do the job by themselves, or if they consult 
fellow judges and balance their opinion. According to the CAT, judges should be working 
independently from each other in order to ascertain they are not influenced in any way in their 
judgment. This method is very similar to the procedure of how prestigious prizes are awarded. 
However, in more practical settings, people rarely work in isolation. During brainstorming 
processes, the judges and the creators of the ideas are often the same people. For the self-
selection of creative ideas, a moderate frequency of communication and a decentralised 
communication pattern were found as the most advantageous settings (Leenders, van Engelen, 
& Kratzer, 2003). 
The insights drawn from here is that there are various practices on how to evaluate 
creativity. Although most researchers favour to use the CAT, sometimes in real-life settings, it 
would be more desirable to provide absolute ratings about creativity. A scientific measurement 
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tool cannot be based on hunches, however, often it would be troublesome to require judges to 
verbalise why they find something creative. To combat this issue, detailed measurement 
instruments have been constructed, however, some judges of creativity prefer to assess creative 
products rather holistically than analytically due to the complexity of the task. The next section 
analyses the available measurement techniques according to their complexity. 
 
2.4 Sorting the Paradigms According to Complexity 
Plucker and Renzulli (1999) suggested that creative evaluation techniques can be sorted 
according to their degree of complexity. With a simple grouping of similar methods, they 
identified conceptually less and more sophisticated evaluation techniques. Several 
straightforward rating scales are comprised of a few but clearly demarcated dimensions. 
Examples for this are the Creative Product Inventory (Taylor, 1975) measuring Generation, 
Reformulation, Originality, Relevancy, Hedonics, Complexity, and Condensation; the Creative 
Product Semantic Scale (Besemer, 1986), whose conceptualisation was discussed in Chapter 1 
already, or the Creative Product Analysis Matrix (Horn & Salvendy, 2009) which consists of 
six main dimensions related to product creativity: Novelty, Resolution, Emotion, Centrality, 
Importance, and Desire. Additionally, some researchers have developed criteria which can be 
employed to assess specific tasks they use in their studies, such as the criteria constructed by 
Kozbelt and Serafin (2009) for the dynamic assessment of drawings. 
As for the conceptually more complex techniques, creativity researchers often not only 
rely on specific scales but on persons who have the necessary expertise to take all relevant 
dimensions into account. Raters may vary in terms of the tasks they need to judge: in 
educational settings, teachers often register the scales mentioned above and additionally, 
provide comprehensive comments based on their knowledge of the student’s individual 
development. Similarly, experts of a domain, such as film, technology, or marketing, are often 
47 
 
employed to judge the creativity of a product corresponding to their specialised knowledge not 
only in a quantitative but also in a qualitative form. When experts are asked to share their 
professional opinion, some techniques offer instructions which are guiding the judges 
(Csíkszentmihályi & Getzels, 1971) and some do not provide additional information to avoid 
biasing the judge in any direction (e.g., Jeffries, 2017; Lee, Lee, & Youn, 2004; Lu & Luh, 
2012). A lengthy discussion of using expert ratings with and without accompanying criteria can 
be found in Chapter 3. 
The takeaway from this section is that creativity remains ineffable for many and while 
standardising its measurement is crucial from an academic point of view, in practice, many 
times the ratings are made while considering the constellation of various dimensions and cannot 
be made only by evaluating single dimensions and adding up the scores. Feelings and hunches 
are important for the judges of creativity, which might be linked to the lack of explicit 
conceptualisations about creativity in folk psychology. The next section touches upon two 
major methodological issues related to creative evaluation, which will shed further light on the 
challenges associated with the scientific measurement of creativity.  
 
2.5 Issues 
The two most common methodological problems every creativity researcher is facing 
when it comes to the evaluation of ideas are the selection of rating criteria and the subjectivity 
found in the ratings; this latter is called the rater bias (Hung, Chen, & Chen, 2012). I will first 
discuss these two problems, then continue with the issue of domain specificity since the 
domain-specific nature of creativity vastly influences the selection of rating criteria for its 
measurement. 
2.5.1 Variability in the Creativity Judgments. There are considerable individual 
differences in the rating of creative ideas (e.g., Caroff & Besançon, 2008), which poses several 
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theoretical questions about the measurement of creativity. First, one assumption of the scientific 
measurement is that while measuring a construct, the measured aspect must reveal itself 
identically to all observers (Messick, 1989; Long & Pang, 2015). Thus, it must be ensured that 
the ratings are outcomes of a systematic process and not assigned randomly. Further, since the 
variance in the creativity ratings might reflect more the judges than the construct in some cases 
(e.g., Silvia et al., 2008), the sources from which this variance stems from and their share of the 
variance must be determined. Specifically, the relation between the product and its judge must 
be established and there are two major conceptualizations for this. One of them regards the 
judges of creative products as 'rating machines', while the other considers them as independent 
experts (Hung, Chen, & Chen, 2012). If the judges are thought of as rating machines, they are 
expected to cast their ratings objectively, according to well-defined criteria, and therefore are 
expected to reach an almost full agreement. If the judges are considered as independent experts, 
the assessment becomes more subjective as the judges are expected to apply their own 
understanding of the criteria and the goal is not to reach a high degree of consensus but to apply 
the criteria consistently. As a quality control of the ratings, the use of a large number of judges 
is recommended, thus the effect of individual differences can be cancelled out. However, 
acquiring ratings from many judges is rarely feasible in practice (Kaufman & Baer, 2012) (see 
Chapter 3 for more details). 
At the core of the two outlined approaches lies the way in which the idiosyncratic 
interpretations of creativity are considered. The intra-individual variability is influenced by 
both situational and dispositional factors, e.g., demographic variables and expertise were found 
to be related to the judgments made about creativity (White, Shen, & Smith, 2002). Even a 
general term, the so-called rater effect was coined to describe the individual rating tendency of 
a judge which influences the assessment of creativity (Wolfe, 2004; Hung, Chen, & Chen, 
2012). In most creativity studies, the rater effect is dealt with as a type of noise related to the 
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data which should be estimated and corrected for, along with other sources of error (Long & 
Pang, 2015). Ultimately, the rater effect is understood as the human factor or the social 
constituent in the creativity ratings. While there is a general attempt to minimize it as it might 
pose a "major threat to construct validity" (Long & Pang, 2015; Messick, 1995), it is an open 
question whether the judges are indeed making systematic errors while assessing the ideas. And 
if so, what could be learned about creativity from these errors.  
Taking a different approach, the variance due to the raters could also be observed as 
meaningful data and not as a source of measurement error. The rater effect might reflect the 
variability of the creativity conceptions internalized in each judge. Thus, while the first general 
model of creativity outlines that  
creativity rating = creativity of the product + measurement error 
in the second case, the model could be expanded to  
creativity rating = creativity of the product + rater's understanding of the criteria + 
measurement error. 
As it becomes apparent from this section, the most important question to address is 
whether it would be a reasonable expectation from the judges of creativity to cast the same 
rating about a product (within a confidence interval). For a scientific measurement, such a 
universal “creativity value” would be required. Or, if giving such absolute values are more 
influenced by the judges’ rating tendencies than by the creativity of the product, would it be 
reasonable to expect from the judges of creativity to make the same ranking of the products? 
The CAT assumes that this latter is feasible to expect from the judges. 
Before constructing a novel paradigm, one must think through what scale should be used 
for measuring creativity. Even more so, the variability found in the creativity ratings must be 
interpreted on a theoretical level. In the present research, the idiosyncratic interpretations of 
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creativity are acknowledged as meaningful data and this data source is part of our measurement 
theory. 
Next, a different issue with the measurement is discussed: the question whether 
creativity is rather domain-general or -specific (or perhaps neither or both) and how this 
influences the construction of a measurement tool for creative evaluation. 
2.5.2 Domain-Specificity. The degree to which a given domain constrains a creator is 
one of the hot debates in creativity research. As Baer (2010, p. 321) noted it, “whether creativity 
is a general, domain-transcending set of skills, aptitudes, traits, propensities, and motivations 
that can be productively deployed in any domain – or, conversely, whether the skills, aptitudes, 
traits, propensities, and motivations that lead to creative performance vary from domain to 
domain – is a key question in creativity research and theory”. There are many different points 
raised in the debate; e.g., since a general factor, which could be utilised to many different 
domains, was found in intelligence research (Neisser et al., 1996), it seemed reasonable to think 
that there would be a personality trait or cognitive skill associated with generating creative 
products, regardless of the domain (Baer, 2015). The broad adoptability of general intelligence 
also inspired the construction of creativity tests and trainings for many years. From all the 
related issues to domain-specificity, two key questions were selected corresponding to the 
purposes of this thesis: (1) are domain-general evaluators good enough judges of creativity or 
domain-specific experts are needed? (2) are the results obtained from one domain of creative 
evaluation transferable to reason about other domains and are they comparable with the results 
acquired from different domains? 
To answer these questions, we must note that for creative achievements, broad abilities 
(such as problem-solving skills) must be used in a specialised way or, differently put, in a 
narrow direction. Thus, even if domain-general judges of creativity are experienced and 
proficient in evaluating ideas or proposals, they would need domain-relevant information to 
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assess the feasibility of a project from a highly codified domain (Kaufman et al., 2013). Based 
on this logic, if the creative product is related to a more accessible domain, then domain-general 
judges are acceptable to use. Regarding the second question, even the advocates of the domain-
general approach acknowledged that creativity is content-specific, and in many cases, even 
task-specific (Plucker, 1998). These are not good news for research efficiency and a 
compromise might be to compare results obtained from the same branch of creativity research 
(e.g., functional judgments or aesthetic judgments). 
Csíkszentmihályi (1999) argued that one reason for the controversies observed in this 
debate is that, similarly to chemistry before the periodical system or to physics before the 
quantum theory, without a paradigm proposing a symbolic system for a domain, it is very 
difficult to resolve conceptually intertwined issues. On a similar note, Plucker & Beghetto 
(2004) resolved the Gordian knot by declaring that the question of whether creativity is domain-
general or domain-specific is most likely to be posed improperly since this kind of division is 
not clearly interpretable. They bring the example of humans having the potential to become an 
eminent creator in multiple different domains (domain-general abilities) but then acquiring the 
necessary expertise in only one of these possible domains (domain-specific performance). 
Clearly, the chosen domain of a creative endeavour influences what measurement 
technique can be used for assessment, also what measurement instrument can be constructed to 
account for all relevant dimensions present in a task. In the present thesis, these challenges were 
overcome by selecting both domain-general and -specific criteria for assessment, which will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Now we move on to the next section, in which I collect the criteria used for creativity 





2.6 Existing Taxonomies of Features 
A review of 90 creativity studies (Dean, Hender, Rogers, & Santanen, 2006) was used 
to identify the features by which a creative product is evaluated. The authors adopted 
MacCrimmon & Wagner’s (1994) multi-attribute taxonomy and classified the features related 
to creative products as typically falling into categories that include novelty, workability, 
relevance, and specificity. This four-dimension framework mapped well with 51 out of the 90 
studies. Novelty was defined based on whether an idea has been expressed before. Workability 
could be interpreted as feasibility: whether the idea could be easily implemented (did it violate 
known constraints?). Relevance was fulfilled if the idea satisfied the goals set by the problem 
solver. Finally, thoroughness was closely related to resolution – an idea was found to be 
thorough if it was worked out in detail. It is conspicuous that all four features were domain-
general criteria of creativity, accordingly, the studies were collected from various domains. 
A full list of all features stated in the studies goes as the following: Novelty, Creativity, 
Originality, Unusualness, Paradigm Relatedness, Non-obviousness, Imaginativeness, 
Innovativeness, Excitement, Rarity related to Novelty. Workability, Feasibility, 
Implementability, Logical, Adoptability, Non-violation of known constraints, Practicality, 
Social Acceptability, Probability related to Workability. Relevance, How well it dealt with 
problems, Effectiveness, Appropriateness, Ability to solve the problem, Potential plausibility, 
Impact, Value addition, Applicability, Business potential, Utility/Usefulness, Relation to topic, 
Importance, Realistic, Magnitude of impact of policy on stakeholders, Goodness or usefulness 
for purpose, Validity, Significance, Quality related to Relevance. Finally, Specificity, 
Thoroughness, How well described, Solution based on facts and possibilities, Generality, 
Detail, Depth, Clarity related to Specificity. This list is provided to show that a wide variety of 
creativity-related features exist and there is no consensus on which ones to use. In fact, there 
are several problems stemming from the irregular use of features associated with the assessment 
of creativity: (1) they make it difficult to train the judges, (2) they result in raters being 
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inconsistent in their individual ratings, (3) they can lead to inconsistencies between the raters, 
and (4) they make the studies’ comparability and generalisability low (Dean et al., 2006). 
The conclusion of the review was that different studies measure different constructs: 
measuring idea quality and idea creativity are not equal. Also, Dean et al. (2006) found that for 
a systematic sampling, the best is to score each creativity-related dimension separately than to 
provide a holistic, overall creativity score too. 
In the recent years, another ambitious initiative set out to construct a comprehensive 
scale for the evaluation of functional creativity (Cropley & Kaufman, 2012, 2013; Haller, 
Courvoisier, & Cropley, 2011). The Creative Solution Diagnosis Scale consists of four main 
features: Relevance and Effectiveness, Novelty, Elegance, and Genesis. The 30-item 
measurement instrument was validated through a study of judging mousetrap designs and was 
shortened to a 24-item scale (Cropley & Kaufman, 2012). There are several indicators 
associated with each feature. Relevance and Effectiveness consists of correctness, performance, 
appropriateness, operability, safety, and durability. Novelty includes diagnosis, prescription, 
prognosis, replication, combination, incrementation, redirection, reconstruction, re-initiation, 
redefinition, and generation. Elegance involves recognition, convincingness, pleasingness, 
completeness, gracefulness, harmoniousness, and sustainability. Finally, Genesis, which is a 
dimension not mentioned in the review above, includes foundationability, transferability, 
germinability, seminality, vision, and pathfinding.  
These partly domain-general, partly domain-specific indicators were collected and 
validated to offer a fine-tuned resolution about the creativity judgments and to cover all possible 
contributing factors. Although Cropley & Kaufman’s scale covers more dimensions than any 
other evaluation inventories, it is questionable whether it would become a widely used 
measurement instrument due to the time and energy constraints imposed by the administration 
of it. The takeaway message for this thesis is that a good balance should be kept between 
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covering all dimensions and covering too few dimensions: several but not too many criteria 
should be selected for the present research, which can be handled by both expert and lay judges 
of creativity. Next, I discuss which criteria were selected for the applied purposes of the present 
research. 
2.7 The Implementation of Features in an Applied Context 
The previous section shed light on the wide range of features used as creativity-related 
criteria and on the lack of consensus among the researchers on which ones to use. Creativity-
related criteria are not standardised, and the selection of features is most likely to be determined 
by the specifics of the task and by the information available to the researcher, e.g., the 
consciously chosen research tradition which the scholar set out to follow. In psychological 
research, efforts are made to cover all relevant dimensions related to creativity (e.g., the 
Creative Solution Diagnosis Scale, Cropley & Kaufman, 2012). However, in applied research 
fields, such as consumer research, or in practical settings, such as multinational corporations’ 
product development units, fewer criteria are selected to focus on the relevant features and to 
make the process as efficient as possible. For example, in the innovation literature, the 
requirements of creativity are novelty, usefulness, and value produced for the firm, while in the 
creativity literature, these requirements are novelty, usefulness, and value produced for the user 
of the product (Frederiksen & Knudsen, 2017). In the words of the authors, “the usefulness-to-
the-recipients requirement is rarely found in the innovation literature” (p. 3). These examples 
show that the goal of the evaluation must be kept in sight while constructing assessment 
instruments. Additionally, the review analysed above (Dean et al., 2006) outlined guidelines 
for feature selection. The main decision points are the selection of the construct which one aims 
to measure and the selection of the features which are relevant for the experimental task. The 
purpose of the research determines how many and which criteria are chosen to be included in 
the assessment tool.  
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Applying these notions to the present premises, the rationale behind choosing the focus 
of the research will be explained. First, creativity was chosen as the construct to be measured 
(and not, for example, the quality of the ideas). This is due to the theoretical framework outlined 
in Chapter 1. The present research addresses the cognitive mechanisms involved in creative 
idea evaluation, not the ideas presented as the stimuli. The research is designed to learn more 
about what information sources are used to inform judgments made about creativity and how 
they are used.  
Second, the domain of urbanism was chosen for the investigations. Here, the aim was 
to produce realistic stimuli. The target group of the first few experiments were university 
students in London, who are coming from vastly different backgrounds. A common experience 
shared by all of them is living in one of the biggest cities in the world. Thus, the domain related 
to improving urban lives was selected, as presumably the students have some basic knowledge 
and interest regarding this topic. 
Finally, the assessment criteria were selected. Four criteria are used in this research and 
they were selected with a goal of both covering the most relevant dimensions linked to creativity 
and constructing a pragmatic, off-the-shelf tool for assessing urban ideas. Along these lines, 
two criteria, originality and utility, are domain-general and core to the definition of creativity.  
The first criterion measures how novel, unique, and surprising is the idea and the second 
criterion assesses the functionality of the idea. The other two criteria are specific to the domain, 
which is improving urban lives. These are concerned with the feasibility of the creative idea: 
scalability and riskiness (i.e. whether a project would be implementable and sustainable). 
Scalability stands for the likelihood of the creative product to penetrate multiple regions, which 
is a requirement for spreading rapidly. Low risk means a high probability for the product to get 
implemented; this criterion can be measured by how positive the outlook on the project is. 
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These criteria were drawn from field studies observing the criteria used by venture capitalists 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2000). 
In sum, this section explained the principles based on which criteria for the assessment 
of creativity are selected at different premises, then used the insights to describe the purposes 
of the present research and outlined the thought process behind the main decisions made about 
the research design. 
Zooming out, the present chapter inventoried the most important issues which must be 
considered for selecting the methodological approach of the present research. The takeaways 
from this chapter are that both domain-general and domain-specific features should be included 
in the judgment; that researchers must come up with a research design which accounts for the 
variability found in the ratings; and that the aim of the research could be to explain as much 
variance in the ratings as possible and to inform cognitive theory about the mechanisms behind 
creative idea evaluation. 
The reasoning about the selected assessment method will be continued in Chapter 4 
with the description of the creation and validation of the paradigm. Before that, Chapter 3 
continues the outline of methodological considerations, however, with a narrow focus on one 
question. The question the next chapter is considering is that given the criterion problem of 
creativity research (McPherson, 1963, Shapiro, 1970), what alternatives could be used as 






THE CRITERION PROBLEM OF CREATIVITY RESEARCH – USING ALTERNATIVE 




To measure creativity, one needs to know what creativity is. However, finding the 
common denominator in all aspects of creativity is a challenging task. Creativity researchers 
spent decades of efforts on boiling down what the essence of being creative is (as demonstrated 
by the abundance of theories and definitions outlined in Chapter 1); and in the meantime, the 
construct needed to be measured at various fields, from school to workplace, even without a 
consensual definition. As Chapter 2 documented it already, there is a lack of objective 
criterion/criteria against which a creative product can be measured up to. This chapter goes into 
further details about the problems with the measurement and explores what could be done to 
get around these problems.  
Historically, to resolve the lack of conceptualisation which could have been translated 
into an operational definition of creativity (Amabile, 1983), proxies of creativity were used in 
experimental settings. The protocols included either divergent thinking (DT) tests, which were 
designed to capture only one aspect of the construct but could be scored objectively, or other 
creative production tasks which were more ecologically valid but were difficult to evaluate. To 
resolve the latter issue, expert judgments were adopted to academic research. The reason for 
asking experts to evaluate creative products is that according to the mainstream approach, ‘one 
can recognize creativity if one sees it’ (Amabile, 1982; Csíkszentmihályi, 1990; Cropley & 




The reason why tests used to not involve direct criteria for creativity was the lack of 
such criteria. The infamous 'criterion problem' (McPherson, 1963, Shapiro, 1970) denotes the 
methodological struggle in which researchers and practitioners should come up with pre-
defined objective criteria against which the creative product could be measured. The issue here 
is that the most creative solutions are often unthinkable in advance, thus constructing criteria to 
measure them before they exist is troublesome. A further problem pointed out by Amabile 
(1982) is that even if there are criteria for assessment at hand, they are still not going to be used 
in an objective manner but rather according to the internalised conception of creativity 
possessed by the judge. She concluded that an objective scoring of creativity is not possible 
since the judgment is largely based on the specific social context. Similarly, Csíkszentmihályi 
noted that "we cannot study creativity by isolating individuals and their works from the social 
and historical milieu in which their actions are carried out" (2014, p. 47). Hence, a measurement 
technique avoiding the use of criteria was crafted and, in a few decades, it became the 
mainstream method of evaluating creativity in academic research. 
 
3.2 Avoiding the Use of a Criterion: the Consensual Assessment Technique as the 
Mainstream Assessment Tool of Creativity 
Amabile advocated that the judges of creativity should embrace the subjective aspect of 
the process and rely on their ability to detect the signal of creativity when they perceive it. She 
has defined creativity from a practical, measurable point of view: "A product or response is 
creative to the extent that appropriate observers independently agree it is creative. Appropriate 
observers are those familiar with the domain in which the product was created or the response 
articulated" (1982, p. 1001). With this approach, the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT, 
Amabile, 1982, 1983, 1996) was born. 
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The procedure of administering this methodology comprises of two basic steps (Baer & 
McKool, 2009). First, a set of creative products is generated, which might be anything from 
musical pieces through sculptures to mousetrap designs. All participants, who are usually non-
experts or quasi-experts, receive instructions about what they need to produce and are provided 
with the required materials if required. Subsequently, experts of the corresponding field must 
judge how creative each product is. Usually, creativity is judged using a Likert-scale whose 
range is set by the creativity researcher. Judges are encouraged to use the full scale while rating 
multiple products. Seemingly, it is a straight-forward process. 
Additionally, some ground rules were laid down to standardize how the expert judgment 
should be made. First, I describe these rules, then I interpret them from a critical point of view. 
To begin, the experts must work independently and cannot interfere with each other’s judgment 
in any way. More importantly, they cannot be asked to explain how or why they cast their votes. 
Any choice made is considered as final and cannot be questioned under any circumstances. The 
only guideline provided is that judges should use their "mysterious expertise” to judge 
creativity, that is, only their understanding of the field should guide their judgments, nothing 
else. That is, providing with any additional instruction, explanation, or assessment criteria is 
prohibited. 
One should also note that ratings are cast in a relative, not in an absolute manner (for 
further details about how this might influence judgments, see Chapter 7). In other words, judges 
are only ranking the products from the given pool, the judgments cannot be and should not be 
interpreted as standalone creativity ratings. This methodology is only suitable for making 
internal, group-level ratings, i.e., even the highest received score means only that the item is 
the most creative in the pool but can be nevertheless quite weak if contrasted to any external 




To capture the innovative value of this methodology, it will be outlined now what 
exactly was gained by starting to use it and how did it become the mainstream paradigm of 
evaluating creativity. Then, the next section will detail what is on the other side of the coin, i.e., 
how did the success of the CAT lead to a methodological impasse in creativity research. 
There are several factors accounting for the popularity of CAT. Above all, it takes the 
bull by the horns: it is one of the few evaluation methods which directly assesses the full 
construct of creativity. In other words, the CAT is not restricted to measuring a subcomponent 
of creativity or only a related aspect. Further, it makes the lab assessment of creativity largely 
similar to the real-world assessment of creativity. Adding these two aspects together suggests 
that it is an ecologically valid way of measuring creativity. Due to its simple design, it is 
applicable to many different domains, more recently its use has even been expanded beyond 
artistic creativity (Lee, Lee, & Youn, 2005; Tan et al., 2015). If appropriate experts are in reach, 
the conduct of CAT becomes uncomplicated. One of its beneficial aspects is its feasibility. 
On the other hand, several concerns can also be raised regarding the CAT. This section 
plots the problematic aspects of using this methodology, while the next section outlines the 
wider implications of how using CAT has affected creativity research, with a focus on studying 
the evaluation of creativity. The first group of concerns regards the sampling of the experts. 
From the description of the method, it is not transparent what exactly the threshold of expertise 
should be – the decision seems to be left to the creativity researcher. Since convenience is a 
major factor by sampling the participants of any research endeavour, the selection of not 
sufficient judges might not only compromise the results but also blur the findings included in 
the wider literature. It is also not clear how many experts are required for each investigation. 
Although naming them a group implies there must be at least three experts involved, there is 
no explicitly stated minimum which each creativity study should consider. Since the number of 
experts is almost never higher than fifteen (e.g., Kaufman, Gentile, & Baer, 2005; Kaufman et 
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al., 2008; Runco, McCarthy, & Svenson, 1994), perhaps a meta-analysis of the studies 
employing the CAT could be conducted to check whether such a low number of judges is 
acceptable to draw conclusions from.  
The next concern is related to the notion that the experts should work independently 
from each other. It is trivial that if the consensus among independent judges is the dependent 
variable, judges should not communicate in any way during the test. However, the 
independence of the judges cannot be secured with this single instruction. Realistically, the 
expert pool of the CAT is often recruited from the same lab or company. Thus, there is a good 
chance that the independent experts know each other quite well, have professional discussions 
regularly, have formed each other’s tastes and knowledge, as well as share one to many group 
memberships. These experiences are likely to lead to shared mental models which might stand 
behind their consensus. Given these factors, many possible confounds might be involved by the 
expert judgments. 
The second group of concerns is philosophical and regards the way in which creativity 
must be judged by the experts when administering the CAT. Here, the underlying assumption 
is that creativity is an objective quality, which is revealing itself in different products and 
appropriate judges are equipped to recognise it (Csíkszentmihályi, 1999). This assumption 
induces several questions: is creativity really a similar quality to a colour, which might be 
detected visually? Is creativity something which can be perceived or is creativity rather 
something which is constructed on a higher cognitive level? Further, if creativity is linked to 
its recognition, if a product does not get public recognition, then does it cease to be creative?  
It is difficult to locate where creativity happens because neither the individual, nor the 
social context or the domain can be singled out (Csíkszentmihályi, 2014). According to the 
systems view of creativity, all these components are entangled since "without a culturally 
defined domain of action in which innovation is possible, the person cannot even get started. 
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And without a group of peers to evaluate and confirm the adaptiveness of the innovation, it is 
impossible to differentiate what is creative from what is simply statistically improbable or 
bizarre" (p. 48). Investigations using the CAT are focusing on the product instead of the person. 
Although the domain is taken into account, the same cannot be said about the social context. 
Finally, the third group of concerns regards what the judgments of the projects imply. 
On a practical level, the guidelines of the CAT explicitly state that the creativity judgments 
should not be taken at face value but that these judgments are only orienting inside the pool of 
products and cannot be translated into standalone assessments. However, one might question 
that if obtaining absolute creativity ratings would be the ultimate goal of any 
stakeholder/researcher and given that the CAT is declaratively not apt to provide such, then 
should not be another method which can provide this information too?  
In the studies featuring CAT, the products under scrutiny are created for the purpose of 
studying creativity. It is explicitly stated that the judgments provided cannot be generalised 
outside of the pool of products. Conducting measurements by making ’mock-ups’ of creativity 
assessment raises a theoretical issue. Namely, the logic of psychological research is that 
paradigms are sought to organize empirical data in such way that through analysis the 
assumption of a theory can be verified or falsified. The CAT does not belong to the group of 
such paradigms, as after administering it, researchers do not get to know anything about the 
process, only about the outcome. It is almost as if creativity would happen below an opaque 
bell jar - once the process has finished, the jar gets lifted and creativity can reveal itself to the 
public. Some reasonable doubts can be drawn about this. First, is it always possible to judge 
creativity divided from the story behind the creative product? The risk is that only simple 
products (e.g., drawings created by pupils) can be assessed using this method. If expert judges 
cannot be provided with any accompanying information, then more abstract products might 
remain unseen. If it is not evident what a creative product represents (e.g., a dance, installation), 
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then a crucial step of understanding might be missing without providing any additional 
explanation of the context. 
To sum up, although the CAT is a simple and compelling method to evaluate creativity, 
its applicability is limited, and its use does not inform cognitive theory. 
 
3.3 Reasons for Using Criteria for Creativity Measurements 
The main argument of this section is that historically, having had no agreement on what 
constitutes creativity, the CAT was an adequate methodology to measure creativity in the best 
possible way. However, making it the ultimate tool of evaluating creativity also avoided the 
core questions academic research should address and reduced the level of investigations to a 
purely practical, atheoretical level. The CAT is applied since more than 30 years, and during 
the long decades the understanding of creativity in the scientific community has increased with 
a large extent. From this point of view, it seems counter-intuitive why an old paradigm would 
be still in the main stream of research instead of being replaced by methods which are informed 
by the theoretical advancements. It seems that the messiness associated with finding objective, 
ultimate criteria for the evaluation of creativity has kept most researchers away – apart from a 
handful of attempts (e.g., Cropley & Kaufman, 2012; Haller, Courvoisier, & Cropley, 2011). 
The CAT can be used as a shortcut to evaluate creativity but from a theoretical point of view, 
it is rather a temporary solution which might give the false comfort as if finding an ultimate 
solution would not be required. Even if it is accepted that the CAT is the optimal methodology 
which should be adopted on a large scale, one should note that doing so cannot be feasible due 
to the limited number of experts available and due to the limited amount of funds available to 
compensate these experts for their efforts. On top of that, even if there would be more financial 
sources to support a widespread use of the CAT as a general research methodology in all 
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creative evaluation studies, the time-consuming nature of the paradigm would still prompt 
researchers to look for a more scalable solution. 
Thus, while it is not difficult to see that even on practical grounds, the CAT cannot offer 
an ultimate solution, numerous studies are still occupied with providing a more and more fine-
grained account of how it can be used (e.g., Baer, Kaufman, & Gentile, 2004; Jeffries, 2017). 
In the meantime, only limited resources are left to work on the still unresolved theoretical and 
methodological issues. Focusing on the underlying principle of the CAT, which is that one can 
recognise creativity if one sees it, the question arises: how does this recognition happen? It 
would be desirable to decompose the recognition process to its components and this process 
should start with the identification of the psychological processes contributing to it. Another 
reason for why a scientific understanding of how creativity emerges is required in the near 
future is that, sooner or later, this job will be outsourced to machines. If researchers give up on 
finding an at least partly objective way to quantify the amount of creativity in a product, the 
computerisation of the evaluation process cannot be started. Amabile's observation regarding 
the rating of creativity being socially determined was spot on and it means that a good model 
of creativity should include a quantified measure of the interaction between the social context, 
the judge’s knowledge and the creativity signal.  
Indeed, she has acknowledged that it might be possible "to identify particular objective 
features of products that correlate with subjective judgments of creativity or to analyse the 
nature of subjective correlates of those judgments" (Amabile, 1982, p. 1001). This can be only 
corroborated in 2017, as nowadays there is a consensus about the defining traits of creativity in 
the literature, at least one of the novelty/originality and the usefulness/appropriateness 
components being involved in all of them (e.g., Corazza, 2016; Runco, & Jaeger, 2012; 
Simonton, 2012). Still, the consensus in definition does not translate to a consensus in 
approaches in the selection of creativity-related evaluation criteria (cf., Kudrowitz & Wallace, 
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2013, Table 1). As demonstrated in the Existing Taxonomies of Features section of Chapter 2, 
the variability of approaches in selecting creativity-related criteria shows that there is no overall 
agreement on what the standard criteria for measuring creativity should be. Often, it is up to the 
researchers what criteria to use as there are only a few suitable measurement tools and most of 
them are general tests which need to be adopted to the specific domain and task. To combat 
these challenges, in the present thesis two domain-general and two domain-specific features 
have been selected, apart from measuring creativity directly (see Chapter 2 and 4). In the 
remainder of this chapter, alternative methodological frameworks will be considered. First, the 
Lens model is discussed, which is rooting back to the '50s and has been successfully used in 
multiple domains of judgment and decision-making research ever since. 
 
3.4 Probing Whether Expert Judgment Is a Suitable Substitute of the Criterion via the 
Lens Model 
This section deals with Brunswik’s Lens model (1952; Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch, 
1964) which can be used to assess the accuracy of human judgment. The model is presented 
here as it is a good tool to analyse what information is extracted from multiple cues to form the 
basis of a judgment. Also, because it quantifies how much each criterion is contributing to the 
judgment. The Theory of Social Judgment, on which the model is based, was already introduced 
in Chapter 1. Below, the model’s application to creativity research is discussed. 
The Lens model was selected as a possible framework for the thesis research since it 
has been applied widely and because some intriguing similarities were found in the structure of 
the model with our spontaneously constructed data analysis strategy. The Lens model lent itself 
as a suitable mathematical framework to take a closer look at the raters’ internalised criteria, 
i.e., to explore where does the difference between experts’ highly informed judgments and non-
experts’ naïve judgments stem from. In fact, this model allowed for gaining a deeper 
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understanding about how both the group of experts and non-experts interpreted the provided 
criteria and compared what patterns emerged, which helped to determine the extent of 
objectivity in the evaluations (the model is illustrated in Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. The Lens model applied to the current research paradigm. Cues are the creativity-
related features.  
 
To our knowledge, this thesis is the first attempt to apply the Lens model to creative 
evaluation, despite the model being consistently used to study social judgments on fields 
stretching from medical decisions to moral judgments.  
As for the application of the model, there was a clear match between the creativity-
related criteria used in the empirical chapters with the cues used in the model. On the other 
hand, choosing the criterion value proved to be somewhat problematic. The word criterion was 
already mentioned in the sections above, specifically because creativity research struggles with 
not having a clear-cut criterion to mark the threshold between what is creative and what is not. 
Thus, the best available proxy was selected as the criterion: the judgment of experts. One could 
raise the issue that this approach seems largely similar to the CAT, however, while the CAT 
explicitly states that judges should not be provided with any specific criteria or training, here, 
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exactly the opposite happens. Expert judges need not only to rate the creativity of products but 
all cues contributing to the judgment too. With the present application of the model, the use of 
criteria between two groups (experts and non-experts) becomes comparable.  
Although it was argued in this chapter that using expert ratings can substitute the 
missing criterion for creativity ratings, a few caveats must be noted. I do not claim that the use 
of expert ratings can replace a criterion drawn from the environment – I am aware that this 
solution is not ideal. Nevertheless, to make a step forward, the investigation was started with 
the best available proxy. When making this choice, it was acknowledged that there are some 
serious limitations associated with the use of expert ratings. The first one of these limitations is 
using simulated/hypothetical values for the cues and the criterion (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008).. 
The ideal workflow would be to generate predictions, then verify or falsify them by obtaining 
direct measurement values from the environment. The problem with using expert ratings as the 
criterion of creativity is that when the ratings of unexperienced judges are tested, the expert 
ratings cannot inform about the true state of the environment; they only provide with another 
set of predictions. Assumedly, these predictions are more closely representing the true state of 
the environment than the non-experts' ratings but the expert ratings are subjective (e.g., 
Amabile, 1982) and hypothetical too.  
Based on this, one could say that since creativity is only a social construct and can only 
be captured as a subjective preference, then there is no evidence that experts are more accurate 
judges of creativity than lay people are. It has not been shown empirically what aspect of 
expertise is what enables experts to judge creativity better than lay people do. We might even 
come short of direct evidence about how experts are able to judge creativity more correctly, not 
only differently (e.g., Cropley & Kaufman, 2013; Kaufman & Baer, 2012).  In practice, experts 
are thought to be more accurate estimators of creativity than lay people because experts have 
more experience, which enables them to judge both whether a project proposal is original and 
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whether it would be feasible to implement it. Due to the time spent in a certain domain, they 
are better equipped to estimate the associated risk with a project. A further argument for using 
expert judgments is related to a key concept of Brunswik's work. This is representative design, 
which means that any experiment should be created by representing the outside world in order 
to be able to generalise its results to a larger population (Brunswik, 1952; Hammond, 2001). In 
other words, a lab experiment should be designed to mirror how values and structures are 
observed in the ecology. Applying this principle to creativity research, studies investigating 
how creativity is evaluated should be streamlined with the factors of practices of "real-world" 
evaluation of creativity. That is why expert ratings were taken as the assessment method of 
creativity.  
A possible criticism for using expert ratings as substitutes for the criterion of creativity 
is that experts are not unerring either. There is plenty of evidence showing that expertise as a 
mental set can impede the solving of a problem (Wiley, 1998; Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008). 
Anecdotal evidence is also available about the close-mindedness of experts; e.g., art history 
provides us with numerous stories regarding the immediate rejection of new trends in painting 
(such as impressionism, cubism, or fauvism) coming from the experts. As Kaufman & Baer 
(2012) notes it, “How could we expect experts to judge those creations that might be changing 
the very rules that helped establish their own standing in their field?” (p. 84). Again, the 
unavailability of objective metrics makes it impossible to check the true state of the 
environment, therefore, the consensus in the subjective ratings is the only method which can 
make these ratings ‘relatively objective’. Whether there is a ’true score’ of creativity could only 
be found out by taking a closer look at the environment and taking direct indicators of creativity 
from there (possible ideas for this are outlined later in this chapter).  
Apart from the criterion value, there are certain issues related to the use of cues in the 
research context of creativity. One of them is related to the inability to capture the criteria 
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directly and not as an estimate cast by judges. The result of this difficulty is a lack of hard 
numbers. In the words of Karelaia and Hogarth (2008, p. 407),  
 
"an important dimension of many tasks involves identifying and assessing levels 
of relevant information (Einhorn, 1972). Therefore, one can distinguish between 
studies where cues are “given” as opposed to “achieved.” For the former, 
decision makers are provided with the explicit values of the cues by the 
investigator. For the latter, the values of the cues need to be inferred—and often 
even identified—by decision makers."  
 
 
Certainly, the latter is the case by creativity judgments. E.g., originality and 
appropriateness are quite difficult to quantify, and the judges need to get through a lengthy 
process to achieve the values. They need to identify and select the relevant information linked 
to each cue/criterion from a noisy environment.  
Further, an appropriate criterion is linearly linked to the cues (the cues can be its 
predictor variables). To be able to use the experts' ratings as the criterion for non-experts' 
ratings, the two groups must use similar cues to inform their judgments. The validity of these 
concerns could only be warranted by conducting empirical research and checking which 
hypotheses are confirmed by the results.  
Another concern linked to this methodological framework is that a criterion drawn from 
the environment is a single score (even if it includes the measurement error). This looks a bit 
different in case of the present procedure. Although direct creativity ratings were obtained from 
a set of domain-specific experts (n=8), their ratings are estimates and can only be used if they 
are highly consistent (i.e., if the standard deviation in a project's ratings is low). In other words, 
the judgments obtained from individuals with at least 10 years of experience in a domain related 
to cities such as urban planning or civil engineering can only be used as the criterion value if a 
high degree of consensus is found in their ratings. Otherwise, it cannot be determined what 
value should be selected. Although a lot of researchers have reported a rather strong consensus 
amongst the experts rating different creative products (Amabile, 1996; Baer, 1998; Baer, 
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Kaufman, & Gentile, 2004; Hennessey & Amabile, 1999; Kaufman, Lee, Baer, & Lee, 2007, 
Kaufman, Baer, & Cole, 2009), in a few studies, very little or no agreement was found (Hickey, 
2001; Jeffries, 2017; Lee, Lee, & Youn, 2005).  
Even if it can be assumed that experts agree on the evaluation of a given product, 
employing the Lens model to investigate the evaluation of creativity still does not become 
problem-free. The logic of the Lens model is that it assesses the match between multiple 
judgments made about the environment and the indicator of the environment (criterion) 
(Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008) or the so-called judgmental achievement. Amabile argues that the 
judgment of creativity is determined by the "test constructor's or scorer's intuitive assessment 
of what is creative and not according to the objective criteria of novelty, appropriateness, 
satisfyingness, and so on" (Amabile, 1982, p. 999). Based on this, if experts' and non-experts' 
judgments are made according to their internalised conceptualisation of creativity, then the Lens 
model analysis becomes only a comparison between two groups of subjective judgments, not a 
comparison between subjective judgments and the criterion drawn from the environment. Since 
the structure of the model is to compare estimates to one fixed value, comparing two sets of 
estimates might be troublesome. Translating this problem to mathematical terms, the Lens 
model equation’s (presented as Equation 1) outcome measure is the correlation between the 






The components are depicted in Figure 1 presented in Chapter 1 and can be defined as the 
following (based on Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008; Kaufmann, Reips, & Wittmann, 2013): 
ra = achievement index (i.e., the correlation between a person's judgments and the criterion), 
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G = knowledge index or the correlation between the predictions of both models: the predicted 
levels of the criterion and the predicted judgments, 
Re = environmental predictability (i.e., multiple correlation of the cues with the criterion or the 
degree to which a judgment can be made based on the cues),  
Rs = consistency, response linearity, or the reliability of judgments (i.e., the multiple correlation 
of the cues with a judge's estimate or in other words, the extent to which a judge reliably reaches 
the same judgment based on the same pieces of information), 
C = an unmodeled knowledge component that signifies the correlation between the residuals 
from the environmental predictability component and the consistency component. 
To calculate the achievement index, one criterion value is compared with one judgment and 
this step is iterated many times. A requirement for using expert judgments as the criterion value 
of creativity is that the range of the ratings cannot be too wide or otherwise there would be no 
basis on which to decide what should be the single value used as the indicator of the 
environment. The descriptive data about the ratings collected from the domain-specific expert 
judges showed a large variance in the creativity ratings (cf. Table 4 in Chapter 4). A moderate 
degree of absolute agreement was found after conducting a two-way mixed intra-class 
correlation. The coefficient was .497 with a 95% confidence interval from -.008 to .800 
(F(14,98)= 2, p=.026). Krippendorff’s alpha was obtained as another measure for inter-rater 
agreement. Taking all 15 projects, α=.058, which signals a low degree of agreement. Item 
analyses were also conducted to identify projects whose evaluation indicated a higher level of 
agreement. Inter-judge and judge-total correlations were computed to assess the internal 
consistency of the domain-specific judges (see Table 6 & 7 in Ch. 4). Inter-judge correlations 
ranged between .08 and .33, indicating vast individual differences in the experts' judgments. 
Judge-total correlations ranged from .22 to .78, signalling mixed interpretations. All these 
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results confirmed that the variance in the ratings were too high to use averages as the criterion 
values. 
The other requirement of conducting the Lens model analysis is that experts and non-experts 
must use the same cues to inform their judgments. This can be tested by using only the ‘cue 
utilization’ side of the model (as depicted in Figure 2) and treating both experts and non-experts 
as participants providing two sets of judgments. The data presented in Experiment 1 of Chapter 
5 shows that the non-expert and the domain-specific expert participants of this research were 
not found to inform their judgments based on the same criteria. While non-expert participants 
were found to incorporate all four cues (features) to their judgments made about creativity, no 
evidence supported that domain-specific experts would be using any of the cues. (The definition 
of the four cues were provided to all participants before rating them.) 
In sum, the Lens model is a potential tool for assessing the similarities and the 
differences between experts' and non-experts' judgments of creativity, and to scrutinize what 
might stand behind the inconsistencies found between them. It served as a suitable to model to 
test the requirements whether experts' judgments could be used as the objective criterion of 
creativity; this was not found to be the case. (However, studies measuring creativity with a 
different methodology, e.g., Likert scales, might be suitable for further investigations using the 
model.) 
The results indicate that another method should replace expert ratings in the quest for 
searching objective criteria to evaluating creative ideas. As the empirical investigations should 
not be stopped until the criterion problem (Shapiro, 1970) gets resolved, for now, a good 
alternative might be to acquire criterion values directly from the environment, and possibly, 
from multiple sources (such as amounts of investment received, rankings in different 




3.5 Further Alternatives for the Criterion of Creativity 
An issue with aiming for direct creativity assessments is that they might not exist in real 
life. People only rarely score products according to their creativity, that is why it is problematic 
to gain inspiration to the construction of research methodologies by real-life practices. 
However, funding decisions related to creative products indicate in a straight-forward manner 
what their perceived values are, therefore, they could be used (and are used such as in Mollick 
& Nanda, 2015) as a good proxy of the 'true score' of creativity. These investments or budget 
allocations indicate the result of a very complex judgment process. The task of psychologists is 
to disentangle the different factors contributing to the final judgment, including not only the 
weighting of the factors but also the relationships amongst them.  
In conclusion, the way creativity is regarded is central to its measurement. This thesis 
was designed for the study of the recognition/perception aspect of creativity. However, others 
have questioned whether there is anything to perceive at all, that is, it was suggested that the 
creativity of the product might not be there first but is the result of the judgment process itself. 
This assumption poses an interesting constraint because it states that a product hidden from an 
observer is not creative; namely, "product creativity only exists if there is a judgement of a 
product (based on a set of criteria) and products cannot be inherently creative (without 
judgement)" (Horn & Salvendy, 2006, pp. 396-397). This statement is in sharp contrast with 
the ’rater effect’ approach of creativity assessment (Hung, Chen, & Chen, 2012; Long & Pang, 
2015), in which the judge of creativity is a source of potential error, i.e., the subjective 
component of the process is treated as one which blurs the picture, not as one which creates it. 
Csíkszentmihályi warns that research isolating the product from its evaluator can never capture 
what is at the heart of being creative. He notes (1999) that many evaluation research efforts are 
conducted based on a false assumption. The assumption is that there would be an objective 
quality called „creativity” to be found in the product. Then, the job of the judges of creativity 
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would be to perceive and recognise this quality. Instead, he draws attention to the notion that 
„expert judges do not possess an external, objective standard by which to evaluate creative 
responses. Their judgments rely on past experience, training, cultural biases, current trends, 
personal values, idiosyncratic preferences. Thus, whether an idea or product is creative or not 
does not depend on its own qualities, but on the effect it is able to produce in others who are 
exposed to it” (p. 314). Therefore, he recommends that researchers should not measure the 
creator, the product, or the evaluator in isolation, but all these agents of creativity should be 
included in one system. This suggestion is acknowledged by conducting the present research, 
however, the approach taken here is to focus on the product while also registering the 
idiosynchronicities of the evaluators. 
The current methodological problems might be connected to the conceptual 
controversies outlined in this chapter. E.g., the variability found in the creativity ratings, which 
gives a lot of headache to the researchers, can be interpreted, according to the systems view, as 
stemming from the interactional, dynamic nature of creativity. If creativity lies in interactions, 
then creativity researchers should come up with tools to investigate the dynamic process of 
creative systems. One possibility for doing so could be the application of network research to 
creativity. As Csíkszentmihályi (2014, p. 49) notes it: 
 
"Where does the information that gives us the ability to make sophisticated 
judgments come from? The information does not seem to be in the object itself. 
If we think about it, the reason we believe that Leonardo or Einstein was creative 
is that we have read that that is the case, we have been told it is true; our opinions 
about who is creative and why ultimately are based on faith. We have faith in 
the domains of art and science, and we trust the judgment of the field, that is, of 
the artistic and scientific establishments. There is nothing wrong with this, 
because it is an inevitable situation. But by recognizing it, we must also accept 
some of its consequences, namely, that any attribution of creativity must be 
relative, grounded only in social agreement. And from this it also follows that 
social agreement is one of the constitutive aspects of creativity, without which 




To wrap up, this chapter has outlined how expert ratings are and could be used for 
evaluating creativity, as well as why people's internalised conceptualisation of creativity should 
be brought to the surface by rating creativity-related features and thereby externalising what 
cues are implemented to form judgments about creativity. Finally, theoretical assumptions 
underlying creativity research were discussed to find new potential methods for investigating 
creativity.  
What needs to be carried forward from this section is that creativity cannot be rated with 
one value only, however, asking raters to do so might reveal meaningful information about how 
the evaluation process takes place. In the empirical chapters, different contextual manipulations 
are introduced which are aimed to enhance the agreement between different groups of 
participants. This approach was motivated by the current research trends in which conditions 
are searched for aligning non-expert participants’ judgments with experts’ judgments. Using 
one side of the Lens model, it became possible to test the requirements of using experts' 
judgments as the criterion of creativity. The requirements were not fulfilled in case of the 
current research, however, other methodologies applied on a different domain of creativity 
might be able to fulfil them.  
The next chapter is getting to the nuts and bolts of the paradigm developed for 
conducting the empirical studies. The entire creation and validation process of the paradigm, as 
well as the rationale of each study will be outlined. A list of all hypotheses which were tested 




RESEARCH PARADIGM AND HYPOTHESES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodological considerations behind the construction of the 
research design. It also presents the details of the pilot work that was used to determine the 
materials, design, and procedure for the main 4 experiments that will be presented in the three 
empirical chapters (Chapter 5-7). Previously, Chapter 2 summarised how creativity could be 
conceptualised for the measurement purposes in. In Chapter 3, further methodological concerns 
were introduced, alternatives of the criterion of creativity were discussed. Now, this chapter 
describes how the measurement of creativity was operationalised for the purposes of the present 
premises. 
The objective of this research project is to holistically measure the evaluation of creative 
ideas based on selected criteria. A crucial aspect of the measurement is to avoid aesthetic 
judgments and focus on tangible projects. Thus, our attention was turned to functional creativity 
(Cropley & Cropley, 2005, 2008). Creative evaluation studies were found to range widely 
regarding the type of stimulus they use: advertisements (Caroff & Besançon, 2008), apparel 
design illustrations (Freeman, Son & McRoberts, 2015), websites (Zeng, Salvendy, & Zhang, 
2009), restaurant interior designs (Horng, Chou, Liu, & Tsai, 2013) or even sketches of toasters 
(Kudrowitz, Te, & Wallace, 2012) were all used to study what counts as creative. We also had 
to choose a specific domain to specify the paradigm and looked for a relatively highly codified 
domain (Kaufman et al., 2013), which at the same time also seemed to be approachable for 
naïve judges. Although a few paradigms were considered for conducting the research, a novel 
one was created. This decision was motivated by the realisation that there are only a few 
77 
 
research paradigms available, also that it is a common practice among creativity researchers to 
adopt the assessment criteria which are the most relevant for their research projects. 
As the research was conducted in London, one of the biggest cities in the world, the idea 
to measure how creativity is demonstrated in cities, i.e. researching creativity in the domain of 
urbanism lent itself. By the time this thesis was written, it was noted with delight that a largely 
similar paradigm to ours emerged from the innovation literature (Frederiksen & Knudsen, 
2017). As discussed in Chapter 1, although the structure of the creativity assessment and the 
selected criteria in the Danish study are comparable to ours, the chosen domain (technical 
innovation of renewable energy) and the analysis of the data paved ways for making different 
inferences than in our case. This example illustrates the need of adapting the measurement tool 
for the exact research purposes: main research questions of this thesis regard the criteria 
informing judgments made about creativity and their respective weighting; and the already 
established paradigms were not used to measure the weighting of the criteria the way as it was 
aimed in the present project (details will be provided in Chapter 5). 
The next section outlines the construction of the experimental paradigm. The aim was 
to collect a representative set of tangible ideas on how cities can be more creative; to achieve 
this, project outlines were pooled together.  
4.2 Creating the Paradigm 
The outcome of the construction phase is a final set of fifteen project ideas, which were 
created based on proposals collected from an open-source platform, OpenIDEO (2011). All 
project ideas were entries for a competition on “How might we restore vibrancy in cities and 
regions facing economic decline?” originally. They were collected from the website and were 
edited into two paragraphs of texts. Subsequently, the validation process took place, and the 
entries collected from the website were transformed into proposals describing a single initiative, 
the set including samples ranging between 'hardly creative at all' to 'very creative'.  
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In all empirical chapters presented in this thesis (5-7), participants were instructed to 
become invested in the outcome of the realization of the projects evaluated by them. Realistic 
stimuli were selected for the purposes of the research despite of being aware of the potential 
problems stemming from the higher amount of noise associated. The stimuli were picked to 
ascertain a high level of ecological validity. In line with this, the stimuli included project 
proposals about opening local museums, creating guided tours, or establishing rooftop 
gardening projects. After outlining the objective which the paradigm was set up to achieve, I 
report the process of collecting and validating the project proposals below. 
 
4.3 Selection of the Features 
4.3.1 Construction of the Paradigm. To control for the influence of visual appearance, 
and to make the implementation of the experimental manipulation easier, the project outlines 
included a one-page brief without any graphical illustration. Each project was rated by a pool 
of domain-general experts (n = 16) on four features: originality, utility, scalability and riskiness 
(see Table S1). Admittedly, the criteria were self-selected to learn more about the judgment 
making process. The rationale behind selecting the features, as outlined in Chapter 2 already, 
was to cover the most relevant dimensions but also to construct a pragmatic, off-the-shelf tool 
for assessing urban ideas. Along these lines, two of the four selected criteria, originality and 
utility, are domain-general and core to the definition of creativity, while the other two of them 
are domain specific because they are concerned with the functionality of the creative idea: 
scalability (i.e., the opportunity of growth) and riskiness (i.e. whether a project would be 
implementable and sustainable). Table 2 contains the explanations of the four features provided 
to the expert raters.  
Experts validating the presence of the criteria in the paradigm were domain general 
experts of evaluation and the discernment of ideas: they were recruited with a snowball 
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methodology from junior and senior science staff at Queen Mary, University of London. Each 
feature was rated by them with one of the three responses: high level, low level and unsure. 
Experts were also prompted to indicate if any of the projects were diverging from the others in 
the pool so much that comparing them would become problematic. 
 
Table 2 
Feature definitions as presented to the experts and non-experts. 
Feature DEFINITION 
Originality The quality of being novel or unusual, unique. In the present case, whether the 
project is unprecedented in its environment. 
Utility The (perceived) ability of something to satisfy needs or wants. In the present case, 
one has to determine whether a project would satisfy the needs of a city. 
Scalability The ability of a proposed project to be enlarged to accommodate growth. In the 
present case, whether a project would be implementable on a larger scale (e.g. 
worldwide). 
 
Riskiness The probability that the project will be successfully implemented. In the present 
case, whether the project outcome is unsafe, uncertain or precarious. 
Note. The riskiness feature denotes “low risk”, thus the higher the riskiness rating, the lower 
the perceived risk is. 
 
4.3.2 Validation Process. To establish the final set of stimuli, N=20 projects were rated 
in three consecutive rounds. After the first round of evaluation, preliminary results showed the 
categorical judgment of each feature by each project. Subsequently, the content of these projects 
was changed in order to cover the entire matrix of the possible combinations (e.g., low level of 
originality, high level of utility, low level of riskiness, high level of scalability), aiming for a 
final set of N=16 project proposals.  
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After the second round of evaluation, the optimal differentiation, defined as an α > .80 
consensus regarding the categorical ratings made by the experts, of these 16 projects has not 
been reached. Wording of the texts were changed for clarity on the level of features. N=1 project 
was excluded due to being substantially distinct from the rest in the set, as reported by the 
experts.  
After the third round of evaluation, n=19 projects were rated and n=15 projects have 
been selected as the final set due to the consistency in their ratings. Fifteen projects were 
selected because a) one combination of the features, namely a low level of originality, utility, 
scalability, and a high level of low risk was found to be not applicable even after several 
attempts and because b) these projects received consensual ratings, α > .75. 
At the time, the expert ratings were obtained to validate the stimuli. However, later we 
wanted to compare whether experts and non-experts are rating creativity in a similar way and 
for doing so, obtaining creativity ratings from experts on the same scale as from non-experts 
became crucial. The first approach was to use the data we already had as a proxy to creativity 
ratings, thus it was checked in what extent can their feature ratings predict non-experts' 
creativity ratings. 
4.3.3. Domain-specific Experts. However, in order to make a Lens model analysis 
possible, as outlined in Chapter 3, a criterion variable was needed, thus direct creativity ratings 
from the experts had to be obtained. Since the additional data collection was unavoidable, it 
was taken as an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. Not only the missing ratings were 
collected but the expert pool was extended to domain-specific experts. Domain-specific experts 
were selected based on the following criteria: (1) they must be UK residents and proficient 
English speakers, (2) they must have at least 10 years of expertise in their domain, (3) their 
domain must be related to cities, e.g., urban planning, architecture, civil engineering, policy 
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making to cities, etc., and (4) they also must have some understanding of creativity, e.g., writing 
poems or publishing novels, composing music, coding programs, etc. 
Domain-specific experts were identified via multiple rounds of Google X-ray searches 
for 'creativ* & city', filtering to UK results, then finding further links and people with a 
snowball methodology. The professional platform LinkedIn was also exhaustively researched 
to locate suitable experts. After collecting the contact information of all candidates using 
various customer relationship management techniques (e.g., lead generation databases), they 
have been contacted in a personalised e-mail shortly describing the purpose of the research. 
They were kindly asked to contribute to the research and were offered with a £10 Amazon 
voucher as compensation. The ratio of rejection to completion was 94:10. This resulted in a 
sample size of N=10 domain-specific experts, from which two participants had to be discarded 
due to providing incomplete data, resulting in a final data set of n=8 experts with 
M=20.38±10.37 years of relevant expertise. They are aged M=47.38±12.22 years, 3 of them 
are males. 
Finally, please note that 2.5 years have passed between the data collection of the 
domain-general judges and of the domain-specific judges and they have not been matched 
according to any demographical variable. These might mean a relevant limitation toward the 
comparability of their ratings. 
After outlining the methods of establishing the paradigms, the focus is moved now to 
the research questions which the paradigm was designed to address. First, the research questions 
will be identified, subsequently, the hypotheses related to each empirical study will be listed. 
 
4.4 Research Questions 
This thesis is exploring the basis on which people evaluate creative ideas. Three broader 
questions were explored. First, (Q1) in a noisy environment, what information do judges use to 
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evaluate creative ideas? What criteria is applied internally to form an overall creativity 
judgment? The present research investigated the link between creativity-related criteria and 
holistic creativity ratings. Criteria were selected to test to what degree can the evaluation of 
creative ideas be predicted by using them. This leads us to the second broader question of this 
thesis, which delves into (Q2) the weighting each one of the criteria is carrying towards forming 
the overall creativity rating. Both domain-general and domain-specific criteria were tested, and 
it was examined whether being original or useful is more important in an urban domain. The 
third large question addressed in this thesis (Q3) was seeking to understand how certain 
contextual factors influence creative idea evaluation.  
As for the contextual factors, three research themes emerged. It was investigated how 
the level of motivation, the amount of available information about the study, and the manner in 
which the rating is cast influences the evaluation of creative ideas. In the next section, the 
hypotheses of each empirical study are outlined. 
4.5 Rationale of each Study & Hypotheses  
This section offers a full overview of the hypotheses which were investigated in the 
empirical studies (Chapter 5-7). They are numbered consistently, and a summary of the 
rationale behind conducting each study is provided here to make the connection across the 
studies explicit. 
 
4.5.1 Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, the effect of motivation was tested. Extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation were both enhanced by using incentives. Motivation was manipulated for 
two purposes. (1) In order to mimic conditions outside of the laboratory, in which experts are 
motivated to evaluate creative ideas on the basis of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, we 
introduced manipulations comprising of the two types of motivation on the creative evaluation 
process. In addition, (2) in order to assess the extent to which experts and non-experts can be 
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brought into alignment, goal oriented motivational manipulations were introduced. The 
intrinsic incentive made it the goal of the participants that they invest the funds of their 
investment company in the most effective way, while the extrinsic incentive made it to their 
goal to do their best on the task to bring home the highest possible sum as a reward for their 
participation. 
The following hypotheses were expected to be confirmed as the result of this study: 
(H1) Overall creativity ratings can be predicted from the four features we have identified 
as critical for the assessment of creativity of ideas (originality, utility, scalability, and riskiness), 
i.e. all four of them are contributing to the judgments made about creativity. 
(H2) Due to the subjective nature of creativity assessment, lay participants' creativity 
ratings can be predicted better from their feature ratings than from the expert judges' creativity 
ratings. I.e., the internal model comprising of how the four features are weighted differs as a 
function of expertise. 
(H3) Enhancing the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of lay participants through the use 
of incentives will result in non-experts’ task performance becoming more similar to experts' 
ratings as compared to non-incentivized baseline performance. 
 
4.5.2. Chapter 6. In Chapter 6, the effect which the amount of available information 
has on rating creativity was tested. Particularly, two manipulations were used: first, the role of 
providing task-relevant information on task performance was investigated. Second, the role 
of meta-information with respect to the task’s characteristics was investigated. 
The description about the task-relevant features was manipulated by dividing 
participants to two groups: the first started the experiment with the Feature rating task, while 
the second group started with the Investment task. It was a within-subject design, so all 
participants completed both tasks eventually. Critically, in the feature rating task, participants 
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were provided with the name and definition of the relevant criteria for making their judgment 
about creativity in the second part of the experiment. The participants who started with the 
Investment task were not informed about the criteria before casting their creativity ratings. Two 
hypotheses were outlined about the potential effects:  
(H4) Those participants who were made aware of the name and content of criteria linked 
to creativity will cast feature and creativity ratings more closely linked to each other than the 
participants who were not made aware of which criteria are connected to creativity ratings. 
(H5) The different order of completing the Feature rating task and the Investment task 
provides a different amount of available information to the participants at the time of casting 
their creativity ratings. Therefore, the mean of the creativity ratings will be affected by the order 
in which the experimental tasks are completed. 
 
Introducing different meta-information about the experiment conducted was assumed to 
influence the outcome in the following ways: 
(H6) It was assumed that if people need to evaluate the creativity of ideas, they make 
less certain judgments than what they would make if they were informed they have to evaluate 
business ideas per several dimensions, not mentioning creativity explicitly (‘nothing special’ 
condition). 
(H7) In addition, we expected people to give less coherent creativity ratings than 
viability ratings as they would have more expertise in estimating the usefulness/feasability than 
the creativity of an idea. For this, we expected to find a difference in the average of creativity 
ratings between the 'creativity' and the 'nothing special' groups, whilst no difference in the 




4.5.3. Chapter 7. In Chapter 7, the effect of making absolute vs. relative judgments 
about creativity was tested. The aim was to extend the scope of the evaluation process from 
absolute creativity judgments to comparative judgments, i.e., participants needed to rank which 
projects are more/less creative than others instead of simply judging them one-by-one. This 
procedure was motivated by ecological validity as the comparative approach models how 
creative ideas are selected most of the time, e.g., how grants are awarded or how the creative 
industry works. One group of participants had to shortlist the best 6 ideas, while the other group 
needed to shortlist the worst 6 ideas.  
Three types of metrics were collected regarding the evaluation of creativity: (1) absolute 
creativity ratings were obtained (the same way as outlined in the earlier chapters), (2) the 
projects were shortlisted, which resulted in a relative ranking, and finally, (3) a budget of 100 
coins was allocated amongst the selected 6 projects, which resulted in a relative weighting.  
First, internal consistency in the ratings were checked to estimate their similarity, that 
is, to see whether the different type of creativity ratings would result in the same ranking of the 
projects (please note that the absolute creativity ratings were obtained in randomized order). 
(H8) The ordering of the absolute creativity ratings corresponds to making relative 
judgments about how creative the stimuli are compared to each other. That is, more than half 
of the 6 shortlisted projects was expected to be listed in the top/bottom six ideas too when 
converting the absolute judgments to an ordinal scale.  
(H9) The explicit rank ordering established in the shortlisting task aligns with the 
weighted rank ordering established in the budget allocation task with regard to the ranking 
across the projects. That is, the projects should be aligned in their ranking position to show the 
judgments are reliable. 
Subsequently, the data was analysed according to task condition to determine which 
type of creativity ratings are aligned with each other. 
86 
 
(H10) We expected the absolute creativity ratings to not differ between the two task 
conditions (shortlisting the best vs. the worst ideas), as the task instructions did not concern 
these ratings. 
(H11) However, we expected the shortlists to be severely influenced by the task 
condition. It was hypothesized there would be no overlap between the 'best ideas' and the 'worst 
ideas' shortlists, i.e., they would share less than one idea on average. 
Finally, we wanted to explore whether experts' rankings of the projects would be similar 
to non-experts' rankings. That is, even if their absolute judgments were found to be largely 
dissimilar, it is possible that the ranking of the projects is better aligned between the two groups. 
(H12) It was expected that the rankings provided by domain-specific experts and non-
experts would largely overlap. That is, an overlap of at least half of the projects in the best six 
ideas and the worst six ideas was expected between the two groups. It was not required the 
projects to be listed in the same ranking position. 
 
To sum up, the three empirical chapters of the thesis are investigating three contextual 
factors which might influence how creative ideas are evaluated. First, it is probed whether 
motivation is a decisive factor contributing to the different way in which experts and lay people 
judge creative ideas. Second, it is investigated how task-related information modulates 
creativity ratings. Third, it is explored whether making judgments about creativity in an 
absolute as compared to a relative manner would result in distinct outcomes. 
The next section of this chapter provides an account of how each project proposal 
presented as a stimulus was rated on average. This is to inform the reader what are the baseline 





4.6 Project-wise Evaluation of the Stimuli 
The creativity ratings were calculated by averaging all ratings in case of each project by 
all non-expert participants (n=447) contributing to any of the experiments. When ideas were 
ranked, the rankings stretched from the highest to the lowest mean in case of the best ideas and 
from lowest to highest mean in case of the worst ideas.  
First, the raw ratings show quite a bit of fluctuation in the values cast by non-expert 
participants. The standard deviations range between 21 and 28, which is, counted towards both 
directions, covers approximately half of the scale. Based solely on the aggregated data, one 
might conclude that, on a group level, non-experts do not have a consistent concept on how to 
judge creative ideas. However, the mean ratings are roughly following the domain-general 
expert ratings, thus although most of the projects were classified to the mid-part of the rating 
scale and therefore the comprehensive creativity ratings cannot be set apart from each other 
distinctly, a direct comparison across the projects seems like a promising alternative method to 
find the threshold between more and less creative project proposals. Table 3 shows the 




Table 3  
























2 0 100 56.26 1.21 25.50 
Intermodal 3 0 100 66.24 1.02 21.65 
Street Signs 
With Stickers 
4 0 100 36.60 1.27 26.82 
miLES 5 0 100 65.26 1.06 22.42 
School of ideas 6 0 100 50.00 1.20 25.43 
Sidewalk 
Chalk Arts 
7 0 100 46.38 1.25 26.50 




9 0 100 44.29 1.35 28.48 
Feel the city 11 0 100 44.47 1.37 28.86 
A.R.T.S. 12 0 100 57.16 1.11 23.56 
Pop-up 
Cultural Hub 
13 0 100 50.83 1.12 23.74 
Fablab 14 0 100 57.39 1.18 24.85 
Movies to the 
park 
15 0 100 33.10 1.21 25.60 




To check the reliability of the expert ratings, domain-specific experts were also asked 
to judge the creativity of the stimuli. Table 4 and 5 show the descriptive data collected from the 
domain-specific expert judges (N=8). What can be deduced from this data is that these experts 
were more severe judges than the non-expert participants; also, that there was a similar amount 
of variability, or in other words, agreement in their ratings as in the non-experts’ data. 
 
Table 4  























2 24 75 48.88 7.24 20.48 
Intermodal 3 16 80 44.25 7.66 21.67 
Street Signs 
With Stickers 
4 5 85 37.25 9.85 27.86 
miLES 5 28 90 63.00 7.63 21.57 
School of ideas 6 19 81 48.13 7.96 22.52 
Sidewalk 
Chalk Arts 
7 14 75 45.38 7.43 21.00 




9 20 85 50.63 7.81 22.08 
Feel the city 11 0 89 50.88 11.37 32.17 





13 18 80 45.25 8.73 24.70 
Fablab 14 9 95 56.00 9.28 26.24 
Movies to the 
park 
15 18 75 39.50 7.29 20.62 
Blogger Café 16 1 60 30.63 7.63 21.57 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive data for the feature ratings provided by the domain-specific expert judges 
















2 35±24.08 52.25±26.55 56.63±23.3 33.38±21.17 
 
Intermodal 3 37.5±23.37 60.5±21.73 65.5±16.48 46.5±28.21 
Street Signs With 
Stickers 
4 50.88±27.33 61.63±30.16 55.88±19.32 44.25±22.45 
miLES 5 44.75±24.75 65.25±27.74 63.38±25.24 51.75±21.68 
School of ideas 6 48.88±31.71 64±24.72 76.25±15.95 36.13±20.72 
Sidewalk Chalk 
Arts 
7 43.63±35.76 47.13±28.71 69.88±24.42 34.75±25.84 






9 42.25±27.89 55.63±36.78 48.75±28.89 31.88±20.29 
Feel the city 11 53.13±29.79 59.75±22.49 58.75±30.62 42±22.08 
A.R.T.S. 12 32.5±22.25 55±31.55 53±31.67 41.88±30.87 
Pop-up Cultural 
Hub 
13 42.25±31.06 49.88±26.23 73±15.03 41.25±31.14 
Fablab 14 21.88±14.46 52±29.6 50±30.53 48±29.66 
Movies to the 
park 
15 44.63±27.26 57.88±34.54 60.75±24.35 38.75±29.51 
Blogger Café 16 54.5±27.34 61.5±33.14 53.88±25.14 45.88±28.74 
 
A moderate degree of absolute agreement was found by the domain-specific experts 
regarding the creativity of the stimuli. The two-way mixed intra-class correlation coefficient 
was .497 with a 95% confidence interval from -.008 to .800 (F(14,98)= 2, p=.026). Due to the 
not sufficiently high inter-rater agreement, item analyses were considered. Inter-judge and 
judge-total correlations were computed to assess the internal consistency of the judges. An 
overall reliability coefficient was also calculated. The results are summarized in Table 6 and 7. 
Table 6 
Internal consistency of the domain-specific experts 








D-S Expert 1 51.93 22.73 -.21 -.20 
D-S Expert 2 52.47 35.41 .16 .64 
D-S Expert 3 54.73 22.02 .21 .60 
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D-S Expert 4 37.93 17.35 .31 .76 
D-S Expert 5 63.33 14.80 .33 .81 
D-S Expert 6 30.27 21.23 .16 .61 
D-S Expert 7 47.47 14.61 .13 .44 
D-S Expert 8 31.47 14.89 .08 .29 
 
Table 7 


















D-S Expert 1 .72 .27 .52 .44 
D-S Expert 2 .66 .21 .78 .67 
D-S Expert 3 .73 .28 .36 .21 
D-S Expert 4 .66 .22 .71 .59 
D-S Expert 5 .65 .21 .78 .65 
D-S Expert 6 .69 .24 .56 .55 
D-S Expert 7 .72 .27 .45 .35 
D-S Expert 8 .77 .32 .22 .03 




Second, in Chapter 7, participants were prompted to directly compare the project 
proposals instead of providing absolute judgments. It was hypothesised that although non-
expert participants might be more uncertain with ‘stamping’ a project with an exact number, 
they might be more apt to rank the projects similarly to the experts, and thereby locate them on 
an ordinal scale instead of placing them on a ratio scale. These results are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7.  
This chapter continues with a measurement of how non-expert participants 
spontaneously conceptualised their internal model of creativity. The data was grouped 
according to the criteria used in the present research to see whether there is an overlap in the 
ratios, i.e., whether participants weigh those dimensions as the most crucial for the judgment 
making which they spontaneously report as the most relevant dimensions of their 
conceptualisation of creativity. 
4.7 Non-experts’ Spontaneous Creativity Definitions 
Prior to any experimental tasks, all participants were asked to name a few factors which 
according to their opinion contribute to perceive something as creative. This free recall task 
was intended to register the ‘expressed conception of creativity’ - the part of a participant's 
internalized, naive conception which can be easily recalled and put into words. This was then 
contrasted with the so-called ‘implemented conception of creativity’; it was examined in 
multiple studies how underlying factors of creativity influence the ratings. A prior study 
investigating the structure in self-reported creativity conceptions was also uncovered. Storme 
& Lubart (2012) demonstrated that the expressed creativity conceptions matched the 
implemented creativity conceptions vastly, as in both cases, originality had the strongest 
predictive power for creativity. They found that subjects were mentioning originality more 
frequently than any other related factor - whether it was the most important or the most easily 
accessible component (or perhaps both) was not clear though. 
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Our sample consisted of n=416 participants. Each of them was prompted by the 
instructions to fill in a middle-sized text box with creativity-associated factors. The string 
variable, which was 1 to 127 words long, was then re-coded by N=2 independent raters 
according to the four features used in the experimental tasks: raters could sort the words or 
syntaxes into the following categories: Originality, Utility, Scalability, Riskiness. If the 
response did not fit any of these four categories, it was sorted into the Other category. As 
typically multiple expressions were provided, the input from one participant could be coded 
into multiple categories. However, one expression could only belong to one category. When 
frequencies were quantified, it was counted whether the participant used a given category in a 
binary manner. E.g., they could either provide some input to utility or not – fluency was not 
measured thus it did not matter whether the participant mentioned 1 or 5 words linked to the 
given category. The agreement between the two non-expert raters (neither of them was involved 
with any prior phase of the research and had any expertise related to creativity research; they 
only received detailed instructions on the categorization task) was κ = .460. Since the value 
indicates a moderate agreement, both categorizations were used for the further calculations. 
Notably, originality was found to be the most popular response, however, this finding 
might be heavily confounded by the instruction providing the word originality as an example 
for the task. Utility was mentioned substantially less frequently than originality. Only the 
content of the ‘other’ category is comparable to the dominance of originality-related words. 
Both scalability- and riskiness-related items were recalled more marginally, although the two 
raters differed a lot in judging the gap between these two frequencies. The raw as well as the 






Table 8  
The categorisation of free associations according to the measured features by two independent 
raters 





317 117 15 84 326 
Relative 
frequency 





403 86 27 35 125 
Relative 
frequency 
96.9% 20.7% 6.5% 8.4% 30% 
Note. N = 416 by each column. ‘Raw frequency’ denotes the number of non-empty cells in the 
categorization, while ‘relative frequency’ is the percentage of non-empty cells divided by the 
total number of cells.  
The next section outlines a few suggestions for further criteria which could be 
implemented in future research efforts. 
4.8 Suggestions for Further Features  
The suggestions listed here are based on the evaluation of free association data obtained 
from non-expert participants (n=416). Table 9 contains the concepts mentioned more than ten 
times to showcase what other factors contribute to creativity according to lay participants. 
Words used in the instructions were eliminated from the list (creativity, ideas, something). 
Table 9 
Participants’ free recalls regarding creativity-related features, ranked by frequency 
Word Frequency of appearance 
Different 44 







Artistic, art 25 (=20+5, resp.) 







Note. Please note that the displayed frequencies were gathered combined from the two 
independent raters, thus are drawn from a duplicate of the data.  
 
From the elements of this list, a few are already covered by our features (e.g., different 
and surprising are covered by the originality feature). However, thoughtfulness and imagination 
could be combined together into a ‘cleverness’ feature. Further, colour, inspiration, art, 
emotion, and aesthetics could be applied as an ‘artistic’ feature and be used when appropriate 
for the domain. What can be seen from this list is that spontaneous definitions of creativity are 
largely associated with artistic features, emotions, and smartness.  
In this chapter, the methodological considerations leading to the creation of the 
paradigm, the entire process of constructing the paradigm, the baseline values obtained by using 
the paradigm, as well as its mapping with non-experts' spontaneous definitions about creativity 
were presented. The construction of the paradigm was detailed to familiarise the reader with 
the methodology used in the empirical chapters. The upcoming three chapters (Chapter 5-7) 








5.1.1 Overview. The present research seeks to answer three questions: (Q1) what 
information do judges use to evaluate creative ideas? What criteria is applied internally to form 
an overall creativity judgment? (Q2) What weighting each one of the criteria is carrying towards 
forming the overall creativity rating? And finally, (Q3) how do certain contextual factors 
influence creative idea evaluation? In response to Q1, this chapter outlines the results of using 
linear models to predict creativity scores based on creativity-related feature ratings. In response 
to Q2, data was collected to find out which criterion is more important than the others to confirm 
or falsify current theoretical conceptualisations of creativity. To address Q3, the experimental 
protocol includes the investigation of motivation via the use of incentives. The role of 
motivation influencing creative idea evaluation as a contextual factor is addressed. Motivation 
is a candidate factor for explaining part of the differences found between experts’ and non-
experts’ judgments. Here, we set out to align experts’ and non-experts’ level of motivation, to 
bring them to a more similar starting point, in two experiments. 
Experiment 1 and 2 reported in this chapter are almost identical as the second one is a 
replication of the first one. What is following now is the first application of the novel paradigm 
introduced in Chapter 4. The data analysis reported here is similar to the Lens model framework 
outlined in Chapter 3, however, no direct comparison is made between the experts and non-
experts in this chapter. The rationale for this is that the judgments provided by experts and non-
experts are treated as two distinct sets. To make a comparison possible, first it needs to be 
confirmed that they are informed by the same information. This is the reason why, similarly to 
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the Lens model, identical criteria are linked to the creativity ratings in case of both experts and 
non-experts to see to what extent they are informing the judgments made by both groups.  
 
5.1.2 General Introduction. A creative product can transform the life of millions - 
smartphones and their apps, drones, tablets and game consoles have changed the way we work 
and spend leisure time. These products start out as one of many ideas in a pile, and through a 
long process of refinement, which requires identifying their potential, the final product 
eventually reaches the market, if successful, even goes viral (Thompson, 2017). It is widely 
accepted that the best judges of creativity are experts with domain-specific knowledge 
(Amabile, 1983), and indeed, businesses employ expert opinion of this kind during idea 
evaluation (e.g., Magnusson, Netz, & Wästlund, 2014). But how does one decide between ideas 
that are creative and investment-worthy from ideas that are not? Despite significant 
advancements in the domain of creativity and ideation (Runco & Pritzker, 2011), the creative 
idea evaluation process is treated almost like a black box; experts are characterized as relying 
on their gut feelings and non-experts are considered to have a noisy and unreliable judgment 
process. In this study, we systematically attempt to peer into the black box of creative evaluation 
in both experts and non-experts. By revealing the inner workings of the box, we aim to explain 
how a truly creative idea is recognized.   
 5.1.3 Experts. When it comes to the assessment of creativity, much of the work tends 
to favour the view that experts and novices are qualitatively different (Kaufman & Baer, 2012). 
The standards and criteria by which ideas are judged appear to differ significantly between 
experts and non-experts (Kaufman et al., 2008; Kaufman et al., 2013; Silvia, 2013). Unlike non-
experts, experts show a high degree of internal reliability in their evaluations of creative 
products (Amabile, 1982; Hennessey & Amabile, 1999; Kaufman, Lee, Baer, & Lee, 2007).  
Experts are equipped to handle contexts where strict criteria of assessment of creativity are 
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available, as well as contexts when there are no decision criteria (Bettman & Sujan, 1987).  In 
contrast, non-experts tend to have difficulty in developing reliable criteria for assessing creative 
ideas, which in turn limits their ability to identify ideas that experts would evaluate as genuinely 
creative (Galati, 2015). Further, compared to non-experts, experts use different problem-
decomposing strategies (Ho, 2001), and utilize and apply their knowledge differently because 
they draw from diverse sources of information (Björklund, 2013). Despite these qualitative 
differences, it is not clear how precisely experts and non-experts differ with respect to the 
degree to which they utilize specific features of an idea/product in order to evaluate its 
creativity. We addressed precisely this issue by comparing experts and non-experts on identical 
judgment criteria.  
5.1.4. Criteria. Though there is no threshold or gold standard, there is a good consensus 
around two core features of assessment of creativity, novelty and usefulness (Runco & Jaeger, 
2012).  Several creativity assessment protocols have been developed using these two, as well 
as other features. For instance, the Creative Product Analysis Matrix includes features such as 
elaboration and synthesis, as well as novelty, and resolution (O'Quin and Besemer, 2006). The 
Creative Solution Diagnosis Scale consists of features such as relevance and effectiveness, 
novelty, elegance, and genesis and are employed for assessing functional creativity (Cropley & 
Kaufman, 2012, 2013). A meta-analysis has identified novelty, workability, relevance, and 
specificity as the most common features that inform creative evaluations of ideas (Dean, 
Hender, Rodgers, & Santanen, 2006). Consistent with this, we have argued earlier that there are 
two broad categories of features that underpin evaluative judgments (Pétervári, Osman, & 
Bhattacharya, 2016). The first refers to how unique an idea is (novelty, originality, surprise) 
and the second refers to how functional the idea is (utility, effectiveness, appropriateness) (e.g., 
Bruner, 1962; Runco, & Jaeger, 2012). 
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Therefore, from the work reviewed, in our current study we consider four features: 
originality, utility, scalability, and riskiness. The first two are domain-general and are core to 
the definition of creativity, while the latter two are domain specific because they are concerned 
with the functionality of the creative idea: scalability (i.e., the opportunity of growth) and 
riskiness (i.e. whether a project would be implementable and sustainable) (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2000). The materials we presented participants were project ideas on improving 
urban lives with varying degrees of these four characteristic features. Experts and non-experts 
evaluated the projects based on the four features, as well as provided an overall creativity 
assessment based on their internalized construct of creativity.  
5.1.5. Motivation. We examined both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, given that both 
types have been strongly linked to the creative process (Baer & Kaufman, 2005). Apart from 
the level of expertise (Kaufman et al., 2013), we identified motivation as an essential factor for 
optimal evaluation performance (cf. de Jesus, Rus, Lens, & Imaginário, 2013). In real life, the 
evaluation of creative products is always goal-directed, and judges are engaged in the process, 
aiming for the best possible decision maximizing the impact of their limited resources. During 
the pilot phase of this study, non-experts were found to be less interested in, or sometimes even 
confused about the outcome of their evaluations. Thus, we streamlined the process by 
introducing intrinsic and extrinsic incentives to simulate a creativity judge’s environment. 
Incentives are rewards which are meant to increase performance by motivating the individual 
to exert more effort towards a task (Bonner, Hastie, Sprinkle, & Young, 2000). The incentives 
were aimed to guide the participants’ thinking while aligning their motivation. In the present 
study, intrinsic motivation was induced by setting the task as a challenge, offering participants 
a sense of autonomy through making important decisions, as well as food for their curiosity, 
and finally, by encouraging the use of their fantasy through the introduction of a role-play 
(based on Lepper, & Hoddell, 1989). Extrinsic motivation involved a financial payoff scheme 
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in which there was a flat fee and further opportunity for a bonus dependent on task performance. 
The incentives were applied together and not separately because a, we were interested in their 
joint effects (reaching the highest task-engagement possible) b, the two conditions cannot be 
fully divided since the task was interesting enough to trigger intrinsic motivation spontaneously. 
We were not interested in whether participants would do the task without payment but rather 
wanted to make sure the participants were as much invested and motivated as possible. This 
manipulation was introduced despite being aware of many instances in which introducing 
(extrinsic) incentives did not equate to better results (Kamenica, 2012). There is a branch of 
research showing a negative effect of incentives on creativity, regarding the idea generation 
phase (e.g., Conti & Amabile, 2011). Yet inspiration to create is a vastly different state from 
making judgments about someone’s creative idea, thus we did not generalize this finding in the 
present study. In fact, there is no prior data on how different types of incentives are affecting 
the evaluation of creative ideas.  
5.1.6. Hypotheses. We expected that (H1) the overall creativity rating of the project 
ideas would be predicted by the four features we have identified as critical for the assessment 
of creativity of ideas (originality, utility, scalability, and riskiness), i.e. all four of them are 
contributing to the judgments made about creativity. However, (H2) the internal model, 
consisting of how the four features were weighted, was expected to differ by expertise.  
Finally, it was assumed that task complexity is a differential component between non-
experts’ and experts’ evaluation ability. If tasks demand high cognitive complexity and if 
participants do not possess the required skills for performing well on them, then incentives are 
less likely to improve task performance (Bonner et al., 2000). Based on this, we set out to 
conclude whether non-experts are performing poorly at evaluating creative ideas because the 
task is difficult, and they are not capable of making accurate judgments, or because they are 
usually not sufficiently motivated to embark on them. (H3) enhancing the intrinsic and extrinsic 
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motivation of lay participants through the use of incentives was expected to result in non-
experts’ task performance becoming more similar to experts' ratings. 
5.2 Experiment 1 
5.2.1 Method 
5.2.1.1 Participants. As for the non-experts, 80 healthy participants (60 females, age: 
M±SD = 20.18±2 years) were recruited from the Queen Mary University of London, UK. All 
participants gave written informed consent and were compensated between 6.5 – 16.8 USD (the 
exact amount depended on performance). As there are strongly diverging opinions on how 
sample size and power computations of linear mixed models should be done (or if they should 
be done at all), we followed the guidelines of Simmons and colleagues (2011) and set the 
sample size to 40 participants in each condition to explore the effects resulting from the use of 
a novel paradigm. To ensure the robustness of the effects, a replication study with 30 
participants in each condition was conducted too (see Exp. 2).Domain-general experts (N=16) 
were recruited with a snowball methodology from junior and senior science staff at Queen 
Mary, University of London. As for the domain-specific experts, N=10 domain-specific experts 
were recruited, from which two judges had to be discarded due to providing incomplete data, 
resulting in a final data set of n=8 experts with M=20.38±10.37 years of relevant expertise. 
They are aged M=47.38±12.22 years, 3 of them are males. Domain-specific experts were 
selected based on the following criteria: (1) they must be UK residents and proficient English 
speakers, (2) they must have at least 10 years of expertise in their domain, (3) their domain 
must be related to cities, e.g., urban planning, architecture, civil engineering, policy making to 
cities, etc., and (4) they also must have some understanding of creativity, e.g., writing poems 
or publishing novels, composing music, coding programs, etc. 
The study protocol was approved by the Local Ethics Committee at the Queen Mary, 
University of London (reference number: QMREC1566a).  
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5.2.1.2 Design and Materials. The experiment was comprised of two conditions, 
following a within-subject design. All participants completed a Feature rating task and an 
Investment task, but the order of presentation of the tasks was randomized across participants.  
The stimuli consisted of fifteen project ideas, which were created based on proposals 
collected from an open-source platform, OpenIDEO (2011); all project ideas were entries for a 
competition on “How might we restore vibrancy in cities and regions facing economic decline?” 
and were edited into two paragraphs of text. Each project was subsequently rated by a pool of 
experts (N = 16) on four features: originality, utility, scalability and riskiness. Experts had 
domain general expertise, consisting of junior and senior science staff at Queen Mary, 
University of London. Table 2 presented in Chapter 4 outlines the four critical features on 
which the experts judged the 15 projects.  A detailed account of the creation of the paradigm 
can be also found in Chapter 4. 
5.2.1.3 Procedure. After giving their consent, all participants were asked to provide 
demographic information, as well as potentially relevant experience related to the task domain, 
their current motivational levels, and their subjective interpretation of creativity. Once 
completed, all participants were presented with two tasks: Feature rating task and Investment 
task. In the Feature rating task, participants were first familiarized with the four features of 
creativity (Table 2). After this, each project proposal (N=15) was presented for 60s, and for 
each, participants rated the project according to each of the four features; rating responses were 
provided on a visual analogue scale (VAS) from 0 (not at all) to 100 (most). In the Investment 
task, participants were presented with the same 15 projects, but this time they were instructed 
to indicate their willingness to invest in each project; they indicated their response on scale 
between 0 (no investment) to 100 (maximum investment). Participants were explicitly 
instructed to make their investment judgment solely on the basis of their subjective 
interpretation of creativity. In principle, the investment responses can be considered as a 
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reasonable proxy for overall creativity; thus, hereafter we refer to these responses as creativity 
ratings.   
The reward schedule for each participant was the same. In order to extrinsically motivate 
participant, they were informed that the amount of they could earn (between £5 and £13) was 
dependent on their performance; this was actually assessed on the basis of a normative rating 
as provided by a separate pool of experts. Total earnings were presented to participants after 
completing the feature rating task and the investment task. In order to assess the extent to which 
participants were sufficiently motivated by the investment task, at the end of the experiment 
participants were asked the following: 1) Did you actually imagine yourself as an investor? (10-
point Likert scale from “I stayed completely outside of the game” to “I was fully immersed, felt 
as an investor”, measuring intrinsic motivation) (2) “How much did the potential earning in the 
experiment motivate you?” (5-point Likert scale from “I did not care” to “I tried to earn as much 
money as possible”, measuring extrinsic motivation).   
5.2.1.4 Data Analysis. The full data set (N=1200 trials) was analysed. To predict overall 
creativity ratings from the ratings of four features, a linear mixed-effects regression (LMER) 
analysis was conducted using the lme4 package of R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2015). This analysis also helps delineating the effect from the variance stemming from possible 
biases in response tendencies (the so-called ‘rater effect’, Hung, Chen, & Chen, 2012). The 
significance of the four predictors was determined while controlling for the intercept of 
participants (random effect). Initially a null model was used including solely the random effects. 
Incrementally, each feature was added to the model as a fixed effect (Model 1-4), and its 
performance was assessed by the likelihood ratio tests. Next, we calculated the coefficient of 
determination to assess the explained variance (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). The formula 







2 , in which 𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑀𝑀(𝑚)
2  is the percent 
of variation in the creativity ratings explained by the fixed effects, 𝜎𝑓
2 is the amount of variance 
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due to all fixed effects,  𝜎𝛼
2 is the amount of variation due to the random effect, and 𝜎𝜖
2 is the 










First, we analysed participants’ self-reported responses on intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations. We observed a moderate to high level of both motivations (intrinsic: 7.55±1.65 on 
a 10-point scale; extrinsic: 3.38±1.12 on a 5-point scale). Before proceeding with the main 
analyses, we also examined the possibility of order effects on creativity ratings, and found that 
an effect of order was present by only two out of the fifteen project proposals, project 3: t(78) 
= 2.14, p = .035; project 8: t(70.43) = 2.70, p = .009. This finding is not detailed here, as the 
first half of Chapter 6 will discuss both the hypotheses about and the wider implications of this 
result. 
To understand the effects of the four features on overall creativity, a LMER analysis 
was performed on the novices’ data (see Data Analysis). We found that Model 4, including all 
four features, provided a better fit than Models 1-3 that included one, two, or three features, 
respectively. The increase in the goodness of fit was revealed by running likelihood ratio tests, 
Model 1 vs. Model 0: χ2(1) = 165.34, p < .001, Model 2 vs. Model 1: χ
2
(1) = 438.62, p < .001, 
Model 3 vs. Model 2: χ2(1) = 40.515, p < .001, Model 4 vs. Model 3: χ
2
(1) = 15.917, p < .001. 
However, the fixed intercept of Model 4 was not significantly different from zero (t = .937). 
Thus, a fifth model was tested; Model 5 differed from Model 4 only that it did not contain the 
fixed intercept. The LMER analysis showed that all four features remained significantly 
different from zero (see Table 10) and the amount of unexplained residual variance remained 
unchanged (Model 4: 436.7 and Model 5: 436.4), suggesting that the intercept was redundant. 






Fixed and random effects for Model 5 predicting the creativity ratings based on feature 
ratings of the participants 
Parameter Estimate (β) Standard error t-value 
Fixed effects  
Originality .275 .024 11.550* 
Utility .514 .024 21.691* 
Scalability .125 .021 5.912* 
Riskiness -.103 .022 -4.745* 
Random effects Variance Standard deviation  
Within-person 
variability 
110.7 10.52  
Creativity ratings 436.4 20.89  
Note. n = 1200, * = p < .05 
 
Next, we computed the coefficient of determination and found that 39.7% of the total 
variance in creativity ratings was due to the fixed effects. Further, combining the fixed and 
random effects, the explained variance increased to 51.9%. This suggests that all four features 
contributed significantly towards the judgment of overall creativity of the projects as made by 
the non-experts. Utility was considered as the most influential, and riskiness the least.  
To determine the extent to which categorical judgments of the features (high/low) made 
by domain-general experts predicted the creativity ratings of non-experts, a LMER analysis was 
carried out. In Model 1, the originality feature did not contribute to the model, as indicated by 
the likelihood ratio test, Model 1 vs. Model 0: χ2(1) = 0.33, p > .250, thus it was omitted from 
further analysis. Model 2 including the utility feature and was a better fit than the null model, 
Model 2 vs. Model 0: χ2(1) = 375.61, p < .001 and Model 3 including utility and scalability, and 
was a better fit than Model 2, χ2(1) = 4.31, p = .038. However, adding the riskiness feature to 
Model 4 showed that the scalability feature no longer contributed significantly to the model (t 
= 1.49), in contrast to the intercept (t = 12.75), utility (t = 21.17) and riskiness (t = 8.31). When 
the scalability feature was excluded from Model 5, the residual variance did not change (Model 
4: 525.2, Model 5: 525.7) and the goodness of fit did not decrease, χ2(1) = 2.24, p = .135. To 
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conclude, Model 5 including the intercept, the utility and riskiness features as fixed effects were 
selected as the best fit for the data (see Table 11). 
As for the coefficient of determination, the feature ratings provided by the experts were 
found to explain 23.4% of the variance in the creativity ratings provided by the non-experts. By 




Fixed and random effects for Model 4 predicting the creativity ratings based on feature 
ratings of the experts 
Parameter Estimate (β) Standard error T-value 
Fixed effects  
Intercept 23.963 1.646 14.56* 
Utility 28.079 1.330 21.11* 
Riskiness 11.227 1.330 8.44* 
Random effects Variance Standard deviation  
Within-person 
variability 
115.6 10.75  
Creativity ratings 525.7 22.93  
Note. Standard errors are identical due to dummy variable coding. n = 1200, * = p < .001 
 
Domain-specific experts’ feature ratings were not suitable for predicting non-experts’ 
creativity ratings. The lack of agreement in their data (see Ch. 4) did not allow for matching the 
two data sets. Similarly, the noisiness in the domain-specific experts’ feature judgments (N=4 
x 120) did not allow for using them as predictors for novice judges’ feature judgments (N=4 x 
1200). 
However, overall creativity ratings provided by the domain-specific experts could be 
predicted from their ratings of the four features. An LMER analysis revealed that none of the 
fixed effects improved the goodness of fit of the null model. Adding each selected criterion to 
the model incrementally (in the order of originality, utility, scalability, and riskiness) did not 
make a difference as indicated by the non-significant likelihood ratio tests, Model 1 vs. Model 
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0: χ2(1) = .196, n.s.; Model 2 vs. Model 0: χ
2
(1) = 1.797, n.s.; Model 3 vs. Model 0: χ
2
(1) = 0.819, 
n.s.; Model 4 vs. Model 0: χ2(1) = .067, n.s.. The null model ( summarised in Table 12) could 
explain only 1.8% of the variance in the creativity ratings, and the difference due to participants 
accounted for further 24% of the variance in the ratings.  
It was also probed whether domain-specific experts’ creativity ratings can be predicted 
based on domain-general experts’ feature ratings. In Model 1, the originality feature did not 
improve the model’s fit, which was shown by the likelihood ratio test: Model 1 vs. Model 0: 
χ2(1) = 0.56, p = .455, thus further models did not include this feature. Model 2 including the 
utility feature and was a better fit than the null model, Model 2 vs. Model 0: χ2(1) = 9.80, p = 
.002, while Model 3 including utility and scalability did not turn out as a better fit, Model 3 vs. 
Model 2, χ2(1) = .02, p = .877. Adding the riskiness feature to utility in Model 4 also proved to 
be redundant, Model 4 vs. Model 2, χ2(1) = .08, p = .960. Thus Model 2 including the intercept 
and the utility feature as fixed effects proved to be the best fit for the data (Table 13), accounting 
for 6.3% of the variance in the creativity ratings, and a further 19.5% of the variance stemming 
from the domain-specific experts. Taken these results together, the domain-specific experts 
demonstrated no linear relationshop between how they rated creativity and the features. On the 
other hand, there was a link between domain general experts’ utility ratings and domain-specific 
experts’ creativity ratings.  
 
Table 12 
Fixed and random effects for Model 0 predicting domain-specific experts’ creativity ratings 
based on their feature ratings 
Parameter Estimate (β) Standard error t-value 
Fixed effects  
Intercept 46.2 3.91 11.81* 
Random effects Variance Standard deviation  
Within-person 
variability 
91.9 9.59  
Creativity ratings 457.68 21.39  





Fixed and random effects for Model 2 predicting domain-specific experts’ creativity ratings 
based on domain-general experts’ feature ratings 
Parameter Estimate (β) Standard error t-value 
Fixed effects  
Intercept 39.8 4.64 8.58* 
Utility 12.0 3.76 3.19* 
Random effects Variance Standard deviation  
Within-person 
variability 
111.7 10.57  
Creativity ratings 423.1 20.57  
Note. n = 120, * = p < .001 
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
In sum, Exp. 1 revealed that all four features significantly contributed towards non-
expert creativity ratings and accounted for almost 40% of the variance. While we found that all 
four creativity-related features contributed to the overall creative evaluation, previous work has 
shown that originality is typically considered as the core feature of creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 
2012). In the present study, for non-experts, the parameter estimate of utility was more than 
twice as large as the parameter estimate of originality (Table 10). This disproportionate 
weighting of utility stands apart from previous studies in which utility was less relevant than 
other features for creative evaluation (Storme & Lubart, 2012), or meaningful only when ideas 
were also judged to be original (Diedrich, Benedek, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2015).  
What is more, it was found that domain-general judges’ ratings of the utility and 
riskiness features could predict non-expert participants’ creativity ratings, which makes the 
domain-general expert ratings candidate for the criterion values. In contrast, when modelling 
the domain-specific judges’ predictors of creativity ratings, it was found that domain-specific 
judges do not use any of the cues the non-expert participants do. This suggests that domain-
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specific experts and non-experts are not suitable for pairwise comparison, as their judgments 
are formed on different bases.  
To examine how robust these findings are, whether they are stable also if other 
participant population is asked to complete the experiment, the protocol was replicated on a 
different sample.  
5.3 Experiment 2 
5.3.1 Method 
5.3.1.1 Participants. 60 healthy participants (24 females, age: M±SD = 29.87±11 years) 
were recruited using Prolific Academic. Only non-student, native English speaker, residents of 
the United Kingdom, participants were eligible to participate; none of them took part in the 
Experiment 1. All participants gave written informed consent and were compensated between 
£5-13 (the exact amount depended on performance). One participant was excluded for not 
following the instructions properly, resulting in a final sample size n=59. The domain-general 
export pool (n=16) and the domain-specific expert pool (n=8) were identical to the ones 
described in Experiment 1. 
5.3.1.2. Materials, Design, & Procedure. The design and procedure, along with the 
stimuli used was identical to Exp. 1 except for a minor change to the presentation style of the 
total reward at the end of the experiment. 
 
5.3.2. Results 
First, participants’ self-reported responses on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations were 
assessed. Similarly to Exp. 1, a moderate to high level of both motivations were reported 
(intrinsic: 7.78±1.56 on a 10-point scale; extrinsic: 3.4±1.25 on a 5-point scale).  
Next, an LMER analysis was implemented to predict non-experts’ creativity ratings 
from their feature ratings. Here, we found that Model 4 including all four features and the 
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intercept as fixed effects provided the best goodness of fit, as indicated by the likelihood ratio 
tests: Model 1 vs. Model 0: χ2(1) = 87.18, p < .001, Model 2 vs. Model 1: χ2(1) = 120.71, p < 
.001, Model 3 vs. Model 2: χ2(1) = 31.68, p < .001, Model 4 vs. Model 3: χ2(1) = 16.83, p < 
.001, Model 5 vs. Model 4: χ2(1) = 8.90, p = .003. The amount of unexplained residual variance 
was lower in Model 4 (506.4) than Model 5 (510.1). Further, the intercept of Model 4 
contributed significantly to the model (t = 2.983) and subsequently, this model was selected. 
Compared to the results of Exp. 1, the parameter estimate of the originality feature was reduced, 
while the estimate of the utility feature marginally increased (Table 14 summarizes the values). 
 
Table 14 
Summary of effects for Model 4 predicting non-experts’ creativity ratings based on features. 
Parameter Estimate (β) Standard error t-value 
Fixed effects  
Intercept 10.218 3.426 2.983* 
Originality .194 .034 6.954* 
Utility .351 .031 20.262* 
Scalability .138 .034 5.040* 
Riskiness -.130 .032 -4.264* 
Random effects Variance Standard deviation  
Within-person 
variability 
108.5 10.42  
Creativity ratings 506.4 22.50  
Note. n = 864, * = p < .05 
 
Calculating the coefficient of determination revealed that 28.6% of the total variance in 
creativity ratings was due to the fixed effects; by adding random effects, 41.5% of the variance 
was explained. 
We turn now to an examination of whether experts’ feature ratings predict domain-
general non-expert’s creativity ratings. As before, categorical judgments (high vs. low) of the 
relevancy of the four features made by the experts were used as predictors. An LMER analysis 
was conducted. Again, Model 1 with the originality feature was not a better fit as the null model, 
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Model 1 vs. Model 0: χ2(1) = 0.46, p = .498, thus originality was excluded from subsequent 
models. Model 2 included the utility feature and was found to increase the goodness of fit: 
Model 2 vs. Model 0: χ2(1) = 238.54, p < .001. In Model 3, the scalability feature was not 
significant (t = .81), thus Model 4 was introduced including the intercept, as well as utility and 
riskiness features. All fixed effects were significant in Model 4 (see Table 15), and the goodness 
of fit was higher than Model 3: χ2(1) = 27.47, p < .001, and Model 2: χ
2
(1) = 28.13, p < .001. As 
in Exp. 1, the model including the intercept, as well as utility and riskiness features served as 
the best fit of the data.  
The feature ratings were found to account for 20% of the variance in the creativity 
ratings, shown by the coefficient of determination. Together with the random effects, 35.28% 
of the variance in the creativity ratings was explained by this analysis. 
 
Table 15 
Summary of effects for Model 4 predicting the creativity ratings based on feature ratings of 
the domain-general experts 
Parameter Estimate (β) Standard error T-value 
Fixed effects  
Intercept 23.804 1.921 14.56* 
Utility 25.061 1.522 21.11* 
Riskiness 8.129 1.522 8.44* 
Random effects Variance Standard deviation  
Within-person 
variability 
120.1 10.96  
Creativity ratings 507.4 22.53  
Note. Standard errors are identical due to dummy variable coding. n = 885, * = p < .001 
 
Exp 2. replicated the pattern of results observed in Exp. 1. All four features when rated 
by the non-experts contributed significantly towards their own creativity judgment. 
Furthermore, utility and riskiness rated by the experts were stronger predictors of non-experts’ 
creativity judgment than originality and scalability. Thus, the results of the two experiments 





As it stands, given the progress of research in creativity, the process of evaluation of 
creative ideas/products resembles a black box. The present study is the first of its kind to open 
the ‘black box’ in order to examine the evaluation process of creative ideas. It has done this by 
exploring how experts and non-experts make creative judgment based on features typically 
associated with creativity, and model the process. In sum, in two experiments it was found that 
non-experts’ relied on all four features (Originality, Utility, Scalability, Riskiness). In 
Experiment 1, this explained 39.7% of the variance in creativity judgments, and 28.6% in 
Experiment 2. In addition, when domain-general experts rated the creativity of the projects, 
their weighting of utility and riskiness over originality and scalability in turn predicted non-
experts’ creativity judgments. The latter of which provides an important insight into the 
alignment between expert and non-expert evaluations of creativity.   
All four creativity-related features contributed to the overall creative evaluation, 
however, in both studies, the parameter estimate of utility was more than twice as large as the 
parameter estimate of originality. This disproportionate weighting of utility is unlike previous 
studies in which utility was less relevant than other features for creative evaluation (Storme & 
Lubart, 2012). However, other evidence also suggests that ideas are positively associated with 
practicality above creativity judgments (Müller, Melwani, & Goncalo, 2012), and that 
compared to experts, non-experts weight the usefulness of an idea over originality (Rietzschel 
et al., 2010). We speculate that the mixed findings with regards to the relevancy of 
utility/practicality in creative evaluations judgments might be explained by differences in the 
domain of the creative judgment task itself. Consistent with this, some have speculated that 
when the ideas being evaluated concern applied domains such as urbanism or design, a salient 
factor is the impact the ideas will have, referred to as functional creativity (Cropley & Cropley, 
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2005, 2008). Moreover, when people report an increased personal involvement with a problem 
domain the creative project is addressing, they tend to assess the more feasible and practical 
projects as creative (Illies & Reiter-Palmon, 2004; Rietzschel et al., 2010). Again, this suggests 
that the usefulness of a creative idea can be more relevant than originality in the process of 
creativity evaluation given a specific domain.  
A possible criticism of our explanation is to question whether investment responses can 
be considered as proxies for overall creativity. Even though participants were explicitly 
instructed that they should rate the stimuli based on their creativity and nothing else, one might 
raise concerns that an ‘investor mindset’ is vastly different from one which would propagate 
creativity. Investors must make returns on their investments; thus, they might become rather 
conservative and loss-aversive when selecting investments, which might be an alternative 
explanation of why usefulness is outweighed at the expense of originality. 
Moving onward, in both experiments, for non-experts, the higher the perceived riskiness 
of a project the more creativity it was judged to be. It is worth highlighting that for the same 
projects rated as low risk by experts, non-experts attached higher creativity ratings to them. 
This suggests that while the riskiness of a project is a relevant factor in creative evaluation, 
perceptions of risk are clearly differentiated on the basis of expertise. Of all four features, 
scalability made the least contribution to creativity judgments, though the reason for this may 
be a result of a lack of domain-specific knowledge non-experts possessed regarding evaluating 
the potential of growth of the project ideas. 
In case of the domain-specific experts, it was found that none of the features could be 
used as predictors of their judgments made about creativity. Based on the findings that all four 
features contributed to the non-expert participants’ creativity ratings and no features contributed 
to the domain-specific experts’ creativity ratings, it is suggested that domain-specific experts 
and non-experts are not suitable for pairwise comparison since their judgments are formed on 
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different bases. However, domain-general experts showed similarities (mainly in the utility 
ratings) with both groups, which shows a gradual decline in agreement as domain knowledge 
increases.  
As well as revealing which factors contribute to the evaluation of creative ideas, the 
present study also showed how taken together, the four features accounted for the variation in 
creativity judgments of non-experts. In Experiment 1, ratings of the four features explained 
39.7% (28.6% Experiment 2) of the variance in creativity ratings, and a further 12.2% was 
accounted for by variability amongst the participants (including the rater effect), resulting in a 
total of 51.9% (41.5% Experiment 2) of the explained variance. While there is no direct 
comparison to the present study, to put our findings in context, a recent study comparing quasi-
expert and novice creativity ratings for ideas designed to solve science problems reported that 
32-40% of the variance in creativity ratings could be accounted for by the non-expert judges 
(Long & Pang, 2015). Moreover, other studies have also reported that non-experts tend to 
generate noisy and unreliable creativity judgments (e.g., Kaufman et al., 2008; Lee, Lee, & 
Youn, 2005). The general conclusion drawn from this work (as it was outlined in Chapter 1 
already) is that non-experts use features in an arbitrary way, which is reflected in the fact that 
they diverge significantly from the pattern of judgments of experts, as well as relative to other 
non-experts (see Kaufman & Baer, 2012, for a review). While it is difficult to make strong 
comparisons given the differences in between previous studies and the present study, in contrast 
to prior work, we show that non-experts do possess an internalised model of creativity that is 
robust and consistent. Previous studies that look at non-expert groups tend to show inconsistent 
judgments as a result of averaging across non-expert groups. We speculate that one key 
difference between previous studies and the present study is our attempt to individually map 
the basis on which creative judgments are made, by using a linear mixed model analysis. This 
analysis is grounded in the Theory of Social Judgment (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, & 
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Steinmann, 1975) and was an attempt to fit the Lens model on creativity judgments to garner 
more information about the cues informing the judgment. The results demonstrate that non-
experts do not make random subjective judgments regarding the assessment of creative ideas 
and the variance found in creativity ratings can be explained if the "input values" of the model 
are adequately defined at the start.  
When the internalised creativity model of non-experts was replaced with an external 
expert model, utility emerged as the dominant feature, suggesting that the perception of utility 
and its influence on creativity evaluation is largely aligned between experts and non-experts. 
Using the same approach to explore other features, when it came to originality, this feature was 
not a significant predictor of creativity ratings in non-experts, suggesting its potential relevance 
in evaluating creativity is likely to be shaped by expertise. It is worth nothing here that a 
possible limitation of the study is that expertise was treated as a distinct, binary construct (expert 
vs. non-expert). In reality, expertise is likely to be graded, thus future studies would could use 
the model we developed to examine how the magnitude of expertise affects creativity ratings. 
Another important factor that also requires further exploration is the generalizability of our 
findings to other creative idea evaluation in other domains. It may be the case that utility 
consistently predicting creativity ratings for non-experts and experts, because of the business 
context of the project ideas, and so further work is needed to explore the extent to which the 
consistency of the non-experts’ internal model of creativity is demonstrated in other creative 
domains. 
In sum, we showed that, if motivated sufficiently, lay participants’ overall creativity 
ratings can be predicted from the four features selected in Chapter 4. Their creativity ratings 
could be predicted to a larger extent from their feature ratings than from domain-general expert 
judges' creativity ratings. The experiments revealed an internal model of the non-experts 
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comprising of how the four features are weighted. In contrast, domain-specific experts’ 
creativity ratings were not found to be informed by their ratings of the features. 
One of the takeaways of this research was that the available information at the time of 
casting the rating might be crucial for forming the judgment about creativity. A frequent 
feedback of the participants was that they would do a better job if they would be provided with 
more information about the task. Thus, this hypothesis was also investigated as part of 
Experiment 1 & 2, however, the analysis of this issue will be presented in the next chapter, as 
task-related information is a different contextual factor than motivation. The next chapter 
discusses in detail how manipulating the available information might influence the evaluation 





CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL STUDY II 
 
6.1 Overview 
The previous chapter discussed key results drawn from Experiment 1 and 2 by focusing 
on the use of linear models. The present chapter builds on these results by providing an account 
of possible reasons which might impose challenges to naïve participants while judging creative 
ideas. This chapter addresses the third main research question (Q3), namely, it addresses the 
role contextual factors are playing in the evaluation of creative ideas. One of the main results 
from Chapter 5 is that creativity ratings can be predicted based on creativity-related features. 
The two experimental manipulations reported below are appended to the previous chapter: they 
help to explore what factors are possibly informing the judgment making process. 
The data presented in this chapter stems from three experiments; the first part of the 
chapter probes whether providing task-relevant information influences creativity ratings based 
on data from Experiment 1 & 2. Subsequently, Experiment 3 is introduced in the second part 
of the chapter. This one is testing whether meta-information regarding the nature of the task 
affects creativity ratings and the corresponding certainty ratings. The aim in case of both 
manipulations is to figure out how does providing and not providing participants with explicit 
information about the task affect how they cast their ratings about creativity. First, an 
information brief is provided to half of the participants about the criteria which can be used to 
assess creativity. It is assumed that those who receive additional information before rating 
creativity would cast different ratings than those who do not receive such information. In the 
second part, meta-information about the nature of the task is given to half of the participants: it 
is expected that they would be less certain in their judgments if it is known that creativity is the 




6.2 The Effect of Providing Task-relevant Information 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Participants without expertise are often asked to complete difficult tasks; in the present 
research, they are instructed to evaluate the creativity of several project proposals, each of them 
outlining an idea about improving urban lives. This job is not only daunting because judging 
realistic ideas is a complex task and one needs to take numerous dimensions into account but 
also because a lay person has very little idea about what the relevant dimensions are. This might 
be also related to studies finding that people have implicit models of creativity (Lim & Plucker, 
2001; Runco & Johnson, 2002). Given the lack of accessible knowledge, it is not rare for 
participants to feel unguided or that their responses can only be provided somewhat randomly, 
without a deeper understanding of the underpinnings, relying mostly on a gut feeling formed 
based on a first impression. 
Thus, we attempted to supply non-expert participants with some essential information 
about the task to reduce their uncertainty and increase their success rate. The aim was to find 
out whether providing participants with explicit information about the creativity-related 
features would affect their creativity ratings. This question was motivated by the logic of the 
Lens model (Brunswik, 1952; Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch, 1964) outlining the judgment 
process as one in which individuals search for cues they can build in to inform their 
judgments.Previous research has also found different ratings of creativity when participants had 
to make judgments with no instruction, guided by explicit criteria, or task-related training 
(Caroff & Besançon, 2008). In this study, it was expected that providing the criteria for 
judgments would impact the evaluations.  
Available information about the task-relevant features was manipulated by dividing 
participants into two groups: the first started the experiment with the Feature rating task, while 
the second group started with the Investment task. It was a within-subject design, so all 
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participants completed both tasks eventually. Critically, in the feature rating task, participants 
were provided with a brief pitch describing the features which have been theorised (see Table 
2 in Chapter 4) to underlie the making of the judgment. Participants completing the Feature 
rating task were presented with the name and the definition of the four features implemented in 
the study (see Procedure). They were instructed to carefully read the presented information and 
keep it in mind while rating the features. It was expected that (H4) those participants who were 
made aware of the name and content of criteria linked to creativity will cast feature and 
creativity ratings more closely linked to each other than the participants who were not made 
aware of which criteria are connected to creativity ratings. Further, participants who started 
with the Investment task were not informed about the criteria before casting their creativity 
ratings. Thus, (H5) the different order of completing the Feature rating task and the Investment 
task was expected to provide a different amount of available information to the participants at 
the time of casting their creativity ratings. Therefore, the mean of the creativity ratings was 
expected to differ between the two conditions. 
A potential caveat of the research design is that participants were not explicitly informed 
that the presented criteria should be used for judging creativity; it was only assumed that they 
would realise they could use their newly acquired knowledge during the second part of the 
experiment too. Also, it was not specified that all criteria should be used, participants could 
choose to incorporate only one or multiple ones to form their judgment about creativity. Based 
on previous findings, originality was expected to contribute the most to the selection of creative 
ideas (Rietzschel et al., 2010). 
 
6.2.2 Method  
6.2.2.1 Participants. For Experiment 1, 80 healthy participants (60 females, age: M±SD 
= 20.18±2 years) were recruited from the Queen Mary University of London, UK. For 
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Experiment 2, 60 healthy participants were recruited via Prolific Academic. They were aged 
between 18 and 61 years (M = 29.87, SD = 11) and 24 of them were female. N=1 participant 
was excluded due to guessing the same number to all ratings. This resulted in an overall sample 
of n=139 participants. All of them gave their informed consent and were compensated with £5-
13 (the amount depended on performance). The study protocol was approved by the Local 
Ethics Committee at the Queen Mary, University of London (reference number: 
QMREC1566a).  
6.2.2.2 Design and Materials. The experiment was comprised of two conditions, 
following a within-subject design. All participants completed a Feature rating task and an 
Investment task, but the order of presentation of the tasks was randomized across participants. 
The data presented here is a sub-set of the data collected in Experiment 1 & 2, which were 
introduced in Chapter 5 already. 
The stimuli consisted of fifteen project ideas, which were created based on proposals 
collected from an open-source platform, OpenIDEO (2011); all project ideas were entries for a 
competition on “How might we restore vibrancy in cities and regions facing economic decline?” 
and were edited into two paragraphs of text. Each project was subsequently rated by a pool of 
experts (n = 16) on four features: originality, utility, scalability and riskiness. A detailed account 
of the creation of the paradigm can be found in Chapter 4. 
6.2.2.3. Procedure. After giving their consent, all participants were asked to provide 
demographic information, as well as potentially relevant experience related to the task domain, 
their current motivational levels, and their subjective interpretation of creativity. Once 
completed, all participants were presented with two tasks: Feature rating task and Investment 
task. In the Feature rating task, participants were first familiarised with the four features of 
creativity. After this, each project proposal (N=15) was presented for 60s, and for each, 
participants rated the project according to each of the four features; rating responses were 
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provided on a VAS from 0 (not at all) to 100 (most). In the Investment task, participants were 
presented with the same 15 projects, but this time they were instructed to indicate their 
willingness to invest in each project; they indicated their response on scale between 0 (no 
investment) to 100 (maximum investment).  
Critically, those who started the experiment with the Feature rating task received the 
additional information about the criteria before rating creativity as part of the Investment task. 
Participants who started with the Investment task were presented with the information only after 
they have rated creativity already. 
6.2.2.4. Data Analysis. The data was analysed by using the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20 as well as Microsoft Office Excel 2010.   
 
6.2.3 Results 
In Exp. 1, a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with 
the two conditions as the independent variable and the project proposals’ creativity ratings as 
15 dependent variables. This test can be considered an extension of the independent-samples t-
test and was run to detect the effect of providing additional information on the ratings (n=40). 
The differences between the two experimental conditions on the combined dependent variables 
was statistically significant, F(15, 64) = 2.239, p = .013; Wilks' Λ = .656; partial η2 = .344. A 
Bonferroni adjusted α level of .0001 with a simultaneous 99.9% confidence level was used. 
There were no significant differences in the pairwise comparisons as outlined in Table 16. 
Making the creativity investment with or without reading the feature descriptions did not result 
in different performance.  
Table 16 
Pairwise comparisons by each of the projects in Experiment 1. 
123 
 









p 99,9% CI for Mean 
Difference, Lower 
Bound 
99,9% CI for Mean 
Difference, Upper 
Bound 
1 70.750 3.521 58.710 82.790 70.750 
2 52.500 4.165 38.257 66.743 52.500 
3 61.925 3.444 50.148 73.702 61.925 
4 29.275 4.290 14.603 43.947 29.275 
5 70.150 3.260 59.003 81.297 70.150 
6 43.375 4.277 28.750 58.000 43.375 
7 36.275 4.049 22.428 50.122 36.275 
8 33.525 3.586 21.260 45.790 33.525 
9 24.625 3.840 11.494 37.756 24.625 
11 36.100 4.750 19.855 52.345 36.100 
12 60.900 3.811 47.868 73.932 60.900 
13 56.850 3.724 44.116 69.584 56.850 
14 45.425 4.332 30.611 60.239 45.425 
15 24.275 3.109 13.643 34.907 24.275 
16 33.575 3.779 20.651 46.499 33.575 
Note. Differences between the average creativity ratings, starting with the Investment task vs. 




In Exp. 2, the same analysis was conducted and the independent-samples t-tests revealed 
no effect due to the manipulation, F(15, 43) = .645, p = .821; Wilks' Λ = .816; partial η2 = .184. 
Table 17 displays the pairwise comparisons and that no significant difference was spotted by 
any of the projects. 
 
Table 17 
Pairwise comparisons by each of the projects in Experiment 2. 
Project ID Mean difference 
between the 
investment first 




p 99,9% CI for Mean 
Difference, Lower 
Bound 
99,9% CI for Mean 
Difference, Upper 
Bound 
1 -1.244 6.279 .844 -23.028 20.540 
2 -6.230 6.994 .377 -30.496 18.036 
3 -.094 6.113 .988 -21.304 21.116 
4 -3.848 5.667 .500 -23.509 15.812 
5 -.475 6.226 .939 -22.077 21.127 
6 -2.311 6.295 .715 -24.154 19.531 
7 3.452 6.431 .594 -18.861 25.765 
8 -10.061 7.504 .185 -36.095 15.973 
9 -10.285 5.945 .089 -30.912 10.342 
11 -3.148 7.532 .678 -29.281 22.984 
12 -8.508 5.909 .155 -29.010 11.994 
13 -4.259 5.593 .450 -23.663 15.145 
14 -7.140 6.736 .294 -30.510 16.229 
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15 -2.221 6.794 .745 -25.792 21.351 
16 -6.407 4.383 .149 -21.613 8.800 
Note. Differences between the average creativity ratings, starting with the Investment task vs. 
with the Feature rating task. N=30 in both conditions. 
 
6.2.4 Discussion 
No effect resulted from providing the definition of criteria to the participants. This null 
result might be due to several reasons. One limitation is that participants were informed that the 
information brief was supposed to help them with the Feature ratings task, not with the 
Investment task, in which the creativity ratings were provided. It was assumed participants 
would connect the two parts of the experiment but there is no guarantee they indeed did so. 
Furthermore, a possible reason for the inefficacy of the manipulation is that the additional 
information was not presented in a form which could have been useful to the lay participants. 
The helpful information was laid out as a set of abstract definitions. On one hand, participants 
reported spontaneously at the end of the testing sessions that this information enriched their 
representations and reduced the vagueness of the task. On the other hand, the information did 
not make any impact on the mean creativity ratings of the projects. The paradigm was not 
suitable for detecting which level of processing formed the bottleneck the information could 
not get through. 
Another issue with the research design might be that the guidelines outlined could not 
be effectively incorporated as there was only one shot to make each choice and no feedback 
was provided regarding the accuracy of the judgment made. A good test of whether the 
manipulation works might be a within-subject rather than a between-subject design as the 
participants were not matched according to any variables. A possible alternative of this 
manipulation could be an explicit instruction handed out to the participants, in which they are 
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told to rate creativity high if they think the level of a feature, e.g., originality, is high in the idea. 
A recent study found that such explicit instructions enable participants to overcome their 
original reluctance of selecting original ideas (Rietzschel et al., 2014). It is also speculated that 
revealing the relations between the cues of the features and the expected creativity ratings could 
inform participants better than presenting the definition of the features. 
However, it is not only the connection of the criteria which might inform participants 
about how to judge stimuli. Information regarding the nature of the experimental task which 
participants must complete might also guide them in their efforts. The second half of this 
chapter lays out how this was studied in Experiment 3.  
 
6.3 The Effect of Meta-information on Creativity Ratings 
6.3.1 Introduction  
During the data collection of Experiment 1 & 2, non-expert participants often reported 
that assessing creativity seems difficult for them because they do not have a clear idea on what 
is expected from them and the fact they need to complete a task they have never done before is 
making them nervous. This chapter is strongly built on this feedback collected from the 
participants. In the first part, it was probed whether providing more information to participants 
would affect how they judge creativity.  
In contrast, Experiment 3 was designed to investigate whether possessing different 
meta-information influences the appraisal of creativity or not. Meta-information is understood 
in this thesis as contextual information which guides the participant in evaluating the task 
beforehand and creating a strategy to solve it. The aim was to check whether meta-information 
is one of the contextual factors which drives the judgments made about creativity. The 
assumption that it would be was motivated by the experience gathered during the data collection 
of the pilot work with the paradigm (not reported in this thesis). It was observed that delivering 
127 
 
the task instructions had discriminable effects on the participants: if it was highlighted that 
assessing creativity would be the point of the experiment, participants became visibly anxious 
and uncertain, while if only the ‘judgment making about ideas’ aspect was stressed, then 
participants seemed to have an easier time while completing the tasks. Thus, the framing of 
creativity assessments became one of the candidate contextual factors possibly influencing the 
judgment making process. 
While meta-information implicates certain interpretations and associations and 
therefore evokes a context for the task, meta-cognition (discussed in Ch. 1) stands for 
understanding people’s theories about their own cognition and reflecting on the strategies which 
govern their ways of thinking (Schraw, & Moshman, 1995). Meta-information helps to step 
into a process and to frame it appropriately, while meta-cognition facilitates the stepping outside 
of a process to consider it from an outer perspective. 
The aim of this project was to find out whether possessing different meta-information 
about the task drives people to judge creativity differently, i.e., whether creativity ratings 
change if participants are aware that creativity is the important dimension in their evaluation. 
Deception is a technique often used in psychological research for discovering the effect of 
informed and uninformed scenarios on the dependent variable, however, here, no false 
information was provided to the participants, we only distorted the narrative of the instructions 
to create two alternatives. Namely, highlighting that creativity is the central dimension which 
needs to be assessed was compared to completing the same procedure without informing 
participants that the purpose of the task is to evaluate creativity. It was hypothesised that (H6) 
if people need to evaluate the creativity of ideas, they make less certain judgments than what 
they would make if they were informed they must evaluate business ideas per several 
dimensions, not mentioning creativity explicitly (‘nothing special’ condition). In addition, (H7) 
participants were expected to give less coherent creativity ratings than viability ratings as they 
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would have more expertise in estimating the usefulness/feasibility than the creativity of an idea. 
For this, difference was expected to be found in the average of creativity ratings between the 
'creativity' and the 'nothing special' groups, whilst no difference in the average of the viability 
ratings between the two groups.  
 
6.3.2 Method 
6.3.2.1 Participants. 85 healthy participants (54 males, age: M±SD = 31.85±7.19 years) 
were recruited using the online platform Prolific Academic. Half of them (n=43) were 
instructed to evaluate how creative the ideas are, whereas the other half of the participants 
(n=42) were instructed to evaluate the ideas taking a few criteria (as such, creativity happened 
to be one of them) into consideration. All participants gave written informed consent and were 
compensated with £3. The study protocol was approved by the Local Ethics Committee at the 
Queen Mary, University of London. 
6.3.2.2 Materials. The stimuli consisted of fifteen project ideas, which were created 
based on proposals collected from an open-source platform, OpenIDEO (2011); all project ideas 
were entries for a competition on “How might we restore vibrancy in cities and regions facing 
economic decline?” and were edited into two paragraphs of text. Each project was subsequently 
rated by a pool of experts (N = 16) on four features: originality, utility, scalability and riskiness. 
A detailed account of the creation of the paradigm can be found in Chapter 4. 
6.3.2.3 Design. The experiment followed a between-subject design: participants in two 
conditions had to complete an almost identical task – the only difference was the experimental 
manipulation, that is, the meta-information the task instruction suggested about the nature of 
the task to the participants. 
6.3.2.4 Procedure. As outlined in the Design section, participants in both conditions 
completed an almost identical task. After giving their consent, all participants were asked to 
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provide demographic information, as well as potentially relevant experience related to the task 
domain, their current motivational levels, and their subjective interpretation of creativity. 
Subsequently, each project proposal (N=15) was presented for 60s. All participants were asked 
to consider each project on the basis of how creative, attractive and viable it is, and 
corresponding certainty judgments were also provided in case of each judgment. Rating 
responses were provided on a visual analogue scale (VAS) from 0 (not at all) to 100 (most). 
After completing the evaluation part, N=14 self-report statements were provided, each of them 
expressing possible strategies which one could use to evaluate creativity (e.g., „Although I was 
asked to judge the ideas objectively, at the end I relied on which one I liked and which one I 
didn't.”). Participants self-reported how much they agree with these statements/how much the 
statements described what they did in the main task on a 1-5 Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = 
fully). 
Critically, the only difference between the two task conditions were the information 
participants received regarding the nature of the task. In the ‘creativity’ condition, participants 
were informed that the point of the experiment is to evaluate creativity. In contrast, in the 
‘nothing special’ condition, participants were told that the aim of the experiment is to assess 
business ideas and there are several dimensions in which judgments must be made. As already 
stated above, the three criteria for evaluation were identical in both conditions. 
6.3.2.5 Data Analysis. The data was analysed by using the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 20 as well as Microsoft Office Excel 2010.   
 
6.3.3 Results 
A one-way MANOVA was conducted with the two conditions as the independent 
variable and the project proposals’ creativity ratings as 15 dependent variables. The aim was to 
reveal whether there were any differences in the creativity ratings between the 'creativity 
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instruction' and the 'nothing special instruction' groups. No significant difference was found 
between the two groups on the creativity ratings, F(15, 69) = .462, p = .952; Wilks' Λ = .909; 
partial η2 = .091. A Bonferroni adjusted α level of .0001 with a simultaneous 99.9% confidence 
level was used for pairwise comparisons but there were no significant differences in any ratings 
between the 'creativity instruction' and the 'nothing special instruction' groups. The same can 
be stated about the certainty ratings: conducting another one-way MANOVA showed that the 
fixed effect had no main effect, F(15, 69) = 1.559, p = .109; Pillai’s Trace= .253; partial η2 = 
.253. Here, Pillai’s Trace was used because the assumption of homogeneity of variance-
covariance matrices was violated, as assessed by Box's M test (p < .001). Table 18 displays the 
creativity ratings, while Table 19 shows the certainty ratings.  
 
Table 18 
Pairwise comparisons between the creativity ratings provided by the two experimental 
groups. 







p 99,9% CI for Mean 
Difference, Lower 
Bound 
99,9% CI for Mean 
Difference, Upper 
Bound 
1 70.750 3.521 58.710 82.790 70.750 
2 52.500 4.165 38.257 66.743 52.500 
3 61.925 3.444 50.148 73.702 61.925 
4 29.275 4.290 14.603 43.947 29.275 
5 70.150 3.260 59.003 81.297 70.150 
6 43.375 4.277 28.750 58.000 43.375 
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7 36.275 4.049 22.428 50.122 36.275 
8 33.525 3.586 21.260 45.790 33.525 
9 24.625 3.840 11.494 37.756 24.625 
11 36.100 4.750 19.855 52.345 36.100 
12 60.900 3.811 47,868 73.932 60.900 
13 56.850 3.724 44,116 69.584 56.850 
14 45.425 4.332 30,611 60.239 45.425 
15 24.275 3.109 13,643 34.907 24.275 
16 33.575 3.779 20,651 46.499 33.575 
 
Table 19 










p 99,9% CI for Mean 
Difference, Lower 
Bound 
99,9% CI for Mean 
Difference, Upper 
Bound 
1 3.781 4.530 .406 -11.675 19.236 
2 -.394 4.521 .931 -15.817 15.029 
3 2.256 4.068 .581 -11.623 16.136 
4 5.502 3.435 .113 -6.217 17.220 
5 4.133 4.102 .317 -9.863 18.128 
6 6.511 4.178 .123 -7.741 20.764 
7 3.468 4.030 .392 -10.279 17.215 
8 -2.497 3.642 .495 -14.923 9.930 
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9 3.669 3.596 .311 -8.598 15.936 
11 -3.341 4.438 .454 -18.482 11.801 
12 2.499 3.705 .502 -10.140 15.139 
13 -.237 4.078 .954 -14.150 13.676 
14 .408 4.215 .923 -13.974 14.790 
15 .904 4.432 .839 -14.218 16.026 
16 -.838 4.068 .837 -14.717 13.041 
 
Upon test completion, 14 self-report statements were filled in by the participants to check for 
their strategy uses. A one-way MANOVA was conducted with the two conditions as the 
independent variable and the self-report statements as 14 dependent variables. The aim was to 
reveal whether there were any differences in the creativity ratings between the 'creativity 
instruction' and the 'nothing special instruction' groups. No significant difference was found 
between the two groups in what they thought about the task and what kind of strategies they 
used, F(14, 70) = 1.606, p = .099; Wilks' Λ = .757; partial η2 = .243. A Bonferroni adjusted α 
level of .0001 was used for pairwise comparisons but no significant difference was revealed by 
the analysis (Table 20). 
 
Table 20 


















I found this task 
difficult to do. 
.352 .210 .098 -.366 1.069 
I made my rating 
somewhat randomly, 
didn't think about it 
too much. 
-.007 .151 .962 -.521 .507 
"Creative" is the 
opposite of 
"practical". 
-.447 .229 .055 -1.229 .336 
I don't think there is a 
good way to judge 
projects, the outcomes 
depend on luck 
anyway. 
-.161 .207 .441 -.868 .547 
I am certain that there 
are objective criteria 
with which great ideas 
can be detected. 
-.239 .225 .291 -1.005 .528 
Creative is something 
I have never heard of. 
.020 .111 .853 -.357 .398 
I think it's simple and 
straightforward to 
judge these ideas. 
-.266 .221 .233 -1.020 .488 
Creative is something 
I couldn't have come 
up with. 
.262 .213 .223 -.465 .989 
Only people who have 
more business-related 
expertise than me 
could do this task well. 
-.022 .237 .926 -.829 .785 
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Only people who have 
creative talents could 
do this task well. 
.214 .210 .311 -.501 .929 
I'm not aware how this 
task should be done 
and felt kind of lost 
during the process. 
-.058 .167 .730 -.626 .511 
I know exactly how to 
judge project 
proposals such as the 
ones I read earlier. 
.246 .202 .226 -.442 .934 
Although I was asked 
to judge the ideas 
objectively, at the end 
I relied on which one I 
liked and which one I 
didn't. 
-.164 .221 .460 -.920 .591 
I know what I was 
doing and applied 
consistent criteria 
over all project 
evaluations. 
.038 .255 .883 -.831 .906 
 
A principal components analysis (PCA) was run on the self-report questionnaire 
including 14 statements. The PCA reveals to what extent are the original distances between the 
data points preserved while reducing the dimensions of this 14 dimensional data set. There is 
no agreement on whether a PCA is suitable for ordinary variables thus alternative methods, 
such as the factor analysis, may also be used.  
PCA revealed five components that had eigenvalues greater than one; they explained 
25.7%, 12.5%, 11.6%, 9.6% and 7.9% of the total variance, respectively. Visual inspection of 




Figure 3. Scree plot of the principal components visualizing the retained variances. 
The two-component solution explained 38.2% of the total variance and is depicted on 
Figure 4. 
 





In the present chapter, factors which might inform the judgment of creativity, and the 
lack of which might impede the successful assessment of creativity, were investigated. The first 
part of the chapter examined the role of task-relevant information in casting creativity ratings 
based on data from Experiment 1 & 2. It was expected that (H4) those participants who were 
made aware of the name and content of criteria linked to creativity would cast feature ratings 
with more predictive power creativity ratings than the participants who were not made aware 
of which criteria are connected to creativity ratings. Also, it was hypothesised that (H5) the 
different order of completing the Feature rating task and the Investment task would provide a 
different amount of available information to the participants at the time of casting their 
creativity ratings. Therefore, the mean of the creativity ratings would be affected by the order 
in which the experimental tasks are completed. No such effect was found, based on which the 
verity of the hypotheses cannot be supported. It might be that task-relevant information does 
not affect creativity ratings but also that applying a different methodology could achieve such 
effect. 
Subsequently, Experiment 3 was introduced, and it tested whether meta-information 
regarding the nature of the task would affect creativity ratings and the corresponding certainty 
ratings, as well the subjective experience of the participants. In this experiment, (H6) it was 
assumed that if people need to evaluate the creativity of ideas, they make less certain judgments 
than what they would make if they were informed they must evaluate business ideas per several 
dimensions, not mentioning creativity explicitly. In addition, (H7) participants were expected 
to give less coherent creativity ratings than viability ratings as they are expected to have more 
expertise in estimating the usefulness/feasability than the creativity of an idea. For this, we 
expected to find a difference in the average of creativity ratings between the 'creativity' and the 
'nothing special' groups, whilst no difference in the average of the viability ratings between the 
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groups. Given the pattern of the results, it can be stated that meta-information about the task 
did not affect the ratings. However, the effect might be only marginal, in which case a within-
subject design could reveal it better. Based on the data, it seems also that participants were no 
more confident judges of feasibility than of creativity. 
Apart from working with noisy stimuli, meeting the task requirements was also 
challenging for the lay participants. Based on their feedback, it seemed opaque to them how the 
degree of creativity should be computed for casting their rating. The lack of prior experience 
seemed like a gap being too wide to bridge over. Providing relevant information about the 
features before starting the task did not change the performance at all. Undoubtedly, providing 
information about the task performance after the completion of the task could not influence it, 
either. Finally, attempting the implementation of a trial-to-trial learning method would not 
feasible in case of the current version of the paradigm due to the limited amount of trials. The 
question of whether providing task-relevant information in a descriptive or experiential manner 
could train laypeople to perform more similar to experts remains open. The null result found 
after providing task-relevant information can be attributed to both not presenting the 
information in a sufficient way for processing it (e.g., it is too abstract thus not straight-forward 
enough to implement it immediately, there is not enough time for the information to sink in, 
etc.) or the presented information indeed not affected the judgment process considerably. Also, 
it was found that the notion itself that creativity must be evaluated is not making participants 
perplexed. They have not been found to become less certain in their evaluations as compared 
to evaluating other factors, as well as did not report daunting feelings associated with evaluating 
creativity. 
To sum it up, the aim in case of both manipulations was to figure out how does providing 
and not providing participants with explicit information about the task affect their judgment 
about creativity. The null results can be interpreted in two ways: it is possible that alternative 
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task instructions are not sufficient to influence the metacognition regarding creativity, as well 
as the creative evaluation performance itself (however, this does not cross out the possibility 
that using different technique could achieve the effect). Another explanation might be that 
despite the anecdotal evidence, metacognition about creativity judgments is not influencing the 
task performance, or at least not in such manner which we could have captured by either the 
ratings or a simple questionnaire. It is difficult to make straight-forward conclusions, since there 
is no theory outlining the connection between meta-cognition and creativity. The construction 
of a theoretical framework can be informed by practical, data-driven research.  
Similar things can be said about the research coming up in the next chapter. One of the 
difficulties with comparing the research paradigms is that some of them assess creativity in an 
absolute manner (by awarding scores to different criteria), while other paradigms establish 
rankings in a pool of creative products, where the scores must be interpreted relatively to each 
other. No theory has outlined yet how absolute and relative judgments made about creativity 
should be compared, or whether they are comparable at all. Chapter 7 is considering this issue 
by discussing the way of casting judgments as a potential contextual factor influencing the 
evaluation of creative ideas.  
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CHAPTER 7: EMPIRICAL STUDY III 
 
7.1 Overview 
The present chapter investigates the similarities and the differences between making 
absolute and relative judgments about creativity. A short introduction about this topic is 
included in Chapter 2. Here, the focus is on the third research question of this thesis, which 
raises the possibility of certain contextual factors influencing the evaluation of creative ideas. 
A few key insights from the previous experiments are that the basic findings of the novel 
research paradigm regarding the weighting of criteria fed toward the overall judgment about 
creativity can be replicated (Chapter 5) and that the amount of available information about the 
features did not influence creativity ratings considerably (Chapter 6). To address whether 
creativity ratings are indeed consistent, this chapter probes whether different ways of evaluating 
creativity affects the ratings in a within-subject design. The aim of the empirical study was to 
extend the scope of the evaluation process from absolute creativity judgments to comparative 
judgments. Participants were prompted to ’shortlist’, i.e., to rank which projects are more/less 
creative than others, instead of judging them one-by-one. An answer is sought to the question 
whether these two types of judgments could be treated as equivalents when applied to the 
present paradigm. The overarching hypothesis is that participants rating of the ideas should not 
be subject of the way in which they are judged. Further, the ranking of the ideas is supposed to 
be independent from asking them to select the best or the worst ideas. The procedure was 
motivated by ecological validity as relative judgment making models how creative ideas are 






7.2 Making Absolute vs Relative Judgments 
7.2.1 Introduction 
Although measuring the same concept with various tasks is expected to yield essentially 
the same results regardless of the task, this assumption is rarely checked, at least in the creativity 
literature. Here we test in a within-subject design whether judging identical stimuli in three 
different ways modulate the findings. Participants were instructed to judge project proposals 
one-by-one such as in the chapters above to obtain absolute ratings of creativity. Additionally, 
they were prompted for the discernment of the ideas, that is, they needed to create a shortlist of 
selected ideas. This procedure is similar but not identical to screening processes, in which ideas 
are eliminated based on their compliance with industry standards (Bink & Marsh, 2000). While 
during the screening criteria is applied to make the judgment, here relative comparisons had to 
be made to produce the selection of ideas. Finally, to increase the ecological validity of the 
study and to gain useful information about the weighting of participants’ rankings, they were 
instructed to allocate a limited budget to the shortlisted ideas based on the judged creativity of 
the ideas. To our knowledge, this study is the first to compare the making of absolute vs relative 
judgments in the creativity literature. There are a few previous examples testing how sorting 
ideas into selected sub-groups impacts creativity assessment, nevertheless, different 
methodologies of judgment making were not contrasted in them. An early example for the study 
of making relative judgments is when participants had to judge a set of eight ideas presented on 
cards to them (Runco & Charles, 1993). In this case, the stimuli were very simple, responses 
collected from divergent thinking tasks, but sorting them was still not straight-forward due to 
the multiple attributes one needed to consider while appraising creativity (and choosing the 
suitable pile for the card). Another empirical study shed light on the role of discernment by 
creative ideas – Silvia (2008) instructed his participants to choose the top two responses from 
the available alternatives. He preferred the protocol of asking people to choose a subset of 
141 
 
responses as “forced-choice measures of creative judgment could offer insight into how people 
make such real-world creative judgments” (p. 144).  
Blair & Mumford’s (2007) paradigm lays the closest to the present research; lay judges 
of creativity had to evaluate project proposals which have been previously created to receive 
funding from a non-profit foundation. The participants were briefed about the scenario for 
which the stimuli were created, were even informed about the history of the funding body. This 
served as the instruction to align the judging criteria: “the Jackson foundation’s primary goal 
was to expand their program along new and useful avenues that might serve to lessen society’s 
significant problems” (p. 204). In the experimental task, participants had to make relative 
judgments and select the one from each of the 72 pairs of available project proposals which 
they considered for further development. Finally, the participants had to make a shortlist and 
select those ideas which they recommended for receiving funding. The manipulations employed 
in this study were the allowed time, the number of ideas which could be selected to receive 
funding (limiting them to 5 or imposing no limit), and the added pressure of social evaluation. 
The findings suggested that lay judges avoid choosing risky and original ideas, these options 
were not selected for further development. The sample of undergraduates preferred the ideas 
which were safe choices and consistent with societal norms and expectations. Participants who 
were limited in the number of ideas they could recommend for funding selected fewer original 
ideas than those who had no limit in the number of proposals they could recommend. 
Finally, a very recent study investigated different contextual factors which have a 
potential to facilitate the selection of creative ideas (de Buisonjé, Ritter, de Bruin, ter Horst, & 
Meeldijk, 2017). From a pool of 18 ideas, participants had to select the 5 most creative ones, 
which is an identical procedure to the relative ranking task reported here. Before the shortlisting 
took place, participants in the experimental condition were primed with promotion focus and 
positive affect and a self-affirmation task was also introduced. More creative ideas were 
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selected in the experimental group than in the control group receiving no contextual 
manipulation, which suggests that contextual factors can aid the discernment of creative ideas. 
 
7.2.2 Hypotheses 
(H8) The ordering of the absolute creativity ratings corresponds to making relative 
judgments about how creative the stimuli are compared to each other. That is, more than half 
of the 6 shortlisted projects was expected to be listed in the top/bottom six ideas too when 
converting the absolute judgments to an ordinal scale. 
(H9) The explicit rank ordering established in the shortlisting task aligns with the 
weighted rank ordering established in the budget allocation task with regard to the ranking 
across the projects. That is, the projects should be aligned in their ranking position to show the 
judgments are reliable. 
Subsequently, the data was analysed according to task condition to determine which 
type of creativity ratings are aligned with each other. 
(H10) The absolute creativity ratings were not expected to differ between the two task 
conditions (shortlisting the best vs. the worst ideas), as the task instructions did not concern 
these ratings.  
(H11) However, we expected the shortlists to be severely influenced by the task 
condition. It was hypothesized there would be no overlap between the 'best ideas' and the 'worst 
ideas' shortlists, i.e., they would share less than one idea on average. 
Finally, we wanted to explore whether experts' rankings of the projects would be similar 
to non-experts' rankings. That is, even if their absolute judgments were found to be largely 
dissimilar, it is possible that the ranking of the projects is better aligned between the two groups. 
(H12) It was expected that the rankings provided by domain-specific experts and non-
experts would largely overlap. That is, an overlap of at least half of the projects in the best six 
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ideas and the worst six ideas was expected between the two groups. It was not required the 
projects to be listed in the same ranking position. 
 
7.2.3 Method 
7.2.3.1 Participants. 118 healthy participants (50 males, age: M±SD = 31.92±8.01 
years) were recruited using the online platform Prolific Academic. All participants gave written 
informed consent and were compensated with £5. N=5 participants were excluded due to their 
relevant expertise in cities. The study protocol was approved by the Local Ethics Committee at 
the Queen Mary, University of London. 
7.2.3.2 Materials. The stimuli consisted of N=15 project ideas, which were created 
based on proposals collected from an open-source platform, OpenIDEO (2011); all project ideas 
were entries for a competition on “How might we restore vibrancy in cities and regions facing 
economic decline?” and were edited into two paragraphs of text. Each project was subsequently 
rated by a pool of experts (N = 16) on four features: originality, utility, scalability and riskiness. 
A detailed account of the creation of the paradigm can be found in Chapter 4. 
7.2.3.3 Design. Experiment 4 employed a between-subject design. There were two 
conditions: in the ‘best ideas’ condition, participants had to select 6 ideas which they found the 
most creative in the shortlisting task, whilst in the ‘worst ideas’ condition, participants had to 
select 6 ideas which they found the least creative in the shortlisting task. N=55 participants were 
instructed to shortlist the best 6, whilst n=63 participants were instructed to shortlist the worst 
6 project proposals. N=10 participants have shortlisted the best 6 ideas despite being instructed 
to do the opposite. Since these participants were not at all aware of the mix-up, their data was 
simply added to the 'best ideas' condition. This resulted in a final number of n=65 participants 
in the 'best ideas' condition and n=53 participants in the 'worst ideas' condition.  
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7.2.3.4 Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed a brief 
questionnaire on demographic information, relevant expertise, degree of current motivation, 
and their internalized interpretation of creativity (e.g., originality). The participants of the ’best 
ideas’ condition were instructed to shortlist the best 6 ideas, while the participants of the ’worst 
ideas’ condition were told to shortlist the worst 6 ideas. Subsequently, each project (N=15) was 
presented for 60 s (or could be skipped any time before). Afterward, participants were instructed 
to rate each feature on a VAS from 0 (not at all) to 100 (most), as well as to type in what was 
the best and the worst aspect of the presented project. Finally, they were asked whether they 
consider the presented project to be included in their shortlist. The presentation order of the 
projects and the features were randomized across participants. 
Once each project was judged in an absolute manner, participants were presented with 
a list of all projects and had to drag-and-drop the 6 projects which they selected for the shortlist. 
On task completion, they were also prompted to explain with their own words how the selection 
was made (this was a built-in check to see whether they have completed what was asked from 
them).  
In the next section, they needed to weight the ranked ideas. This was done through 
allocating a budget. The titles of the shortlisted 6 ideas were presented and participants had to 
divide 100 coins across them. In the 'best ideas' condition, the more creative an idea was, the 
more coins it should have received. Conversely, in the 'worst ideas' condition, the less creative 
an idea was, the more coins should be allocated to it. In both conditions, explicit instructions 
outlined based on what principle the projects should be weighted. In the ’worst ideas condition’, 
participants were instructed by the following statement: "This might sound a bit strange but if 
a project is less creative than the others, it should receive more coins than the others. (So a 30 
coin idea is less creative than a 15 coin idea.) Please focus only on the creativity of the project 
while making your choices. You will need to spend all 100 coins." Finally, participants needed 
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to explain shortly the strategy behind the distribution of their budget (this was another built-in 
check too see whether the task instructions were comprehended). 
7.2.3.5 Data Analysis The data was analysed by using Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 20, the irr package of R (Gamer, Lemon, Fellows, & Singh, 2015) as 
well as Microsoft Office Excel 2010. The full data set (N=1770 trials) was analysed. Three 
types of metrics were collected regarding the evaluation of creativity: (1) absolute creativity 
ratings were registered (the same way as outlined in the earlier chapters), (2) the projects were 
shortlisted, which resulted in a rank ordering, and finally, (3) a budget of 100 coins was 
allocated amongst the selected 6 projects, which resulted in a weighted rank ordering. To 
compare the three different scales, both the absolute ratings and the weighted ranks were 
converted to ordinal scales. In the Results section, the similarities between the acquired 2 
(condition) x 3 (rating method) types of ratings are investigated. 
 
7.2.4 Results 
First, we show the results of the three creativity rating tasks. Subsequently, the results 
will be discussed according to the hypotheses outlined above. Starting with the absolute 
creativity rating task, the findings are displayed in Table 21 and 22. As expected in (H11), there 
were no significant differences in the mean of the absolute creativity ratings between the ’best 

















1 69.65 20.77 
Intermodal 3 66.71 21.24 
miLES 5 62.83 21.83 





2 58.6 19.75 
A.R.T.S. 12 56.83 24.33 
Sidewalk 
Chalk Arts 
7 52.28 25.08 




9 50.49 26.31 
Feel the city 11 49.38 25.81 
Pop-up 
Cultural Hub  
13 48.66 23.19 
Street Signs 
With Stickers 
4 40.69 25.18 
Blogger Café 16 40.6 24.83 
Movies to the 
park 
15 35.91 23.88 
Time capsules 8 28.09 26.55 
Note. N=65. Projects are sorted from the 




Absolute creativity ratings in the ‘worst 
ideas’ condition 




1 70.89 18.51 
Intermodal 3 70 17.61 
miLES 5 67.96 19.19 





2 58.75 24.13 
School of ideas 6 56.68 22.76 
A.R.T.S. 12 55.68 21.46 
Pop-up 
Cultural Hub  
13 47.4 22.6 
Sidewalk Chalk 
Arts 
7 46.83 23.07 




9 45.13 22.66 
Street Signs 
With Stickers 
4 38.19 24.78 
Blogger Café 16 36.79 22.27 
Movies to the 
park 
15 34.89 22.18 
Time capsules 8 25.38 22.61 
Note. N=53. Projects are sorted from the 
highest mean to the lowest mean.
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To get a cleaner measure of the absolute ratings, the descriptive data was also computed 
for the first responses given by the participants due in the randomized presentation order (Table 
23 and 24). This was done to make sure that no relative judgment was made while rating the 
stimuli. Although the magnitude of the results matched the ones in Table 21 and 22, the rank 
order has changed. This must be due to the tiny sample sizes from which the descriptive 
statistics were calculated. The lack of big differences between Table 21 & 23, as well as 
between Table 22 & 24 verifies the validity of both measures. 
 
Table 23 
Absolute creativity ratings in the ‘best ideas’ condition by all of the firstly presented projects 
Project ID of 
the project 
first presented 




5 70.20 19.98 399.20 
3 Intermodal 6 65.83 18.43 339.77 
12 A.R.T.S. 3 61.00 18.52 343.00 








5 56.80 16.75 280.70 











3 44.33 29.94 896.33 
11 Feel the city 10 43.50 28.04 786.06 
6 School of ideas 4 37.00 19.71 388.67 
8 Time capsules 2 35.00 24.04 578.00 
15 
Movies to the 
park 






6 26.17 27.15 736.97 
16 Blogger Café 2 18.00 4.24 18.00 
 
Table 24 
Absolute creativity ratings in the ‘worst ideas’ condition by all of the firstly presented projects 
Project ID of 
the project 
first presented 
Project title n M SD Variance 
5 miLES 4 71.75 9.71 94.25 














8 56.00 19.03 362.29 
14 Fablab 1 55.00 0.00 0.00 




3 47.67 28.04 786.33 
16 Blogger Café 4 35.75 22.72 516.25 
12 A.R.T.S. 1 34.00 0.00 0.00 
15 
Movies to the 
park 





3 31.67 16.07 258.33 




4 26.50 17.67 312.33 
8 Time capsules 3 24.00 7.94 63.00 
 
Next, the relative ratings were sorted into descending order in both conditions. This was 





Relative creativity ratings in the ‘best 
ideas’ condition (ranks) 












miLES 5 9.38 
Intermodal 3 8.83 












School of ideas 6 7.83 
Feel the city 11 7.48 








Movies to the 
park 
15 6.34 
Time capsules 8 6.23 
Note. N=65. Projects are sorted from the 
highest mean ranking to the lowest mean 
ranking. 
Table 26 
Relative creativity ratings in the ‘worst 
ideas’ condition (ranks) 
Project’s name Number 
Mean 
ranking 
Time capsules 8 10.81 
Street signs with 
stickers 
4 10.58 
Movies to the park 15 10.45 
Blogger Cafe 16 10.08 








School of ideas 6 7.04 
Fablab 14 6.94 
Pop-Up Cultural Hub 13 6.77 
Intermodal 3 6.53 
A.R.T.S. (Adaptive 
Reuse of Temporary 
Space) 
12 6.51 
miLES 5 6.34 
SIP Veggie Farm 1 5.79 
Note. N=53. Projects are sorted from the highest 
mean ranking to the lowest mean ranking. 
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The mean rankings were obtained from Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance analysis. 
In the shortlisting task, each participant (n=65 in the 'best ideas' condition and n=53 in the 'worst 
ideas' condition) was to select 6 out of 15 possible projects and rank them. They selected the 6 
idea they were considering as the most/least creative. Consequently, to the remaining 9 projects 
a zero rating was given, indicating that the participant was not interested in including them to 
the shortlist. Since the participants did not use a true ranking order for the projects, the 
coefficient was corrected for ties within raters. 
Using the Kendall’s W analysis, an overall low agreement was found amongst the lay 
participants on which projects to select as part of the 'best ideas' shortlist, as indicated by 
Kendall’s W = 0.11, χ2(14) = 95.61, p < .001. In the ’worst ideas’ condition, a bit higher but still 
low agreement was found, Kendall’s W = 0.19, χ2(14) = 141, p < .001.  
Finally, in the coin allocation task, participants used a budget to weight which projects, 
from the 6 ones they included in their shortlist, should be funded more than the others. To 
analyse the agreement in weighting the projects, the interval scale including the exact number 
of coins (which are displayed in Table 27 and 28) allocated was converted into an ordinal scale. 
The new scale ranked the projects in ascending order, i.e., the project with the first rank received 
the highest amount of funding from the participant. Subsequently, Kendall’s W analyses were 
conducted to detect the degree of agreement regarding the weighting of each project amongst 
the participants. In the 'best ideas' condition, the agreement was tiny, Kendall’s W = 0.06, χ2(14) 
= 54.7, p < .001. In the 'worst ideas' condition, the agreement was twice as big, however, still a 
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Next, it was checked whether the hypotheses could be upheld considering the results.  
(H9) and (H10) were outlined regarding the internal consistency in the ratings. That is, 
we looked whether the different ways of casting creativity ratings would result in the same 
ranking of the projects or not. In the ’best ideas’ condition, there was an overarching agreement 
about the best project (#1, SIP Veggie Farm) regardless of the judgment task. Comparing the 
absolute judgment ratings to the relative ranks, all 6 top projects overlapped, and 2 of them 
were ranked in the same positions (#1 and #3). Comparing the relative ranks to the relative 
weights, 4 projects overlapped but there was no agreement on the ranking positions (except of 
#1). Comparing the absolute judgment ratings to the relative weights, 4 projects overlapped, 
and 2 projects were ranked in the same positions (#1 and #2). 
In the ’worst ideas’ condition, again, there was a consensus regarding which one was 
the worst project (#8, Time capsules). All projects overlapped between the absolute judgments 
and the relative ranks but only #8 was in the same rank position. Contrasting the relative ranks 
with the relative weights, 3 projects overlapped (#8, #4, and #11) but apart from the Time 
capsules, there was no agreement on the ranking positions. Finally, between the absolute 
judgments and the relative weights, 3 projects overlapped (#8, #4, and #11) and the position of 
two projects were identical (#8 and #11). Based on the data, (H9) was confirmed as we found 
the different creativity judgment methods to be sufficiently reliable. (H10) was disproved: 
although 4 and 3 projects overlapped in the best/worst ideas condition, respectively, apart from 
one idea standing out, no agreement was found in the ranking positions. 
Next, the data was analysed according to task condition. While an overlap in the project 
was desired across the different judgment methods, no overlap was expected between the ’best 
ideas’ and the ’worst ideas’ shortlists (H11). The hypothesis was confirmed for the shortlisting 
task (relative ranks). Additionally, we checked the budget allocation task (relative weights) too 
153 
 
but here, there were two projects (#11 Feel the city and #14 Fablab) which were part of both 
the ’should be funded the most’ and the ’should be funded the least’ lists.  
Finally, it was expected that the rankings provided by domain-specific experts and non-
experts would largely overlap (H12). That is, an overlap of at least half of the projects in the best 
six ideas and the worst six ideas was expected between the two groups. As it can be seen from 
Table 4 (presented in Chapter 4), the six most creative projects rated by the domain-specific 
experts are in descending order: miLES, Fablab, SIP Veggie Farm, A.R.T.S., Feel the city, and 
Free Neighbourhood Blocks. The six least creative projects according to them (from worst to 
not that bad): Time capsules, Blogger Café, Street signs with stickers, Movies to the park, 
Intermodal, Pop-Up Cultural Hub. In both conditions, an overlap of four projects was found. In 
the light of the findings, H12 was upheld. 
 
7.2.5 Discussion 
To our knowledge, this study is the first of its kind compare absolute and relative 
judgment methods of creativity. The comparison was necessitated to raise the ecological 
validity of lab experiments - usually, only one or the other approach is applied (e.g., an absolute 
rating scale used by Plucker, Kaufman, Temple, & Qian, 2009; or a relative evaluation 
technique as seen by Kaufman et al., 2008). Here we provided one pool of stimuli to the 
participants, which they then needed to rate in three different ways. What is more, there were 
two task conditions: in one of them, participants had to select the best ideas, while in the other, 
they were instructed to select the worst ideas.  
We found a sufficient degree of reliability across the three rating methods. Participants 
rated the stimuli largely similarly, which is an indirect evidence of them possessing a stable 
internalised concept of creativity. The ranking positions were swapped around between the 
relative ranks and the relative weights tasks, but these might be also due to the nomothetic 
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approach of the research. An analysis of individual differences could show that each participant 
is consistent in rating the ideas. 
Another finding corroborating with this notion is that the best ideas and the worst ideas 
were clearly separated in the shortlists. There was no overlap between the projects in the 6 
highest positions in the shortlisting task.  
Finally, a good agreement was found between the domain-specific experts and the lay 
participants about which ones are the best and the worst ideas in the pool. This evidence is 
supporting the claim that when people are asked to evaluate creativity in a more polarised way 
(i.e., 'which ones are the best ideas based on their creativity?' instead of 'how creative is this 
idea?'), their opinion fall more closely with the experts'.  
In conclusion, non-expert participants were found to possess a stable internalised model 
of creativity, their ratings were reliable even if they needed to make judgments according to 
differing task instructions. By making relative judgments, a good agreement was found between 
the lay and the expert participants.  
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CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
8.1 Overview 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the basis on which people with and without relevant 
expertise evaluate creative ideas. In six experiments, experts’ and non-experts’ judgment was 
examined regarding urban design. Two experiments established the expert ratings of the stimuli. 
Further two experiments explored the extent to which non-experts relied on four features 
(originality, utility, scalability, and riskiness) for judging the creativity of novel project ideas 
while the level of motivation was controlled. In another experiment, the effect of providing 
explicit task-related information was tested. A final experiment assessed the differences 
between making relative and absolute judgments about creativity.  
The discussion is structured as follows: first, the key hypotheses, methodologies, and 
the main findings will be summarised. Then, the relevance of these results will be considered: 
based on (a) what they have contributed theoretically and (b) what they are implying practically. 
The theoretical aspect is divided to the appraisal of the full methodology, to the comprehension 
of the results in case of each type of group contributing to this research (non-experts, domain-
general experts, domain-specific experts), and then a global comparison of the results with 
earlier studies. The practical aspect is divided to guidelines on implementing criteria for 
judgment making, a description of optimal environment for evaluating creativity, as well as 
opportunities for optimisation. Once the results and their implications have been assessed, the 
limitations of this research will be catalogued too. The paradigm, the experimental 
manipulations, as well as relevant difficulties characterising the conduct of creativity research 
will be considered. Informed by both the prospects and the constraints, appropriate directions 





In the present research, three broader questions were explored. First, (Q1) in a noisy 
environment, what information do judges use to evaluate creative ideas? What criteria is applied 
internally to form an overall creativity judgment? The thesis research investigated the link 
between creativity-related criteria and overall creativity ratings. Criteria were selected to test to 
what degree can the evaluation of creative ideas be predicted by using them. This is related to 
the second broader question of this thesis, which delves into (Q2) the weighting each one of the 
criteria is carrying towards forming the overall creativity rating. Both domain-general and 
domain-specific criteria were tested, and it was examined whether being original or useful is 
more important in an urban domain. The third large question addressed in this thesis (Q3) was 
seeking to understand how certain contextual factors influence creative idea evaluation. Three 
research themes emerged, each of them was studied in a separate empirical chapter. Namely, it 
was investigated how the level of motivation, the amount of available information about the 
study, and the manner in which the rating is cast influences the evaluation of creative ideas. 
 
These questions were imposed because there is little known about the basis on which 
creative ideas are judged. Creativity research suffers from the 'criterion problem' (McPherson, 
1963, Shapiro, 1970), which makes the measurement of the concept troublesome (the details of 
this are discussed in Chapter 2 and 3). As other research paradigms of creativity (cf., Long, 
2014), the present paradigm also applied creativity-related criteria to approximate creativity. 
However, the four selected criteria, originality, utility, scalability, and riskiness, were not used 
to substitute a creativity score. Instead, they were used to see to what extent can these values 
predict an overall creativity rating provided by an evaluator. Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 provided 
an overview about the main issues regarding the judgment making about creativity. Briefly put, 
using experts’ estimates for assessing creativity is not an optimal solution but the best we have 
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at hand. The aim of this research was to further unfold the yet ineffable evaluation process by 
identifying and quantifying relevant criteria using a novel paradigm.  
Overall, our procedure included a diverse toolkit of creativity measurements. Four 
creativity-related criteria were combined: two of them were extracted from the consensual 
definition of creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 2012) and they were expected to be the primary 
driving forces behind the judgments. The second two criteria were selected based on practical 
grounds - they were reckoned by investors while evaluating creative ideas (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2000). It was assumed that the rating of a criterion is in a linear relationship with 
judging an idea as creative and it was probed using the Lens model’s framework whether expert 
judgments can be used as proxy measures for the criteria.  
To break more ground for the modelling process, pilot work was started with predictions 
drawn from the literature and from anecdotal evidence, and an equal weighting was given to 
the features as the null hypothesis. Apart from the criteria, expert ratings were used as a proxy 
to creativity. Although this method is the gold standard of measuring creativity (Carson, 2006), 
using expert ratings was found to be a problematic proxy for creativity research. In the present 
research, expert judgment was applied with a twist: instead of using qualitative analyses or 
Likert-scales for the assessment, the judges' opinion was captured on a visual analogue scale 
comprising of a 0-100 interval scale. Finally, a data-driven methodology was also employed, 
as the expressed and the implemented conceptualizations of creativity were contrasted with 
each other using frequency analysis. Participants had to list what counts as creative to them 
(expressed values), which was then compared with how they evaluated the criteria 
(implemented values). 
As for the contextual factors, the ones related to the typical problems associated with 
performing a complex, daunting task were focused on. First, participants were offered with 
various incentives to align their cognitive efforts. The impact of motivation on creative 
158 
 
evaluation was investigated. From the feedback received, it turned out that lay judges cannot 
enhance their performance due to a lack of confidence and understanding regarding what 
creativity is exactly and how it should be evaluated. Thus, explicit information was supplied to 
the participants before embarking on the task to see whether that would help the judgment 
making process and ease the frustration. Despite of implementing such a manipulation, 
judgments did not become more certain, neither the task performance more similar to those of 
the experts. The next 'candidate' source of problem was the available meta-information on the 
specific task. It was checked whether declaring that the task is to 'evaluate creativity' and not 
only to 'make judgments on various factors' would confuse participants already, or even make 
them anxious regarding the task, resulting in less systematic creativity ratings as compared to 
other, more frequently practised ratings. Finally, after investigating the absolute judgments of 
creativity extensively, the scope of the investigation was extended to gain more ecological 
validity. It was probed whether it is easier, more difficult or the same to evaluate creativity in a 
'standalone' version or by rating a batch of projects together. The latter seemed to be more 
frequently applied in everyday judgments of creativity, thus the consistency of creativity 
judgments was examined: are they differently provided in contrast to evaluating projects 
independently from each other? 
The findings of the set of studies carried out were partly confirming our hypotheses 
outlined in Chapter 4 and partly revealed some unexpected insights. The mini-discussions 
dedicated to the interpretations of the results at the end of each empirical chapter already 
touched upon the key takeaways of the presented research, but this chapter will further 




8.2 Main Findings 
The main findings of this thesis can be summarised with respect to five notions. 
The first one is titled as ’opening the black box’. While people without relevant expertise 
in a certain domain were deemed previously as such who would make noisy, unreliable 
judgments about creativity, our findings suggest that they are in fact possessing a robust 
internalised model of creativity. In Chapter 5, based on the ratings of four creativity-related 
criteria which participants gave ‘subjectively’, 51.9% and 41.5% (in Experiment 1 and 2, 
respectively) of the variance in the creativity ratings could be explained. In Chapter 7, a 
sufficient degree of reliability was found across the three rating methods. This means that 
participants rated creativity consistently, regardless of the method in which they were asked to 
cast their ratings. Additionally, separate groups of lay participants had a good agreement on 
which projects are the best and the worst in a given pool of ideas. The best and the worst ideas 
were clearly separated in the shortlists, i.e., there was no overlap between the projects in the 6 
highest positions in the shortlisting task.  
The second one is titled as ‘function is key’. In Chapter 5, the parameter estimate of 
utility was more than twice as large for the prediction of creative ideas as the parameter estimate 
of originality. This finding was interpreted as the lay participants’ preference for usefulness in 
a domain of functional creativity (Cropley & Cropley, 2005, 2008). In other words, judging 
proposals about urban design evoked an enhanced weighting for functionality and impact. This 
explanation was also supported by the analysis of lay participants’ expressed creativity 
conceptions (Chapter 4). When they were asked “what is creativity to you?” in general, without 
the influence of the stimuli, originality was mentioned the most frequently, many more times 
than utility. Although this measure was confounded by the task instruction implying originality 
as one of the possible answers, the difference between the frequency of the recalls was so large 
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that originality can be assumed to be a more integral part of lay participants’ spontaneous 
creativity definition than usefulness, feasibility, or any other concept related to utility.  
The third one is titled as ‘usual judgment making manipulations do not work here’. 
Chapter 5 and 6 listed several attempts of finding methods which would make lay people more 
similar to experts in judging creativity. Neither the manipulation of motivation, the 
metacognition about creativity, or providing explicit information about the criteria changed the 
way how lay people judged creative ideas. A possible explanation for the lack of change in the 
ratings might be that below a certain level of competence, using incentives and other 
manipulations cannot prompt a substantial change. It is speculated that participants want to do 
their best and even if they receive extra information on what they should do, they will still not 
know how to do it. Further, it might not be a fair expectation from lay participants to ask them 
to rate creative products as experts do. The next notion outlines the reasons for this. 
The fourth point is titled as ‘both experts and non-experts make subjective judgments, 
but experts are more informed’. As discussed above, attempts were futile in aligning non-expert 
participants with our expert pool (Chapter 5 and 6). Chapter 4 and 7 showed that the ratings of 
domain-general and domain-specific experts differed too. Apart from utility being key for 
creativity, there was hardly any agreement between the domain-general experts and the non-
experts. Specifically, it was found that when experts rated the creativity of the projects, their 
weighting of utility and riskiness but not their ratings of originality and scalability predicted 
non-experts’ creativity judgments (Chapter 5). Domain-specific experts were not found to 
inform their judgments using the four features. Although there is no clear explanation for this, 
it can be speculated based on the domain-specific experts’ qualitative responses that prior 
holistic experiences shaped their judgment more than individual feature ratings. It might be the 
case that the features are not simply added to each other but are interfering with each other 
while forming an overall judgment. E.g., legislative regulations were mentioned as determining 
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factors, which affect both the scalability and the riskiness features. It must be also noted that 
the evidence from the thesis research does not allow for making sweeping statements: the 
domain-specific expert sample was small and heterogenous, therefore the influence of 
individual preferences and biases might have reached a greater magnitude. Additionally, 
domain-general experts’ utility ratings could predict domain-specific experts’ creativity ratings, 
which suggests that utility is the main driving force behind making judgments about functional 
creativity. Combining these two results, the conclusion is that domain-specific experts have a 
different internal conceptualization of functional creativity than novices and domain-general 
experts. They are affected by their specific experiences and do not rely on adding up individual 
features for forming holistic judgments. Also, there are many kinds of domain-specific expertise 
and each should be studied in homogenous groups to delineate the underlying effects. 
Chapter 3 considered the measurement issues and went into extensive details about the 
feasibility of using expert judgments as the criterion of creativity. There, the conclusion was 
that according to the logic of how concepts are measured in psychological science, expert 
judgment is one of the best proxies available, even if not an optimal one, for the ‘true state’ of 
creativity. This is because all judgments of creativity are subjective but domain-specific experts 
are possessing the most information for making accurate predictions about creativity. However, 
both descriptive data and agreement measures of the domain-specific experts’ ratings showed 
a large variance in the creativity ratings, making the ratings no good substitutes for the criterion 
values. 
The other requirement of conducting the Lens model analysis is that experts and non-
experts must use the same cues to inform their judgments. This was tested while treating both 
experts and non-experts as participants providing two sets of judgments. Non-expert and the 
domain-specific expert participants of this research were not found to inform their judgments 
based on the same criteria. While non-expert participants were found to incorporate all four 
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cues (features) to their judgments made about creativity, no evidence supported that domain-
specific experts would be using any of the cues. A silver lining might be the finding from 
Chapter 7, in which more agreement was found between experts and non-experts if the task 
was to make relative, not absolute, judgments about creativity. Selecting the best and the worst 
ideas in the pool, i.e., evaluating creativity in a more polarised manner, streamlined the lay 
judgments more with expert judgments than previous efforts. (It might be that lay participants 
are more familiar with this type of task.) 
Finally, the fifth notion is titled as ‘a more creative approach is necessary to move 
creativity research forward’. This section shortly recaps what are the novel methods and 
findings in this thesis. First, in Chapter 5, using the four creativity-related features and linear 
models to predict creativity, a bigger proportion of the variance could be accounted for than in 
previous studies. Second, a new insight was gained on lay people’s creativity model. As 
outlined in the same chapter, previously, non-experts were thought as those who would receive 
meaningful data as input but would generate noisy and unreliable creativity judgments as 
output. We looked into the ‘black box’ and found that although there are vast individual 
differences regarding the judgment of creativity, non-experts have a robust internalised model 
of it. Third, a new model was suggested as a potential method to compare experts’ and non-
experts’ information utilisation regarding creative ideas. In Chapter 3, Brunswik’s (1952) Lens 
model was considered as a novel method for creativity assessment. Fourth, the first comparison 
was provided about making absolute vs. relative judgments regarding creativity in a within-
subjects design (Chapter 7) and comforting results were found: a large overlap was observed 
between the results obtained from the two methods. And finally, using spontaneous recalls of 
lay participants’ creativity concepts, two additional features were identified which could be 
used as creativity-related criteria in future studies about judging creative ideas: ‘cleverness’ and 
‘artisticness’ (Chapter 4). 
163 
 
In the next two sections, I discuss both the theoretical and the practical implications of 
the results. 
 
8.3 Theoretical Contribution 
First, the thesis investigated the mechanisms behind the subjective nature of creativity 
evaluations. Creativity is measured up to previous experiences, thus, its judgment is relative 
because the extent in which something is seen as creative does not solely depend on the product 
but on the interaction between the product and its evaluator (Csíkszentmihályi, 1999). The 
evaluation process is situational and differs from person to person. What can be deduced here 
is that the judgment of creativity is inherently subjective, and that only extremities will be 
judged unanimously (as seen in Chapter 7).  
This thesis set out to look behind the subjective nature of rating creativity and provide 
a model based on which creativity can be predicted better than previously. The most important 
novel finding is that lay people too were found to possess a robust internal model of creativity: 
their creativity ratings could be predicted by looking inside their 'black box', i.e., if their 
perception about the input variables were accounted for (Chapter 5). Also, they were found to 
rate creativity with high consistency across different rating methods (Chapter 7), which 
provided another proof of the reliability of the internal model. The difficulties regarding the 
measurement stem from a theoretical issue: although nowadays there is a growing consensus 
regarding what constitutes creativity (e.g., Runco & Jaeger, 2012), in practice, the judged 
degree of creativity is the result of comparing the product in question with the similar products 
encountered with before. Standard paradigms used in other fields of judgment research, such 
as the Lens model, were not suitable to measure how judgments are informed by cues extracted 
from the environment. Therefore, there is no direct evidence for judges being better, not only 
different judges of creativity than novices. 
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Reasons for why experts are considered as better judges of creativity than those without 
expertise are that a) they have access to a bigger inventory of previously encountered products 
and thus possess a more structured internal model of creativity than laypeople do and b) when 
they encounter a product which cannot be compared to anything they have seen before, then 
they can be more certain that the product is truly extraordinary and creative, while laypeople in 
the same situation would be in doubt whether the creative product is only novel to them or 
would be also novel to an expert. The point here is that while the functionality of an object or 
a proposed plan is something which can be judged based on the knowledge possessed by a lot 
of humans, the judgment of novelty is extremely dependent on the socio-cultural background 
of the judge and this kind of expertise cannot be trained easily. Novelty is experience- and 
timing-specific, thus it is not enough for a judge to recall the relevant information for the 
judgment, but that information will also be turned into a different output value in 2007 and 
2017.  
The perceived amount of risk depends also on the richness of the judge's experience 
(e.g., previous malfunctions can enrich the representation of risk). A person who has been 
troubleshooting a lot can judge future situations more accurately by calculating the risk in those 
dimensions too which might be a blind spot for others. Another aspect here is that there are 
common myths surrounding what creativity means and the folk psychological view of creativity 
involves taking big risks. However, the risk in the present research was not presented in the 
problem selection (where it is preferred to take risks) but in the execution of the solution (where 
it is not). Therefore, the amount of risk desired for an idea to be creative was different by the 
experts and non-experts. Finally, the concept of scalability (interpreted as the potential for 
growth) is a dimension which was included due to experts using it and one which was opaque 
to most of our lay participants. When non-experts were prompted to take this dimension into 
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account, they did a good job with it, but this feature was hardly ever mentioned when asking 
about their internal model of creativity.  
There are quite a few papers assessing the typical fallacies lay people make when 
evaluating creativity (Blair & Mumford, 2007; Dailey & Mumford, 2006; Licuanan et al., 2007; 
Lonergan et al., 2004) and the reasons for these errors are most likely to stem from the 
information deficient state in which non-experts have to cast their ratings as contrasted to the 
experts. Especially since creative products are often complex and therefore difficult to 
understand at the first view, there is a lot of degrees of freedom when it comes to their appraisal. 
Lay people code the available information differently (and are also likely to code the more 
available layers when more layers of interpretation are offered), can recall fewer, and 
sometimes less relevant, items from their memory storage than their expert counterparts, and 
are also speculated to have a less sophisticated internal model comprising of fewer dimensions 
than what experts have. It is no wonder then that the information sampled from the stimulus 
and compared with the personal experiences gets weighed in varied ways, and this weighting 
of the dimensions is the one based on which the judgment is manufactured. Tracing the multiple 
ill-defined steps of evaluating creativity, the likelihood of two persons to rate a creative product 
in the same manner seems low. 
In sum, the theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it investigates the mechanisms 
behind evaluating creativity. Although the aim of cognitive science is to provide explanations, 
there is no good explanation yet of why experts are evaluating creativity differently from non-
experts. Here, a methodology was developed to disentangle how criteria is applied towards 
rating creativity in project proposals. By acquiring this information, the results of the 
investigations can be now placed into the wider matrix of creativity literature. 
This thesis yielded a few findings conflicting the earlier results in the literature. 
Previously, testing the boundary conditions of finding a product as creative (Runco & Charles, 
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1993), originality was reduced to zero in an idea set to control for that dimension. Creativity 
ratings were found to decrease when the number of appropriate ideas in the set increased, which 
is the opposite of the finding in our studies.  
In another study (Caroff & Besançon, 2008), when participants had to rate creativity 
without receiving any special instructions, appropriateness was in a linear relationship with 
creativity. Our results align with this finding, however, when participants of the French study 
received explicit instructions on how to judge creativity, appropriateness did not predict 
creativity anymore. Although whether our manipulation in Chapter 6 can be interpreted as 
providing explicit instructions is up to debate, it must be concluded that the same effect was not 
found in our case.  
Finally, when investigating the internalised creativity model of lay participants, Storme 
& Lubart (2012) found too that novelty is the most frequently mentioned criterion (called as 
expressed value above). The alternative result here is that they replicated the dominance of 
novelty in the experimental task too; in fact, novelty had the highest weight (β = .65) towards 
finding an advertisement creative. In our case, utility was a twice as good predictor of creativity 
than novelty. Although the employed paradigms were largely dissimilar in term of their 
structure and the stimuli presented, obtaining highly conflicting results in different studies 
highlights the issue of generalisability of the research results. 
 
8.4 Practical Implications 
First, the applicability of the present paradigm is discussed, then, the applicability of 
using expert judgments for the evaluation of creativity. Finally, guidelines are outlined on how 
to implement criteria for judgment making about creativity. 
To begin, only one paradigm was used in all studies, the one which was newly developed 
as part of the research project. Therefore, its validation is not complete yet. Although face 
validity is high, criterion validity should be tested further. Next, both the convergent and the 
167 
 
discriminant validity of the paradigm should be studied by contrasting the present paradigm 
with other related paradigms. However, to our current knowledge, there is no other paradigm 
which would be tightly linked with the one presented here. This paradigm achieves a direct 
measurement of creativity using visual analogue scales, while the stimuli simulate the 
environment in containing both relevant cues and distractor words. Therefore, the potential pool 
of related studies is narrow and on top of this, the findings obtained from different creativity-
related domains are hardly comparable (Long, 2014). Given our paradigm is linked to the 
domain of urbanism, critical decisions could be difficult to draw if only supported by the data 
acquired from a different domain due to the domain-specific nature of creative performance. 
Nevertheless, there are several things which can be deduced based on the findings obtained 
using this paradigm. 
If we look at the mean rating associated with each project (Table 3), it is striking that all 
projects with a low level of utility received mean ratings lower than 50. The same cannot be 
said about novelty: if an idea was feasible, even if not new, it could still earn a relatively high 
mean rating (up to 70). Please note that the project titled 'Time capsules' received the lowest 
creativity rating (M±SD = 29.32±26.19). This project was neither novel nor useful but was low 
on risk and easily scalable in turn. Still, the two projects, which had the same low-novelty, low-
utility parameters, and additionally higher risk and lower scalability, received slightly higher 
mean ratings (see 'Movies to the park' and 'Blogger Café' in Table 3). 
The conclusion here is that the paradigm is still in its early phase; the pool of ideas as 
well as the array of features could be expanded. However, its core principle, which is about 
using ecologically valid stimuli and linear models to predict creativity ratings based on 
creativity-related criteria is simple and effective to use. With obtaining individual data on the 
input variables, the computation process of the output value becomes clearer. The outcome is a 
reduced portion of noise and a higher extent of explained variance in the ratings, which means 
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we are one step closer to a realistic modelling of how people evaluate creative ideas. The 
structure of the task could be also implemented in different domains of creativity, with this 
method, even aesthetic judgments of visual stimuli could be understood better. Applying the 
Theory of Social Judgment to the measurement of creative evaluation would also mean that 
there is a way to directly compare experts' and non-experts' utilization of available cues. Using 
Brunswik's Lens model (1952), it is becoming tangible what are the distinct information sources 
behind the ratings given by the two groups of judges. Testing the same cues to assess experts’ 
and non-experts’ ratings, the weight of each cue becomes comparable. Another plus side is that 
the model can be extended very easily, thus, an unlimited number of features could be fed in as 
fallible cues related to the judgment. 
A bigger question is whether taking expert judgments is the best way to assess how 
creative a product is. If so, then what would be the approximate number of judges required to 
make valid assessments? The present research did not collect data for resolving this issue, 
however, it showed that there is a far-from-perfect agreement amongst domain-specific experts 
and also that lay people can never replace experts, at least in the relatively highly codified 
domain of urbanism. What follows from this is that if researchers wish to use experts as 
„assessment tools” of creativity, then they need to convince at least one, and ideally multiple, 
group(s) of experts to volunteer for the study. A group is recommended because it seems that 
only a pool of similarly sampled participants is providing similar ratings. Further, contrasting 
the ratings obtained from multiple groups of experts could shed light on both the reliability and 
the validity of the judgments. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that achieving such a desirable 
state is difficult. Then, empirical research efforts should be made towards testing what would 
be the rule-of-thumb on using experts, and this side of the assessment should be standardised; 
the sooner, the better. An alternative of using high quality evaluators for the assessment could 
be potentially (so only in some cases) to use a high quantity of evaluators. Here the idea is that 
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a) there are domains of creativity, such as the performing arts or the innovation of common 
products, where lay people are the main consumers of the products and therefore their 
preference should be served at least partly and b) with modern technology, accessing a big pool 
of people is no longer an issue. This is how crowdsourcing evaluations and recruiting judges of 
idea markets is turning into a trend (Mollick & Nanda, 2014; Soukhoroukova, Spann, & Skiera, 
2012). Recently, massive data sets became available to researchers, so evidently it is easier to 
create algorithms which can analyse the hard metrics of an ecologically valid data set than 
spending a lot of time and effort on trying to recruit scarce and expensive human labour to 
produce such metrics. 
Finally, after exploring what the future will bring, let us turn back to the present. Based 
on the research presented in this thesis, a handful of guidelines can be plotted for real-life 
evaluations. Creators should note that in the domain of urbanism, function is above all and 
developing a novel design can never happen at the expense of usefulness. On a similar note, 
evaluators should take into account that if time is scarce or they do not have the resources to 
give an overarching feedback to the creator, then they should start with appraising the 
usefulness of the product as that one is the crucial dimension which needs to be prioritised. This 
means that the outer appearance of the product is, at least in principle, inferior to functionality 
of the product. Another thing evaluators should aim for is making a comprehensive registry of 
their judgment criteria. Both a holistic impression of creativity, likely to be given on a ratio or 
an ordinal scale, and creativity-related criteria should be registered. For the latter, Cropley & 
Kaufman (2012, 2013) developed a domain-general tool which includes a large-scale inventory 
of potential rubrics. Once a substantial amount of data becomes available for analysis, with the 
linear models presented in Chapter 5, it will get traceable what sub-components of creativity 
are the most influential to perceive a product as creative, and this information can be fed back 
to forthcoming tenders as production criteria. Funding criteria can also be informed by the 
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properties which are most typical of products later deemed as creative. Turning now to the 
interest of companies and other businesses, one recommendation would be to not to spend a lot 
of resources on trying to train people with absolutely no expertise to quickly become 
comparable to experts in creativity assessment. Chances are good they will not, especially if 
the training includes written instructions instead of hands-on experience. On the other hand, the 
evaluation of creativity can be optimised in an environment where a) the goal for which the 
product is created is clear to all, b) the criteria for the assessment is already provided to the 
creators at the time of the production, and c) the shaping of an idea or product can be followed 
through the entire production process and feedback from the evaluator can be provided multiple 




The research presented here is an original contribution to the field, which yields both 
strengths and weaknesses. This section is about the latter. As the issues with the validity of the 
new paradigm developed for the present purposes is already discussed in the Practical 
implications section of this chapter, these concerns will be not repeated here. 
Another concern regarding our newly developed methodology is that while it gets 
beyond the prior research efforts in scrutinizing what is underlying the differences between the 
perception of creativity across experts and non-experts, it does not register all the steps of the 
spontaneous process through which a judgment is formed. The paradigm proposed in Ch. 3 was 
not suitable for studying how cues support the forming of a judgment about creativity. It can 
only be assumed that the relevant information gets extracted from the presented text by 
detecting it during the provided reading time. Further, even if the relevant information is 
perceived by the participant, that is still no guarantee that the information bit gets used for 
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making the judgment, or even if so, that it gets used in the 'correct' way, i.e., with an appropriate 
weighting. 
Another issue concerns the judges who use the information extracted from the stimulus. 
Namely, one could criticise that the test-retest reliability of judges has been not tested in any of 
the experiments. It has been not tested whether the judges would make the same ratings if their 
task would be to rate the same trials multiple times. This is not only due to the constraint of 
time and resources; a major limitation of our paradigm is that it only includes a few trials 
(N=15), moreover, the project proposals are quite memorable, so it would not make sense to 
present them repeatedly. Given that there is considerable variability in the judgments given 
about creativity (for details, see Chapter 2), the reliability of the judges must be checked. This 
issue was overcome by conducting a replication study was conducted to probe whether the task 
performance would be stable on a group level. The results confirmed that the ratings are vastly 
similar even if different samples are tested. Thus, although the reliability of individual judges 
was not followed up, the reliability of the ratings was examined on a group level. 
A further issue with this research is an assumption which was made about it. The 
motivation behind the studies was to identify criteria and/or factors which enable people to 
evaluate creative ideas efficiently, ultimately, to equip lay judges with tools to become more 
similar to expert judges. The search for such tools is based on the tacit notion that such tools do 
exist, i.e., practising for multiple thousand hours is not the only way to become reasonable good 
at evaluating creative ideas but a proxy can be found for expertise. Thus, we set out to find a 
method which would align the ratings given by judges without expertise largely with those who 
have expertise. In judgment making research, the manipulations used in the presented studies 
usually work (e.g., Chang, Chen, Mellers, & Tetlock, 2016; Donovan, Güss, & Naslund, 2015; 
Kudryavtsev, & Pavlodsky, 2012). However, when applying classical manipulations to the 
present framework, the results included from zero to moderate effects. At this point, it is open 
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to debate whether the observed effects are due to the actual manipulations not being optimally 
designed (assuming that other manipulations could achieve the desired outcome) or to the 
evaluation process not being pliable to the same manipulations which are usually used in 
judgment and decision-making research. Conducting more research, including both other 
manipulations using this paradigm and using the same manipulations on other creative 
evaluation paradigms, could bring some enlightenment for this issue. 
 
8.6 Directions for Future Research 
The findings of the research in this thesis warrant possibility for conducting multiple 
types of follow-up research. Regarding the open questions, qualitative information could be 
collected to shape future quantitative studies. Theoretical and practical issues, especially blank 
spots and found inconsistencies, should also be tackled.  
First, our experimental manipulations were drawn mostly by relying on prior protocols 
of judgment making research. Although trying them has led to many insights, they were not 
sufficient to cover all key differences between how non-experts and experts judge creativity. 
Remarkably, domain-specific experts were found to not use the same features which domain-
general experts used to inform their judgments (see Chapter 4 and 5). Thus, before conducting 
further quantitative studies to explore what's in the shadow of their decisions, qualitative studies 
should be carried out to gain a deeper understanding of domain-specific experts’ perception of 
creativity. It is acknowledged that accessing such experts is not easy, however, with good 
timing and a bit of luck, one could collect invaluable information. Our research granted the 
insight that instead of trying to approach experts one-by-one, it is a more valid and perhaps less 
time-consuming strategy to arrange data collection with a group of experts. This group may be 
formed by participating in a common cause - specific conferences might be good places to 
approach experts, as well as ongoing competitions might grant a good opportunity to observe 
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how decisions are made outside the lab environment (examples of this could be administering 
multiple short interviews during the evaluation process, at each stage of filtering the 
participants, or administering structured interviews at the beginning and after the final decision 
with curators of creative products). The interviews could guide the researcher's attention to 
systematic social and cognitive factors lying beneath the seemingly subjective decisions. 
Second, there are several theoretical concerns needing resolution. Although basic 
research is dedicating a lot of resources to find out how the relevant information is filtered out 
from a noisy environment (e.g., Peelen, & Kastner, 2014), no previous study has addressed this 
issue specifically in creativity research. Even if the complex integration of information cannot 
be made visible to researchers, there are excellent methodologies already to register up to a 
certain point how the information is being scanned into the system. That is, an eye tracking 
study should be conducted to find the exact words participants spend longer time processing 
(also those which are overlooked by them albeit containing crucial information), then these 
words could be clustered to features. This would be a data-driven, bottom-up way to create 
features and could be complemented with the data obtained from interviewing the experts about 
what aspects are central to their judgments in general. Another study could determine how many 
and which additional features should be introduced, based on the frequency with which the 
features are used. The optimal number of features could be explored by factor analysis, then 
pilot studies using the selected features could establish the ranking of the features, as they 
contribute to the judgment making with different weights.  
It should be also tested what is the basis of most studies finding a moderate-to-strong 
inter-rater reliability (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Cheng, Wang, Liu, & Chen, 2010) among experts 
about how to rate creative ideas, while the domain-specific experts with 10-35 years of 
experience participating in the thesis research showed almost no agreement at all. A not-yet-
investigated explanation might be that there are factors other than expertise which influence the 
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consensus across experts. These moderating variables should be mapped, as they might bring 
us closer to understanding the specific role which expertise plays in evaluating creativity. Given 
the lack of empirical evidence, one can only speculate and rely on hunches to establish what 
the confounding variables might be. One suspect behind the agreement amongst a group of 
people could be their group membership, or more generally speaking, the sampling of 
participants. An empirical study should compare the consensus amongst experts rating the same 
stimuli if they are member of the same group as compared to half of them or all of them not 
sharing any group membership. While keeping the degree of expertise constant, it is assumed 
that experts sharing group membership would agree more with each other. Another study could 
investigate whether experts and non-experts evaluate creative ideas more similarly if they share 
group memberships (such as religious or political views but not expertise related to the domain) 
as compared to the data presented in this thesis, where they do not.  
Third, while the current research protocol is to ask experts to rate the 'actual amount of 
creativity' in a product, even experts often err (e.g., Harry Potter was first rejected several times 
by publishing houses as mentioned by Licuanan et al., 2007). One proposition to correct for this 
is to run studies to determine a rule of thumb of how many judges are needed (approximately) 
in a certain domain to judge creative products with a sufficient validity. Another proposition 
would be to run more explorative studies outside the lab and measure which creative ideas are 
the most viable when implementing the criteria in a realistic situation. „Crowd evaluation” of 
ideas is becoming more and more popular (e.g., Soukhoroukova, Spann, & Skiera, 2012) and 
apart from the number of judges, the number of measurement points can be also increased. 
Regarding the current paradigm, an example would be to rate the project proposals' creativity 
from their first pitch through the final realization of the project. A good opportunity for doing 
something like this could be a start-up competition, where different project ideas are competing 
(or a hackathon, where different solutions compete with each other to solve the same problem). 
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After an initial evaluation, the projects should be monitored at regular intervals to gain metrics 
about how creative they were perceived by the investors and by the public. This would yield 
simultaneously acquired data points from both experts and non-experts. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis set out to start filling the gap in knowledge regarding the 
cognitive mechanisms behind the judgments made about creativity. In a series of experiments, 
factors and conditions were searched for which could enhance the detection of creative ideas. 
People with and without expertise in urban design were compared with each other based on 
how they evaluate creative ideas. A novel methodology was created, with which different 
aspects of information processing were manipulated to see how these variables influence lay 
people’s and experts’ judgment making process. 
First, non-experts' evaluations of creativity were modelled based on four related features 
(originality, utility, scalability, and riskiness). Their judgment of creativity relied significantly 
on all four characteristic features when rated by themselves and the amount of explained 
variance was substantial. We found that in project proposals related to cities, functionality was 
preferred above all - utility was twice as likely to predict creativity ratings than the originality 
of the product. These findings were replicated, and good reliability was found on a group level. 
The results suggest that experts and non-experts disagree in almost all aspects of assessment 
except of the perceived utility of a product. 
When accounting for the individual differences in the input variables, non-experts were 
found to possess a robust internal model of creativity – despite previous research classifying 
them as making noisy, random choices. This notion was further confirmed by contrasting 
absolute with relative judgment making: lay people provided consistent ratings. In general, 
there was a substantial overlap between the selection of best and worst ideas even if they were 
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sorted in various ways, however, a full agreement in the ranking positions was only found by 
the extremities. Providing different task instructions did not make a solid difference in the 
creativity ratings. 
Overall, the ‘black box of creativity assessment’ was opened and it was shown that 
although the judgments made about creativity are subjective due to drawing the value from an 
interaction between the creator and the evaluator, objective measurement tools accounting for 
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Table S1  
Levels of features in the projects based on the categorical judgments of experts 
Project’s 
name 









 2 High High High Low 
Intermodal  3 High High Low High 
Street Signs 
With Stickers 
 4 High Low High High 
miLES  5 Low High High High 
School of ideas  6 High High Low Low 
Sidewalk 
Chalk Arts 
 7 High Low Low High 




 9 High Low Low Low 
Not applicable!  10 Low Low Low High 
Feel the city  11 High Low High Low 
A.R.T.S.  12 Low High Low High 
Pop-up 
Cultural Hub  
 13 Low  High High Low 
Fablab  14 Low High Low Low 
Movies to the 
park 
 15 Low Low High Low 











Founded by Eric Ho, miLES (made in the Lower East Side) seeks a better way to utilize 
underused storefronts and "turn them into vibrant community hubs for working, learning, 
connecting, and starting up new projects". The platform is notorious, works just like Airbnb 
and Zipcar: people can rent out a service from an online database for temporary use. 
miLES, likewise to its competition, opens up storefronts to new possibilities by changing short-
term multi-use spaces into community hubs (such as a studio, classroom, cinema, library, etc.). 
There are more than 200 vacant storefronts in the Lower East Side and this ratio is typical for 
other cities, too. The project is trusted and funded by both local committees and successful 
crowdfunding campaigns. The service is getting more and more popular and is looking at a 
bright future. 
 
All stimuli can be downloaded from the Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/r3xch/?view_only=5a78847982ad434ea66167cbb8c9b861    
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